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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) – also named “Unmanned Aircraft Systems” – have gained a 
significant importance in recent years due to their operational effectiveness and efficiency with 
respect to manned aircraft, becoming a relevant part of the current aviation world. UAS role is 
destined to further increase considering the challenge of their integration in civil airspaces, that 
would open a new range of missions with a consequent broad diffusion of UASs. In order to reach 
this goal, however, a series of improvements shall be brought to the current systems, that suffer of a 
poor reliability with respect to manned aircraft. At this purpose, analyzing the past mishaps, one of 
the main causes is the poor Human Machine Interface (HMI). The Human Factor is in fact 
particularly critical in unmanned systems, due to the physical separation between human and 
vehicle, and to the different function allocation between user and automation. Therefore proper 
solutions shall be adopted in order to keep adequately the human operator inside the control loop, 
providing a high situational awareness and an affordable workload.  
At this purpose, the doctorate – done jointly by the “Politecnico di Torino” and “Alenia Aermacchi” 
– has regarded the study of an innovative HMI relatively to a Flight Management System (FMS) for 
a MALE UAS Ground Control Station (GCS). FMS can be thought as the “brain” of a manned 
aircraft, since it is responsible to manage several functions: navigation, trajectory prediction, flight 
planning, performance computation/optimization, guidance, communication and aircraft 
configuration. Many of these functions are already performed on current UASs, but with a lower 
level of integration and performances with respect to that offered by a FMS. A FMS for unmanned 
system, introduces some peculiarities with respect to classical manned implementations, both in 
terms of architecture (due always to the physical separation between operator and vehicle) and 
performed functions (e.g. autonomous replanning). In any case the critical element is again the 
Human Machine Interface, since also in airliner operations the great quota of FMS related incidents 
is due to human factor problems. 
As design constraints for the FMS development, the civil certification and interoperability 
requirements have been considered. In particular, the interoperability is always more required for 
UAS in order to reduce the operative costs and enhance the mission effectiveness in terms of 
exploitation, dissemination and analysis of gathered data. To implement it, the STANAG 4586 has 
been followed as reference standard to define the communication protocol between GCS and 
vehicle. As a consequence of this requirement and taking into account also the need to realize and 
easily upgrade system for future improvements, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) has been 
implemented, with an as much as possible parametric and modular structure. In particular, a 
significant innovation is represented by the adoption of touchscreens, that provides a more 
instinctive interaction and high flexibility to the interface. 
Put together UAS HMI issues, current manned FMS HMI problems, design constraints and 
touchscreen issues, the development of an innovative interface has been very challenging. More in 
detail, the work on the HMI formats has not been limited to the design of the GUI, but has involved 
the definition of the operative concept of the FMS, the decision of the functions to include in the 
new system, their allocation between user and system, and finally the link between graphic controls 
and STANAG 4586 protocols. Besides the studied GUI has been integrated in a real GCS, 
following a test process involving different environments with an incremental level of integration: 
GCS sub system rig, UAS system rig, ground tests on the real system and finally the flight tests.  
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Enlarging the HMI concept to the human-automation interaction, some advanced mission planning 
algorithms have been designed and integrated in the GCS. Mission planning is a FMS function, and 
for UASs it acquires particular relevance since it is one of key factors in the determination of 
system Level Of Automation (LOA). Planning a mission is in fact a complex task due to the 
number of involved parameters – especially for mission replan – and hence a system support in 
terms of automatic options during manual planning or autonomous replanner represents a 
significant added value in reducing the operator workload and increasing the operational 
performances. These algorithms, in particular, have been studied from the operative and functional 
standpoints: which functions shall be performed, the paradigms and parameters to consider in each 
computation, or how the human operator interacts with these algorithms are examples of treated 
items and of considered standpoint in the research activity.  
The thesis structure follows the work approach, starting from a preliminary analysis of the involved 
issues and then presenting the developed interface. More in detail, “Chapter 1” introduces the 
concept of UAS, providing the relative definition, history, assigned missions, an introduction to the 
different ways with which an unmanned vehicle can be controlled, certification and operator role 
issues. It is a sort of introduction to the world of unmanned, and it provides the key concepts to 
understand the operative and normative context in which the research activity has been performed. 
“Chapter 2” presents the manned aviation FMS, providing a description of each performed 
functions, of FMS interfaces in the cockpit and finally of current systems problems, due essentially 
to HMI lacks. The chapter is concluded with an analysis of how a traditional FMS can be adapted 
for an UAS, providing in particular a function allocation between ground and airborne segments. 
Linking to the FMS problems, “Chapter 3” presents the UAS HMI deficiencies, analyzing their 
contribution in past mishaps and to the lower UAS reliability with respect to manned aircraft. The 
general concepts of workload and situational awareness are introduced as starting base from which 
analyzing each UAS specific human factor issues (the different role of the automation included). 
“Chapter 4” is an extending of “Chapter 3” relatively to the human automation relation, crucial for 
UASs. Starting from definition of automation, automatism, autonomy and artificial intelligence, the 
concept of Level Of Automation and the relative measuring scales are presented, passing then to the 
paradigm of Human Supervisory Control and to the most critic human-automation interaction 
issues. References to their occurrence in manned aircraft are included. The chapter is concluded 
with the presentation of the RAFIV model - chosen representation of human-FMS interactions at 
cognitive level – from which practical considerations about improvements of current interfaces are 
drawn. 
“Chapter 5” explains the STANAG 4586, the adopted reference standard for the interoperability 
implementation. It results therefore a sort of bridge between the preliminary analytic part of the 
work and the practical implementation. Starting from the Level Of Interoperability (LOI) concept, 
the system architecture to adopt in order to realize the desired LOI, the standard protocol message 
structure and the suggested STANAG implementation of guidance-planning-navigation-trajectory 
prediction functions are presented. The chapter ends with a list of current STANAG 4586 
limitations and possible future improvements emerged during the work. 
“Chapter 6” introduces the second part of the thesis relative to the new HMI development. The 
chapter starts with a detailed work scope about the research activity and the relativant flow chart 
(linking to UAS FMS function allocation of Chapter 2), passing then to a presentation of high level 
requirements from which the study is started and the consequent new HMI architecture. In 
particular, the choice of touchscreens as FMS input devices and resistive technology as touchscreen 
type are motivated, presenting advantages and disadvantages of each available options. 
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“Chapter 7” is relative to the HMI style guide, that is the followed guidelines in the GUI 
development. Starting from the definition of User Centered Design (i.e. design philosophy in which 
the final user is at the center of the system development), generic HMI heuristics derived from 
technical literature and specific rules of our project are presented. Particularly relevance is given to 
specific graphical solutions for touchscreens. 
“Chapter 8” presents the HMI design of vehicle control related functions, that is: guidance, 
navigation (included trajectory prediction), vertical profile, communications and system 
configuration. Operative, functional and graphics issues are treated in detail for each format. 
“Chapter 9” is relative to the mission planning. Starting from the basic definition provided by the 
STANAG 4586, the concept of mission is exploited adding also elements non relative to the 
communication protocols, passing then to the analysis of different planner/replanner types and to 
present general planning algorithm issues. The chapter is concluded with the presentation of 
functional and graphic design of the GCS embedded mission planner and the navigation format on 
TSD map.  
“Chapter 10” is relative to the planning algorithms. Starting from an algorithm work scope, each 
function is then presented. 
“Chapter 11” concludes the research activity presentation, reporting the process of testing and 
integration. In particular, the peculiarities of each test environment are presented.  
At the end, the thesis conclusions are reported. 
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1 UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
1.1 Definition 
Although the most visible element is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), it is more correct to 
consider an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). In particular, according to the STANAG 4586 
(standard for UAV interoperability), the following elements (see Fig.1) can be distinguished in a 
UAS [1]: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. UAS Elements 
 
Main distinction is between the ground based elements and the airborne (on-board) ones, linked 
together by the datalink. Entering more deep in the Ground Segment, the core is the Ground Control 
Station (GCS), from which the operators control one or more vehicles. GCS can be situated in a 
room, integrated in a shelter, put on a carrier (e.g. a cross country vehicle, a ship or a manned 
aircraft), or hosted on a laptop, according to the specific UAS. Besides, there are stations from 
which it is possible to control only the payload and not the vehicle, and vice versa. Mission 
Planning and Data Exploitation stations are “optional”, but they are usually provided for advanced 
systems. Launch & Recovery equipment are typically feature of “little” UAVs that are not able to 
perform conventional take off and landing or as provision for short take off and landing. Logistic 
support is fundamental for the system operability, and it means for example the ground power unit.  
Airborne segment, instead, is made up basically by an UAV and the relative payloads, with the 
provision to control more vehicles from a single GCS. In particular, a UAV must not be confused 
with ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles, also if many technologies are 
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common [2]. In fact, according to the STANAG 4586 [1] and the “Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Roadmap 2005-2030” [2], there is the following definition for an UAV: 
 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to 
provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, 
and can carry a lethal or non lethal payload. 
 
Finally, datalink subsystem is divided in Ground and Air Data terminals. Many times there are two 
datalinks for the Line Of Sight (LOS) communication: one for the Vehicle Command and Control 
(C2) functions and the other for the payloads (control and data streaming). In case of Beyond Line 
Of Sight (BLOS) operations, instead, there are two possible solutions: radio relay or satellite 
communication (most used). Independently by the datalink case the following two channels are 
distinguished for each link: 
• uplink: commands sent on-board from the ground segment, 
• downlink: data sent by the airborne segment to the ground. 
Each of UAS recognized element, off course, varies in size, capability and characteristics according 
to the UAS category, but the general system description is the one previously reported.  
 
 
1.2 History 
Origin of unmanned flight arose from the experiments of the Montgolfier brothers balloons in 1782. 
First practical recorded application was the use of aerostats by Austrian army to attack Venice on 
August 22, 1849. Aerostats were loaded with explosive and launched from the ship “Vulcano”, but 
many of them failed the mission due to a wind change that deviated the balloons back over the 
Austrian lines [3]. Similar use was done by the Northern Union in the America Civil War in 1861-
1865, when incendiary devices where put on aerostats and released toward the Confederate forces 
[4]. Although these applications were far from current idea of UAS, they represent a first attempt to 
use an unmanned flying objects in military applications.  
A further step were the steam powered propeller driven model aircraft built by John Stringfellow 
and William Henson from England in 1848-1868 [4], [5]. Models were wire guided, but during a 
display in the Crystal Palace of London in 1868, a large model triplane was managed to leave the 
wire and flew for a distance [5] (see Fig.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Steam Engine Powered 
Large Model Triplane On Display At The Crystal Palace, London, England – 1868 [5] 
 
 
Another steam model - called Aerodrome Number 5 – was built by Samuel Langley (USA) in 1896, 
and flew for 0.75 mile along the Potomac river [4].  
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In 1883 the first aerial photograph was taken using a camera mounted on a kite and controlled by a 
long string attached to its shutter. Six years later (1889), this technology was practically used in the 
American-Spanish war [6].  
In the aviation age, during the World War I, two prototypes of flying bombs (a sort of forerunner of 
today’s cruise missiles) were developed in USA: the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane (1916) and 
the Kettering Bug (1918) [3] (see Fig.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Kettering Bug [7] 
 
 
Although they were not real UASs, they permitted an improvement in the automatic control 
technologies applied to the aircraft. Control system was based on gyroscopes, barometric altimeter, 
pneumatic/vacuum system ad an electric system. A mechanical device tracked the distance flown in 
order to hit the assigned target [7]. These two aircraft were tested in flight, but they were not used in 
war. In particular the Kettering Bug flew for 50 miles on a preset course in 1918 [4]. 
Between the two World Wars, the research on unmanned vehicles went on. In particular, in UK a 
DH-82B “Queen Bee” were transformed in a radio controlled aircraft, becoming the first reusable 
and returnable UAV. “Queen Bee” was able to fly up to 17000 ft, at over 100 mph for 300 miles [8] 
(see Fig.4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. DH-82B “Queen Bee” [8] 
 
 
In 1930s, radio controlled model where diffused for fighter and anti-aircraft artillery training [3]. In 
particular, in1936, the term “drone” was created in order to indicate a radio controlled aerial target 
by US Navy researchers. 
During World War II, unmanned vehicle use grew. Germany develops the famous V1 (see Fig.5) 
and V2 (1944), first real cruise missiles in the history. Like the Kettering Bug, they are not UAVs in 
the current meaning, but they involved a further and important growth in automatic control 
capability, besides to be a milestone in the missile technology development. They were able to hit 
London starting from their launch sites in France [4]. 
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Figure 5. Fiesler FI 103 V1 [4] 
 
 
Germany also developed two radio controlled glide bomb: the Henschel Hs 293 and the Fritz X. 
They were launched from a mother aircraft and steered toward the target by an operator. Two Fritz 
X, in particular, were used to sank the Italian battleship “Roma” on September 9, 1943 [4].  
On the Allies front, USA developed aerial “torpedo” like the Interstate BQ-4 (see Fig.6), converting 
manned aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Interstate BQ-4 [4] 
 
 
They were used in real operations resulting in 18 hits on Japanese targets [4]. They were radio 
controlled and TV camera guided.  
After the war, converted manned aircraft (prop bomber B-17, prop fighter F-6 and jet fighter P-80) 
were used to monitor nuclear test (1946, 1947, 1951) in order to gather samples in the nuclear cloud 
[3].  
During Vietnam war, the Ryan Model 147 “Lighting Bug” (see Fig.7) performed 3435 
reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and China with 554 UAV lost [3]. It was launched in 
flight and then controlled by a mother C-130 “Hercules”. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ryan Model 147 “Lighting Bug” 
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In 1970s, greater performances reached by satellites, momentary slowed down the UAS 
development in USA (and more general in Occident), limited to few prototypes. Unmanned rebirth 
happened during the Israeli operations in Lebanon in 1980s, where the Scout and Pioneer (see 
Fig.8) UAS were used [9]. They represented the evolution toward the current glider-type UAV 
model [10]. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Pioneer 
 
 
Starting from that years, the role, number and complexity of UAS have increased continuosly, with 
a peak in the last ten years after the Twin Towers attack in 2001. Noteworthy the achievement of 
1,000,000 flight hours by the General Atomic Predator in 2010 (see Fig.9), especially considering 
that in 2006 the flight hours were 80,000 [11]. Very recently also the aim of 2,000,000 flight hours 
has been reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. General Atomics Predator A 
 
 
Currently UASs have reached a good level of maturity, both in terms of operational capability and 
performances, also if the reliability is still lower than manned aircraft. This issue, in particular, is 
very important for the integration of UAS in the civil air traffic, one of the primary milestone of the 
expected UAS roadmap. Another and related point is the increment of automation level of UAS. 
Current UASs have been already developed in order to rely on less on remote manual human 
control, but the trend is to confer more and more authority to the system, especially when a quick 
reaction is required.  
 
 
1.3 UAS classification 
Several UAS classification have been created according to different parameters and criteria, without 
reaching a universal accepted standard. In particular, the NATO Joint Capability Group On 
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Unmanned Aerial System (JCGUAS) classification has been chosen. It proposes an UAS 
classification in which three different classes have been individuated according to the UAV mass 
[12]. Each class is further divided in different categories according to the following parameters: 
- employment, 
- operative altitude, 
- mission radius, 
- primary supported commander in military operations. 
 
 
 
Table 1. JCGUAS UAV Classification table [12] 
 
 
Following chapters are directly referred to the Class III, and in particular to the Medium Altitude 
Long Endurance (MALE) UASs, but many considerations can be applied also to the Class II and in 
part also to Class I. 
In particular, for strike/combat category (Class III) we talk about Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
(UCAV), while the relative system is named UCAS. 
 
1.4 Missions 
Unmanned vehicles have been historically conceived in order to replace humans in the execution of 
the so-called “3D missions”, where the three D are: Dull, Dirty and Dangerous. Dull missions are 
typically represented by long endurance flights and/or repetitive tasks execution. Examples can be 
surveillance mission or long roundtrip phases. In these cases, psycho-physiologic human limitations 
can affect the achievement of mission goals and the effective endurance of the system. With an 
UAS, instead, there are not these problems, since the persistence of the vehicle on the mission area 
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depends only by the aircraft endurance, while the operator turnover in the Ground Control Station 
guarantees correct level of operator vigilance and workload. 
Dirty missions are characterized by operating in a dangerous environment for the operator health, 
characterized for example by radiation, pollution, chemical or biological threats. Example of these 
missions were the nuclear cloud sampling performed by the radio controlled B-17 and F-6 between 
1946-1948, or the recent monitoring activities of the Global Hawk over the Fukushima reactor in 
2011 [13]. 
Finally, Dangerous missions are defined in a military context, where there are several threats to the 
pilot life. In particular the original idea at this purpose was to substitute manned fighter/bomber 
with unmanned vehicles only for the most dangerous tasks like for example the Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) or reconnaissance over highly defense target, but the future trend is to 
increase the role of unmanned aircraft for other missions. At this purpose, 3D concept has been 
enlarged in military field, arriving to define the following mission types: 
• Intelligence 
- Image Intelligence (IMINT), 
- Communication Intelligence (COMINT), 
- Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), 
- Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), 
• Surveillance. 
• Reconnaissance. 
• Unexploded artillery detection. 
• Battle Damage Assessment. 
• Combat mission (generic). 
Besides military field, however, UASs are expected to be used ever more for civil applications. 
Several civil missions in which UASs can provided a significant aid, in fact, have been individuated 
[14], [15]: 
• Security 
- border surveillance, 
- law enforcement, 
- smuggling fighting, 
- big event monitoring. 
• Territory monitoring (e.g. after an earthquake). 
• Searching Task (e.g. shipwrecked or missing persons). 
• Agricultural industry support 
- fertilizer dispersing, 
- pesticide dispersing, 
- crop monitoring. 
• Fisheries support. 
• Environmental control /weather research. 
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• Scientific research support (generic). 
• Mineral Exploration. 
• Coast Monitoring. 
• Pollution detection/monitoring. 
• Telecommunication relays. 
• News broadcasting. 
• Air traffic control over busy airports. 
• Ground traffic control. 
• Sea traffic control. 
• Terrain mapping. 
• Pipeline monitoring. 
• Firefighting. 
 
 
1.5 UAV Control 
According to the system Level Of Automation (LOA), an UAV can be controlled in several ways. 
The problem to define the LOA is complex and it will be discussed in Chapter 4, but just to give an 
initial idea the following vehicle control ways can be identified in Fig.10: 
 
 
 
Figure 10. UAV Control Types 
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In practice, the distinction is not so clear, since an UAV can have the capability to be controlled in 
different ways according to the selected guidance mode, and plus there can be hybrid modes (e.g. an 
automatic guidance to follow a route in the horizontal plane, while the altitude and speed are 
controlled in semiautomatic way by the operator). Each control type involves specific Human 
Machine Interface issues. Autonomous UAVs behave in the same way of automatic ones from the 
standpoint of vehicle control. Automatic and Autonomous behaviors are distinguished by the 
allocation of higher level decisions between human and system. These concepts will be better 
treated in Chapter 4. 
 
 
1.6 UAS Certification 
Since UAS have been initially developed for military applications, there is not a defined and 
universally accepted set of rules for civil certification. This lack shall be solved in the future in 
order to integrate the UAS in the National Airspace Systems. This integration is based on three 
main principles [16], [17]:  
1. Equivalence: UAS shall demonstrate an Equivalent Level Of Safety (ELOS) with respect to 
manned aviation.  
2. Compliance: UAS shall operate in compliance with the existing aviation regulation in terms 
of operative and flight rules. 
3. Transparency: UAS shall be transparent to other airspace users, i.e. other aircraft do not 
perform extraordinary procedure due to the presence of an unmanned vehicles.  
These macro requirements need a regulation infrastructure analogous in form to that existing for 
manned aircraft. In particular the following aspects shall be certificated: 
• system airworthiness, 
• operator certification, 
• operating and flight rules, 
• vehicle registration and marking, 
• maintenance. 
Currently these is a broad series of regulation proposals for the previous issues, derived by several 
researches involving civil authorities, air traffic control authorities, air forces, industries and 
universities. Developing the new regulation framework, the basic approach is to start from the 
existing manned aviation regulation in order to reuse as much as possible the well proven manned 
rules. However several researches have demonstrated that this way is not completely pursuable. In 
fact, it has been estimated that only the 30% of current rules are directly applicable, while the 54% 
may be reused with some modifications, and finally the 16% is not usable [18]. UAS in fact are 
characterized by many features not contemplated on a manned aircraft like for example the GCS, 
the datalink or the greater level of automation.  
In particular, for the airworthiness the STANAG 4671 “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Airworthiness 
Requirements” (USAR) has been adopted [19], since it is considered applicable as certification 
basis by the EASA Policy Statement Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) E.Y013-01 [20]. STANAG 4671 refers mainly to fixed wing UAV system with a maximum 
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take off weight between 150 and 20,000 kg. It has been derived directly by the EASA Certification 
Specification (CS) 23, i.e. the European rule relative to general aviation and commuter aircraft. 
More in detail, the STANAG 4671 is divided in 7 sections (see Fig. 11): sections from A to G are 
directly derived from the CS-23, while the subparts H and I have been properly created for UAS 
[19] (see Fig.11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11. STANAG 4671 structure [19] 
 
 
About the software, the STANAG 4671 considers the RTCA DO-178B/EC-12B “Software 
considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification” as reference.  
 
 
1.7 UAS Operators 
STANAG 4671 does not provide information about the UAS Operator qualification. When we 
speak about UAS crews, it is more correct to refer as a generic “operator”, since it is not obvious 
that he/she is a pilot. About the professional qualification and background of UAS operators, in fact, 
there is not a clear and univocal position: each user adopt a particular solution according to the 
specific case (UAS type, cultural influence, previous experience, etc.). Considering always a Class 
III UAS, the following possible operator figures can be identified: 
• UAV operator: responsible of vehicle control. He/she can also coincide with the payload 
operator. 
• Payload operator: responsible of one or more payloads control. He/she can also coincide 
with the UAV operator. 
• Mission Commander: crew leader and final responsible of the UAV. This role can be 
assigned to a dedicated figure or to an another operator. 
• Data analyst operator: operator assigned to the real time detailed analysis of the collected 
data (e.g. images) and their exploitation. 
• Communication specialist: operator dedicated to the communication with other actors in the 
operative scenario. In case, he/she can be also responsible of the management of some GDT 
functions. 
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According to the specific UAS, only a subset of the previous roles are usually present in a GCS. In 
particular, in this section only UAV operator role is considered – identified for simplicity as generic 
“operator” – since he/she is charged to control the FMS. A representation of the differences 
between a manned cockpit and an unmanned Ground Station is reported below in Fig.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Aircraft Pilot versus UAS Operators 
 
 
As UAS operators, basically, it is possible to distinguish between who has a previous rated flight 
experience (as pilots or flying officers) or not. This is not a trivial issue, since it involves 
consequences not only from the regulation standpoint and in the training process, but also in the 
design of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) in the GCS.  
Consider a rated pilot can be easier from several standpoints: the pilot figure, in fact, is well 
regulated, and the UAS qualification can be translated in a type-rating like on manned aircraft with 
an ad hoc training. However this choice has some disadvantages: first of all the cost, since the 
flying training is really expansive. Besides a pilot could not appreciate to work “on ground” – 
missing the phase of flight – and this can involve a performance detriment. Finally, a pilot could not 
be the proper figure to manage an advanced autonomous UAS, both for mentality and professional 
background. These considerations are valid also for flying officers, usually employed as payload 
operator.  
A generic operator, instead, could be potentially more oriented to control an autonomous UAS via 
high level commands, and his/her training will be less expansive. In any case having to control an 
aircraft (also if unmanned), they need at least an airmanship theoretical training. The issue is to 
evaluate the need also for a minimum practical flying training (i.e. basic pilot training). Without a 
real experience in controlling an aircraft, in fact, an operator could have more difficulties to 
understand the UAV state/behavior. Besides, if the considered UAV can be also remotely piloted 
through traditional flight controls (i.e. stick, throttle and pedals), this experience could be a 
fundamental step. 
About this issue, it is interesting to consider the experience of the greatest UAS user in the world: 
the United States Air Force (USAF) [21], [22], [23], that in 2011 has trained more UAS operator 
than fighter and bomber pilots combined [24]. In order to satisfy the increasing demand of UAV 
operator, in fact, the USAF has opened the UAS career also to undergraduate pilots and not flying 
duty officer, developing a proper training syllabus. Previously, this role was accessible only to rate 
pilots. In particular, this has been done for the Predator/Reaper systems, that have the possibility to 
be manually controlled, and so a basic flying training has been considered for duty officers. After 
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the first training cycles, the amount of provided flying hours have been increased from 18 to 35 
hours, remarking the importance of flying background in the UAS training. Probably this need will 
decline in the future with the UAS level of automation increase, but now it is still required, 
especially when the remote manual control is available.  
Italian Air Force, instead, employs only rated pilots, but the it has a very limited numbers of UASs 
and so it has not problems in finding operators.  
The trend however is to move toward a greater employment of non pilots operators, especially in 
order to reduce the operational cost of the UASs. The definition of a dedicated set of rules to 
certificate this role, in particular, is a milestone for the unmanned system diffusion, especially for 
civil application.  
The design of the HMI is drawn by the operator background, since a rated pilot is more confident 
with a cockpit like symbology/controls. A generic operator, instead, probably is more prone to learn 
the use of a different type of interfaces – more similar to a computer – having not a previous 
“imprinting” on manned aircraft.  
In any case, independently to have a pilot or an operator, controlling an UAS is a particular 
demanding task that involves several issues in terms of Human Factors due to the physical 
separation between the operator and the vehicle. This challenges will be described in Chapter 3. 
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2 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Flight Management System (FMS) can be though as the “brain” of modern airliners [25], and it is 
devoted to the management of the following functions: 
• navigation, 
• flight planning, 
• trajectory prediction, 
• performance computation/optimization, 
• guidance, 
• FMS initialization, 
• communication. 
Historically it derives from the Navigation Management System (NMS) [26], introduced in the 
1980s in order to reduce the pilot workload to plan the flight and then navigate the aircraft. 
Significant commercial flights increase, in fact, has involved the need for airliners to follow strict 
rules in all flight phases. So flight planning before take-off and management of any possible 
deviation in flight have become very demanding tasks for pilots [25]. The NMS has automated 
some functions and provided a better interface for some others, reducing the pilot workload and 
increasing their situational awareness. In particular the NMS has permitted the introduction of the 
Area Navigation (RNAV), that is a navigation concept in which an aircraft follows a 3D path 
defined by waypoints, instead of standard routes determined by the radio navigation aids 
(NAVAIDs). The FMS derives from the merge of the NMS with aircraft performance database and 
autothrottle system, obtaining the capability to optimize the flight plan and following in automatic 
way the computed speed schedule. FMS introduction, in particular, has contributed to remove the 
role of the flight engineer for the long range flights, reducing the crew size from three to two. This 
automation increase in the cockpit, however, has not been introduced without problems, since it has 
involved a shift of pilot role from aircraft manual controller to system supervisor, with several 
issues about the human-automation integration. Some accidents have occurred due to these 
problems. In recent years, the FMS has further increased its capability adding new functions and 
taking into account the future of the Air Traffic Management (ATM). 
The idea to integrate a FMS into an UAS is very attracting, since it will enable an improve in 
navigation, planning, communication and 4D trajectory control capabilities, needed for an 
integration of unmanned vehicles in the National Airspace System (NAS) [27].  
 
 
2.2 Architecture 
Flight Management System is made up basically by two macro-elements: a Flight Management 
Computer (FMC) and the relative HMI. FMC is redounded for safety, and is linked to several 
aircraft sensors and equipments. Fig. 13 represents a typical FMS hardware architecture for an 
airliner, providing an idea of the system complexity.  
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ACARS Aircraft Communication Addressing & Reporting System  FCMC 
Fuel Control & Management 
Computer 
ADF Automatic Direction Finder  FCU Flight Control Unit 
ADR/IR Air Data Reference / Inertial Reference  FMGC 
Flight Management & Guidance 
Computer (equivalent to a FMC) 
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit  ILS Instrument Landing System 
CPC Cabin Pressure Controller  MLS  Microwave Landing System 
DME Distance Measurement Equipment  LGCIU Landing Gear Control Interface Unit 
ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor  RA Radio Altimeter 
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System  SFCC Slat Flap Control Computer 
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control  VOR VHF Omni-directional Range 
Figure 13. FMS Architecture [25] 
 
 
For the HMI, instead, the main data entry interface is the Multifunction Control Display Unit 
(MCDU), while the navigation status is monitored on the Navigation Format. In order to permit the 
datalink communication with the Air Traffic Control (ATC), further formats (considered part of the 
FMS) have been added to the flight-deck. However, the FMS strictly interacts also with other 
interfaces like the autopilot mode panel (FCU) - from which the guidance of the FMS is enabled – 
or the display control unit, from which for example is controlled the navigation format (orientation, 
declutter, etc.). In Fig. 14, an example of the Airbus A-330 cockpit is presented. 
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Figure 14. FMS HMI 
 
 
2.3 Functions 
In the following paragraphs the main FMS functions will be discussed. Each of them is presented 
alone, also if they are strictly related each other in the FMS. 
 
2.3.1 Navigation 
The navigation is responsible for determining the best estimate of the current aircraft state (best 
data) by the fusion of navigation data provided by several autonomous sensors or receivers. Aircraft 
state is provided by the following parameters [28]: 
• three dimensional position (latitude, longitude and altitude), 
• velocity vector in NED reference frame (i.e. Ground Speed – GS – in the horizontal plane 
and Vertical Speed – VS), 
• track angle, 
• heading angle, 
• drift angle, 
• wind vector (speed and direction), 
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• Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU). 
A typical navigation sensor suite for an airliner is made up by [28]: 
 
 
Autonomous Sensors Navigation Receivers 
• Air Data Reference 
• Inertial Reference 
• DME 
• VOR 
• ADF 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) 
• Differential GPS 
Table 2. Navigation Sensor Suite 
 
 
Navigation receivers are managed by the FMS. In particular there is an auto-tune function that 
permits to select the proper NAVAID frequency according to the aircraft position and the flight 
plan. Different navigation data sources can be combined together to determine the best estimate 
with three possible criteria [26]: 
1. Prioritization: only the best system is used according to an established merit classification.  
2. Weighted Average: available sources are combined, weighting the relative data according to 
the sensor characteristics. 
3. Kalman Filter: optimal recursive data processing algorithm, used to estimate the aircraft 
state taking into account the input noise. 
In practice – being the most accurate criteria – the Kalman Filter is actually used on airliners, 
although its development is expansive. Prioritization and Weighted Average criteria were used in 
the past, and now they are available in some cheap applications for general aviation. The crew is 
however able to force the best data source to a desired sensor. 
In any case, the precision relative to the aircraft position computation (EPU) is calculated and 
displayed to pilots. It is compared with the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) in order to 
determine if the aircraft is able or not to perform the RNAV. RNP varies with the airspace 
according to the DO-206 standard [28]: 
 
 
Airspace definition RNP (NM) 
Departure 1.0 
Enroute domestic 2.0 
Enroute oceanic 12.0 
Terminal 1.0 
Approach 0.5 
Table 3. Required Navigation Performance 
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Current trend is to use the differential GPS combined with the inertial data as primary navigation 
data source [29], reaching RNP lower than 0.3 NM (also 0.1 NM).  
 
2.3.2 Flight Planning 
Flight Planning function is relative to the creation, modification and activation of the flight plans. 
Usually for an airliner a primary flight plan is specified from the departure airport to the destination 
one. Some secondary flight plans are available in order to permit an aircraft diversion to other 
airports in case of problems (e.g. bad weather or a failure). A flight plan consists in the aircraft 
route, plus other related information like the radio/NAVAID frequencies. A route is specified linked 
together several elements present in the aircraft navigation database [28]:  
• Standard Instrument Departure (SID) procedures, 
• Standard Terminal Arrival (STAR) procedures, 
• approach / missed approach procedures, 
• holding patterns, 
• airways 
• fixes (waypoints, NAVAID, airport reference points, runway thresholds, etc.). 
Procedures and patterns, in general, are coded by the path and terminator concept [29], according to 
which a route leg (i.e. the segment joining two fixes of the route) is defined not only specifying the 
ending point, but also the path that the aircraft shall follow to reach it. At this purpose, 23 leg types 
are reported in the standard ARINC 424. These legs translate in computer language procedure 
originally created to be manually flown with compass and clock [29]. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. ARINC 424 legs 
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According to the DO-206, non determinist legs – like course legs or legs ending at an unspecified 
position – should be avoided, since they could involve problems for air traffic separation and added 
complexity to the FMS path construction being dependent to the aircraft performance. DO-206 
suggests to use track legs with a specified terminator. In particular, track legs are advantageous with 
respect to course legs, since they not depend by wind condition and avoid problems related to 
magnetic variation. 
Among the deterministic terminators, the most relevant are the waypoints. In particular, the users 
can define the WP position on horizontal plane in several ways [28]: 
 
 
WP determination Description 
PBD Polar coordinates (bearing and range) from 
an another fix. 
PB/PB Intersection of bearings from two defined WPs. 
ATO Specified by an Along Track Offset (ATO) from an existing flight path fix. 
LAT/LON WP is defined entering the relative Latitude/Longitude. 
LAT/LON Crossing WP 
The WP is placed at the intersection of a 
specified point (LAT/LON) with the active 
flight plan. 
Airways Intersection First point at which two given airways 
crosses. 
Runway extension WP WP is placed at a given distance from the 
runway threshold along the runway heading. 
Abeam WP 
When a direct to function is activated toward 
a fix, abeam WPs are created at their abeam 
position on the direct to path. 
FIR/SUA Intersection WP 
WP is placed at the cross between the active 
flight plan and the Flight Information Region 
(FIR) or Special User Areas (SUA) 
boundary. 
Table 4. WP creation methods 
 
 
A WP can be of two different types, according to the way with which the round between the relative 
legs is flown: 
• Fly-By (also named short turn): the WP is not overflown and the aircraft links the two legs 
with a turn. 
• Fly-Through (also named fly-over): the WP is overflown and then the aircraft returns on the 
leg. 
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Figure 16. WP types 
 
 
DO-206 prefers the Fly-By type, since the Flight Through trajectory is not predictable. Overshoot 
due to the WP overflight, in fact, depend by several factors like the aircraft speed, aircraft bank 
limitations and wind. With the Fly-By, instead, there are not these problems, since the roll-in points 
(starting point of the turn between the two legs) is properly determined according to the aircraft 
characteristics and wind condition. 
Above issues about the WP creation methods and the WP types are relative to the Lateral Flight 
Plan (i.e. Latitude / Longitude plane). Regarding to the Vertical Flight plan, instead, at each WP it is 
possible to associate altitude, speed and time constraints. The following constraint types are usually 
available [28]: 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Vertical Flight Plan Constraints 
 
 
In particular, DO-206 suggests to not use the altitude “at” constraint in order to avoid undesired 
climb/descent paths. Analogously, also speed “at” constraint is not typically considered, since speed 
is normally varied by the FMS in the feasible range in order to optimize the performance according 
to the selected criteria. An example of vertical flight plan profile is reported in Fig. 18. 
Apart the characteristics presented above, a WP is identified by an alphanumeric string in order to 
facilitate its recognition by the pilots. 
According to the presented paradigms/rules, the Flight Plans are created. Creation can be performed 
both in the MCDU and in an external planning station. In the last case, the flight plans are upload 
on the FMS by a proper memory card.  
Only a flight plan can be activated at time (as default the primary flight plan is activated). Crew is 
able to modify the active flight plan during the flight, changing any WP attribute or adding new 
WPs.  
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Figure 18. Vertical Flight Plan profile 
 
 
In particular, there are the following two functions that permits a change in the active flight plan 
[28]: 
• Direct to: the aircraft flies toward a given fix from its current position. If the selected fix 
belongs to the active flight plan, the prior WPs are deleted; while if the fix is a new point, a 
discontinuity is inserted after it and current flight plan is conserved. 
• Direct/Intercept: equal to the Direct to, but the pilot specifies also the course with which the 
selected fix shall be reached. 
 
2.3.3 Trajectory Prediction 
Trajectory Prediction function computes the predicted four dimensional flight profile (both in lateral 
and vertical planes) [28] according to the active flight plan (constraints), weather conditions, 
aircraft performance and selected mode of operations.  
Numerically integration on the aircraft energy balance equations is performed in order to calculate 
for each WP the following variables: 
• lateral path (e.g. cross track error and track angle error with respect to the current leg, roll-in 
point and turn radius for fly-by WP, path to intercept a WP, etc.), 
• predicted fuel consumption, 
• arrival time, 
• distance to travel, 
• altitude, 
• speed. 
An initial prediction is performed before take off, but then the prediction is continuosly updated 
considering the best estimate of the aircraft state calculated by the navigation function, taking into 
account any possible diversion [28].  
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In particular the following two points are calculated during the flight: 
• Point of Non Return (PNR): point along the flight plan where the fuel to reach the 
destination is less than the fuel to return to the departure airport. 
• Equal Time Point (ETP): point along the flight plan where the time to go back to the origin 
is the same as the time to continue to the destination. 
In order to obtain an accurate prediction, weather conditions – in terms of wind (speed and 
direction) and air temperature – are very important. During the planning wind and air temperature 
data are entered for the different flight phases. For take off and landing prediction, wind and 
temperature are provided for the considered airports (departure, destination and alternates). For 
climb and descent, instead, wind is usually entered for different intermediate altitudes, while the air 
temperature is only provided for a given altitude. Finally, for the cruise phase, wind and air 
temperature are provided for the desired altitude. Besides it is usually possible entering further 
value at each cruise WP. In any phase, a linear propagation of wind and temperature data is 
provided. During the flight the measured wind and air temperature values are used to update the 
initial forecast, always applying a linear propagation. Pilots, in any case, are however able to 
modify the previously entered forecasts. 
 
2.3.4 Performance Computation/Optimization 
Performance function has enabled the evolution of the NMSs in the current FMSs, providing the 
computation of several performance parameters previously manually calculated by pilots, and so 
making possible an optimization of the flight plan according to several paradigms. The computation 
takes into account the aircraft performance database, engine performance database, airport database 
and weather condition. The optimization occurs in the vertical flight plan, and in particular on the 
speed schedule computation for each flight phase, taking into account however the fixed 
constraints. The following possible criteria are considered for each phase [28]: 
 
 
Climb Cruise Descent 
• economy (lowest cost), 
• steepest (max climb angle), 
• fastest (max climb rate), 
• required time of arrival. 
• economy (lowest cost), 
• max endurance, 
• max range, 
• required time of arrival. 
• economy (lowest cost), 
• fastest (max descent rate), 
• required time of arrival. 
Table 5. Performance Optimization Criteria 
 
 
The criteria to use is selected by the crew for each phase or portion of phase. Some criteria are 
common to all phases, like the economy and the required time of arrival. Economy criteria 
determines the optimal speed to minimize the overall cost of operation, according to a Cost Index 
(CI) entered by pilots in the FMS (see Eq.1). Cost Index is determined by each company according 
to the current economy state, especially considering the oil cost. Required time of arrival, instead, 
varies the speed in order to minimize the overall cost (CI), guarantying the achievement of the 
required time of arrival at the considered WP. 
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Equation 1. Cost Index [28] 
 
 
Speed is defined in terms of Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) or Mach number (M) according to the 
cross-over altitude (i.e. the altitude for which CAS and M are equivalent). In particular: when 
altitude is lower than cross over altitude the CAS is used, while for greater altitudes the Mach 
number is considered. This distinction is done in order to avoid compressibility and aeroelastic 
effects at high altitudes. In any case, the crew is able to perform a manual override of the speed 
schedule both in terms of CAS and M. Besides, for climb and descent is also possible to manually 
edit a vertical speed. 
Regarding the altitude, the following data are calculated [28]: 
• Cross over altitude: altitude for which CAS and M are equivalent. 
• Optimum altitude: altitude for which the ratio between the ground speed and the fuel 
consumption is maximum. 
• Ceiling altitude: max altitude reachable with a residual climb rate available. 
• Trip altitude: compromise between the optimum altitude and the specific flight profile. It is 
considered for short range flight, when the aircraft has not the possibility to reach the 
calculated optimum altitude. 
Optimum or trip altitude can not be usually reached directly after the climb phase due to the heavy 
weight of the aircraft. The FMS computes the optimal point to execute a step climb and the new 
altitude to achieve. The same happens for the descent. This is very important especially for the long 
range flights in order to reduce the fuel consumption.  
Another feature of the performance function is the computation of the take-off and landing data in 
terms of characteristic speeds and altitudes.  
 
 
Input Output 
• runway slope, 
• runway length, 
• runway threshold coordinates and altitude, 
• runway stopway, 
• runway clearway, 
• flap setting, 
• air temperature, 
• wind, 
• aircraft weight, 
• aircraft Center of Gravity (CG) position. 
• V1 = max speed at which the take off can be 
aborted, 
• VR = rotation speed, 
• V2 = take off speed, 
• VFR = flap retract speed, 
• VSR = slat retract speed, 
• VCL = final segment climb speed (also V3), 
• engine thrust reduction altitude (from take 
off to climb value), 
• acceleration altitude. 
Table 6. Take off performance computation 
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Input Output 
• runway slope, 
• runway length, 
• runway threshold coordinates and altitude, 
• runway stopway, 
• runway clearway, 
• flap setting, 
• air temperature, 
• wind, 
• aircraft weight, 
• aircraft Center of Gravity (CG) position. 
• VAPP = approach speed (the pilot is usually 
able to do an override of this value), 
• VREF  = landing reference speed at an height 
of 50 ft above the runway threshold, 
• Minimum maneuvering speed in clean 
configuration, 
• Minimum maneuvering speed with slats 
extracted, 
• Minimum maneuvering speed with flaps 
extracted, 
• Landing weight. 
Table 7. Landing performance computation 
 
 
Another considered condition is the performance computation with One Engine Inoperative (OEI), 
relative in particular to the following parameters: 
• maximum climb rate, 
• maximum cruise speed, 
• ceiling altitude, 
• take off data, 
• landing data. 
In general, for any performance computation, the thrust limit is considered in order to prevent 
unexpected maintenance and to extend the engines life. In particular, several limits are calculated 
according to many parameters: 
 
 
Input to calculate the Thrust Limits Computed Thrust Limits 
• aircraft characteristic, 
• engine characteristic, 
• engine bleed setting, 
• air temperature, 
• altitude, 
• speed. 
• Take-off thrust, 
• Climb thrust, 
• Cruise, 
• Maximum continuous thrust, 
• Go Around. 
Table 8. Computed thrust limits 
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Finally, a performance factor entered by the crew is considered in performance computation to 
make worse the computed values in order to take into account the aircraft age. Performance factor is 
usually expressed as a percentage increment to predicted fuel flow. It is equal to zero for new 
aircraft.  
 
2.3.5 Guidance 
Starting from the outputs of the previously presented functions, the guidance lets the aircraft to fly 
the active flight plan. Generally guidance function provides input to the Flight Control System 
(FCS), but in modern aircraft FMS and FCS can be strictly coupled each other, and so the guidance 
function provides directly the control surface/engine commands. Apart basic autopilot modes (e.g. 
altitude, speed, vertical speed, heading hold/acquire functions), three different navigation related 
guidance modes (specific of FMS) are usually provided: 
• Lateral Navigation (LNAV), 
• Vertical Navigation (VNAV), 
• automatic landing. 
LNAV provides the following of the active route in the LAT/LON plane. Altitude and speed are not 
considered in this mode. Output of guidance function for LNAV is usually the roll command to 
follow the flight plan.  
VNAV, instead, is the opposite mode: it considers the altitude and speed/time assigned to the WP, 
but not the lateral path of the route. It provides pitch axis and thrust command. VNAV mode can be 
only activated if the LNAV mode is already active and involves typically also the autothrottle 
engaging. Activating together LNAV and VNAV an aircraft is able to perform a 4D navigation. 
Automatic landing function takes the aircraft to land annulling the deviations from the approach 
path. Advanced systems executes also the final flare that brings the aircraft to the touchdown. 
Deviations from approach path are traditionally determined by the Instrumental Landing System 
(ILS) or the less diffuse Microwave Landing System (MLS). Improvements in navigation precision 
– due both to the sensor suite (e.g. augmented GPS) and the FMS computation functions – permits 
however to perform precision like approaches with guidance both in lateral and vertical planes. In 
practice the descent path is determined by FMS computed WP beam starting from the airport data 
and previously stored procedures in the FMS database. In this way it is possible to optimize the 
descent path, reducing the flight time, fuel consumption, pollution and acoustic impact on ground. 
Besides in this way it is also possible performing automatic landing on airport for which previously 
it was not possible due to the orography that prevents a straight alignment of the aircraft for the ILS 
use, requiring hence a manual execution (possible only with good weather conditions). Currently 
these precision like approaches are cleared for visibility conditions higher than that of ILS, but in 
the future probably these differences will expire considering the estimated precision increase of the 
differential GPS with airport local augmentation.  
 
2.3.6 FMS Initialization 
Initialization function permits to initialize some FMS parameters and to check some other data. This 
is a very specific function of each system. Example of parameters that can be set are: 
• aircraft weight (in particular fuel weight), 
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• IRS initialization (if the IRS is available), 
• Cost Index, 
• Performance Factor, 
• preferred altitudes for cruise, 
• default air temperature and wind for cruise, 
• departure, destination, and alternate airports (this data can be entered in the flight plan 
creation or initialization phase according to the system). 
Possible data to check are the FMS software part number or the databases (navigation, performance, 
engine, etc.) release dates. This is important since for example the navigation database shall be 
updated each 28 days.  
 
2.3.7 Communication (Radios, Transponder, Datalink) 
Basic communication function for a FMS is relative to the tune (also automatic according to the 
active flight plan and the navigation database) of the NAVAIDs. Current trend in avionics however 
is to integrate navigation, communication and identification (transponder) functions together. Some 
FMSs, so, are able to manage also radio communications and transponder. In particular Satellite 
Communication (SATCOM) is managed through FMS. In any case, a dedicated panel to manage 
communication functions on the cockpit is however provided as back-up interface.  
Another fundamental feature is the datalink communications. Two different types of datalink 
communications are distinguished: 
• Controller Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC), 
• Aircraft Communication Addressing & Reporting System (ACARS). 
The former is relative to the ATC functions, and in particular to the exchange of 
request/authorization or information between the controller and the pilots. It was introduced in order 
to reduce the use of voice radio communication, that was becoming overloaded with the increase of 
air traffic. Practically it consist in the exchange of textual messages (like a mobile phone SMS) that  
correspond to standard voice phraseology used in radio communications. Currently, CPDLC is used 
on oceanic routes and in upper airspace (above Flight Level 245) of Belgium, Germany and 
Netherlands [31], but there are several researches that aim to extend the use of CPDLC to other 
airspaces like the terminal areas (e.g. Single European Sky ATM Research – SESAR). 
ACARS, instead, is a system to exchange textual messages not relative to ATC between aircraft and 
ground station with a standard protocol. It is used for several purposes like for example: 
• aircraft automatic maintenance report to the airline maintenance staff,  
• dispatch exchanges with the airline administration, 
• weather report updates. 
Some of the ACARS messages are automatically sent/received, while others are directly entered by 
pilots through an alphanumeric keyboard like for CPDLC. In any case, in practical applications 
CPDLC and ACARS are strictly related applications. In Fig. 19, a list of CPDLC and ACARS 
combined functions are reported according to the flight phase. 
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Figure 19. CPLDC and ACARS functions for phase of flight [32] 
 
 
2.4 Human Machine Interface 
In this section, the main Human-Machine interfaces of the FMS will be examined, starting from the 
traditional layout (see Fig. 20), and then presenting the most recent operative solutions that 
introduce some innovations with respect to the classic systems (see Fig. 21, 22). Datalink 
communication interfaces are not considered. 
 
2.4.1 Multifunction Control Display Unit 
MCDU has a hierarchical organization in which, starting from the top menu, there is a sort of 
“folder” for each macro function, composed at its time by one or more pages. Pilots have to 
navigate in these pages in order to access all available data/controls.  
 
 
 
Figure 20. Classic MCDU elements 
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Classic MCDU is made up by the following macro elements: 
• Line Select Keys: permit to interact with the current MCDU page selecting the available 
items. 
• Function and Mode Keys: permit a quick access to the main FMS functions without passing 
from the MCDU menu. Besides they enable the navigation between the possible several 
pages of the current selected function. Number and type of function keys depend by the 
specific FMS: there is not a standard.  
• Alphanumeric Keyboard: data entry interface for the pilots. It is usually organized in a 
numeric pad and in a characters keyboard organized in alphabetical order. A Clear key is 
also provided. 
• Annunciators: convey urgent messages to the crew, like for example a MCDU failure or the 
reception of a datalink message. 
• Brightness Adjust Knob: permit to regulate the display brightness according to the lightning 
condition. If the MCDU has an automatic brightness regulator, this control permit a manual 
override of the brightness. 
In classical interfaces, the Navigation format has only a monitoring function and the crew is not 
able to provide command through it.  
In most recent airliners like the Airbus A-380 and the Boeing B-787, instead, the MCDU 
configuration is changed, since there is a bigger display without Line Select Keys, on which the 
crew acts through a Cursor Control Device (CCD), that is a trackball or a trackpad. In this case, it is 
possible to interact with the CCD directly on the Navigation Format. With this implementation, it is 
possible for example to command a “direct to” toward a WP with a simple “point and click” 
interaction on the Navigation Format, without moving in the pages hierarchy of the MCDU. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Airbus A-380 cockpit 
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In particular, the control devices (CCD and keyboard) have the following layout:  
 
 
 
Figure 22. A-380 FMS Interfaces [33] 
 
2.4.2 Navigation Format 
Navigation format provides the situational awareness about the aircraft position in the horizontal 
plane. Core of this format is the aircraft symbol, around which some concentric circles/arc of circles 
are displayed at indicated radial distances from it. In particular, the external circle reports the 
compass rose with respect to the North, that gives the name to the entire symbol (external and inner 
circles). There are usually two possible layouts of aircraft symbol/compass rose:  
• center (also named “rose”) mode: the aircraft symbol is displayed at the center of the 
navigation format, with the whole Compass Rose around it. 
• offset (also named “arc”) mode: the aircraft symbol is displayed at the bottom of the 
navigation format, with only a circular sector of Compass Rose displayed.  
Aircraft symbol is fixed in position on the display, while the beneath world runs according to the 
aircraft position. The entire navigation format can have several orientation: North Up, Track Up or 
Heading Up. In the first case the aircraft symbol rotates according to aircraft heading/track, while 
for others two orientations it is fixed in upright position, and it is the format that rotates when the 
aircraft turns. Therefore offset layout is not available for North Up orientation. 
Besides aircraft symbol and Compass Rose, other symbology is displayed on Navigation format: 
active flight plan, navigation database fixes (e.g. NAVAIDs, airport, etc.), wind indication, 
autopilot/FMS demands, navigation parameters (e.g. distance and time to reach a WP, aircraft 
Ground Speed), NAVAID frequencies, etc. 
Other information can be displayed on Navigation Format background, like for example the images 
coming from the weather radar or the terrain orography.  
Recent Navigation Format includes also a Vertical Profile that provides situational awareness about 
the VNAV.  
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Figure 23. Airbus A-380 Navigation Format in Offset mode [33] 
 
 
Especially for regional aircraft, there is also the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI), used 
especially for radio navigation. It can be also be integrated in the Primary Flight Display (PFD). 
 
 
 
Figure 24. ATR-600 PFD 
 
 
2.4.3 Autopilot Modes Panel 
Autopilot Modes Panel (AMP) is the interface with the guidance function of the FMS. Considering 
in fact the always greater integration between FMS and FCS, the AMP can be considered a part of 
the FMS HMI, also if historically it has been developed early as separate interface to control basic 
autopilot mode. In general, from the AMP it is possible to perform the following actions: 
• activate/deactivate the Flight Director, 
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• activate/deactivate a guidance mode, 
• select the guidance mode demand, 
• activate/deactivate the autothrottle. 
Advanced FMS guidance modes differs from the basic autopilot ones in the level of automation, 
that is higher in the first case where the aircraft follow an entire horizontal/vertical profile instead of 
holding/acquiring discrete values entered by pilots.  
 
 
 
Figure 25. Boeing B-777 autopilot modes panel 
 
 
The indication of the active autopilot modes is usually displayed on the PFD. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Autopilot mode data on Airbus A-380 PFD 
 
 
The moding of autopilot mode pushbuttons on the AMPs, instead, is different from an aircraft to 
another one. In particular, some mode pushbuttons illuminate or otherwise show they have been 
selected regardless if the mode has been actually engaged or not [34]. The active mode, in fact, is 
always displayed on the PFD. This different indications, however, can be misleading for the crew, 
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especially since the pilots usually expect to check the mode on the relative control panel. Problems 
relative to the AMP will be detailed in chapter 4. 
Finally, autopilot/autothrottle disconnect pushbuttons are also present on stick/control wheel and 
throttles in order to permit a quick recovery in manual control by pilots.  
 
 
2.5 FMS Problems 
Introduction of FMS in the airliner cockpits has enabled an improvement in aircraft performances, 
crew situation awareness and safety, supporting the increase of the air traffic. Nevertheless these 
advantages, the new level of automation to manage has involved several incidents/accidents. Pilots, 
in fact, sometimes are in difficulty to understand the system behavior and to choose the proper level 
of automation to use. These troubles are related both to the FMS algorithms and to the Human 
Machine Interface. In particular, the following issues have been risen in an investigation performed 
by the USA Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) [35], that is a voluntary and anonymous pilots/ATC operators reports about incidents 
occurred in flight: 
 
 
 
Figure 27. ASRS FMS related problems 
 
 
Several problem have been reported, with comparable percentages of occurrence. In particular, the 
most diffuse type is relative to crew errors about the comprehension of the FMS logic. Second 
position, instead, is relative to troubles about the selection of the guidance mode. More in detail, it 
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is possible to distinguish between two categories: problems directly related to FMS 
algorithms/components, and that relative to the interface with the crews. 
 
 
FMS Algorithms and Components FMS Human Machine Interface 
• Hardware problems. 
• Software problems. 
• FMS/AMP interaction problems. 
• FMS Database Errors. 
• Crew Keyboard Errors in Data Entering. 
• Crew Logic Errors in Data Entering. 
• Crew Errors relative to ATC Logic. 
• Crew Errors relative to FMS Logic. 
• Crew Workload above 10,000 ft. 
• Crew Workload below 10,000 ft. 
• AMP Crew Selection Errors. 
• Crew Training Deficiencies. 
Table 9. FMS problems categories 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. FMS Problems Categories 
 
 
As reported in Fig. 28, the HMI issues are preponderant with respect to the FMS elements 
problems. Logic errors – about the FMS moding, ATC constraints implementation in the FMS or 
guidance mode selection/awareness – are responsible of a generic poor comprehension of how the 
automation works and what the automation is doing by the crew. FMS interface, in particular, does 
not provide an adequate feedback about the automation state and requires a complex interaction to 
modify the flight plan/guidance mode. This complexity contributes also to increment the pilot 
workload, especially below the 10,000 ft of altitude where the air traffic is particularly congested, 
with consequent high time pressure on the crew to perform flight plan/guidance changes. The 
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workload is also due to the mnemonic effort required at the pilots by the MCDU menu structures 
(i.e. number of pages and relative navigation logic). At this purpose, the FMS has been originally 
conceived for the long-term control of the aircraft, and so when a suddenly flight path change is 
needed the use of a lower level of automation (i.e. basic autopilot mode/flight director) or manual 
control is preferable. Many companies, in fact, suggests to avoid FMS re-program below 10,000 ft. 
For more details, a deepen analysis about human automation interaction will be reported in Chapter 
4. 
Data entering errors, instead, are related both to the FMS complexity (in particular to the sub-
menus/pages structure) and to a poor interface that does not guide the pilot in the task execution 
alerting for possible erroneous entering.  
Finally, there are the crew training deficiencies, particularly relevant in the first years after the 
adoption of the FMS, when the new pilot role related to the higher level of automation to manage 
was not well comprised, with consequent poor training relative to the FMS. This issue, however, is 
still relevant, since the difficulty to train adequately the pilots to manage all possible automation 
failures. Training necessity, in any case, shows how the automation does not provide a complete 
assistance to the operator, and requires a detailed training to be successfully and safely managed.  
Analyzing the occurrence of ASRS reports per phase of flight (Fig. 29), we find that the greatest 
number of incident is relative to the vertical flight plan, and in particular to the violation of crossing 
restrictions (in terms of altitude, speed or time constraints) and to the climb management (altitude to 
reach, desired climb rate, etc.). This result is due to the complexity of vertical route profile (see Fig. 
16 for an example), and to the low situational awareness provided by the HMI. The introduction of 
Vertical Profile in recent navigation formats has been just done to alleviate this problem.  
 
 
 
Figure 29. FMS problems per phase of flight 
 
 
To summarize, the current FMS Human Machine Interface suffers of the following lacks: 
• poor situational awareness about the automation state (especially about the guidance mode); 
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• complexity of MCDU interface – in terms of number of pages, linkage between them and 
navigation logic – with consequent high workload and difficulty to timely re-program the 
FMS; 
• poor information/data arrangement in each screen; 
• information sources are split in several formats (e.g. a complete situational awareness about 
the VNAV is obtained combined the information present on AMP, MCDU PFD and 
navigation format), with consequent visual/cognitive workload; 
• no graphic FMS assistance (e.g. pop-up, prompt, etc.) in the task execution with consequent 
possible errors/high workload; 
• no erroneous data entered alerting; 
• poor situational awareness about the vertical flight plan management. 
ASRS investigation is relevant to first FMS generations, and in fact the new models (e.g. A-380, B-
787, ATR-600 FMSs) provides some innovations to mitigate the HMI problems, like for example 
the Vertical Profile in the navigation format, or the bigger size of MCDU screen with a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) controllable with a cursor. The previous considerations, however, are still 
applicable and shall be considered in the design of new interfaces, especially considering the 
foreseen greater role that the FMS should have in the future ATM scenario.  
 
 
2.6 Flight Management System for UAS 
Main FMS functions are usually performed by current UASs, but with a lower level of integration 
and performances with respect to that offered by a traditional manned Flight Management System. 
Therefore the improvement obtained integrating a FMS into an UAS is fundamental, not only to 
increase the operational capabilities of unmanned systems, but also for a future UAS integration in 
the civil air traffic. 
Unfortunately, a traditional certified FMS can not be taken and installed on an UAS without any 
care. A Flight Management System for a UAS, in fact, is different in terms of architecture and 
functions with respect to an airliner one. Starting from the architecture, the equivalent of FMCs are 
split between on-board and ground segments, according to the performed functions (see Fig. 30). 
Referring to UAS elements (Fig. 1), on the ground segment the FMS regards only the GCS, while 
on the airborne part only the airframe is involved. More in detail, the HMI and all functions 
requiring direct and frequent interactions with the operators are hosted in the GCS (high level 
control loop). On the vehicle, instead, are allocated the inner control loop functionalities (e.g. 
navigation, guidance, etc.). Besides the common functionalities, on a UAS there are also other 
functions not performed by a manned FMS (e.g. autonomous replanning on the vehicle).  
Generally speaking, in terms of functions a FMS for an UAS is simpler with respect to that of a 
manned aircraft for some aspects (in particular for that directly related to the airframe), while it 
could be considerably more complex for other functions, especially that relative to the mission 
planning and the vehicle autonomy. A possible functional division between GCS and UAV has 
been defined starting from typical airliner functions (see Fig 31). In any case, also if a function has 
been mainly allocated to a segment, there will be often a part also to the corresponding element (e.g. 
the navigation function is performed on-board, but the aircraft position is displayed on the 
Navigation format in GCS). As UAV reference, a Class III MALE has been considered. The 
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payload type, instead, is not relevant in a general context, since the FMS does not interact directly 
with it. In the FMS, in fact, the payload can be considered only during the planning or in the 
selection of related guidance modes.  
 
 
 
Figure 30. Architectural differences between manned and unmanned FMSs [27] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Functional differences between manned and unmanned FMSs [27] 
 
 
Entering deeper in the functional analysis, in the following table the characteristics of the 
considered functions are detailed, providing their main features.  
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Function GCS UAV 
Navigation 
Navigation output are displayed to the 
operator in the Navigation Format (HMI) in 
order to provide situational awareness about 
the vehicle state. 
Manual override of the best data source can 
be available for the crew. 
It is usually based only on IRS/GPS sensors, 
with a Kalman filter as best estimate criteria. 
Use of NAVAIDs would be considered as 
provision for a future integration in the NAS 
if they will be required by the civil 
authorities. In any case, also for manned 
aviation the trend is to rely on less on 
NAVAIDS. 
Trajectory 
Prediction 
Trajectory Prediction outputs are displayed 
to the operator in the Navigation Format. 
From the HMI standpoint, navigation and 
trajectory prediction can be merged. 
Analogous to the manned FMS, with in 
addition possible calculation relatives to 
mission parameters (datalink coverage, 
target visualization, etc.) 
Mission Planning 
At difference of airliners, for UAS the 
concept of mission is considered and not a 
basic flight plan, with all the related issues 
(mission zones, targets, emergency routes, 
etc.). Other peculiarities regard the Loiter 
WPs and the contingency WPs/Routes, 
terminating usually on safe crash points. 
Besides, since UAVs are not yet integrated 
in the civil air traffic, the routes usually have 
less restrictive speed and altitude constraints. 
 
Autonomous 
Replanning 
It is a very specific UAS functionality. 
Ground replanning is preferable for medium 
Level Of Automation, and it is simpler to 
certify. 
On-board replanning is a very specific 
feature of UAS. Basically it is relative to 
emergency conditions, but it can be also 
consider  the operative context (e.g. 
autonomous route replanning if a new target 
has been detected). It is suitable for high 
Level Of Automation, with the relative 
certification issues. 
Performances 
Performance calculation is essentially 
relative to the planning. Typically MALE 
UAVs are propeller driven and single engine 
(reciprocating or turboprop), and so the 
computation is simpler than an airliner. 
Performance calculation can be involved in 
the autonomous replanning, trajectory 
Prediction and in the guidance. 
Guidance Selection of guidance mode and parameters (HMI).  
Aircraft control algorithms. In general 
guidance has a greater role than on a manned 
aircraft, since it is the main (or the only) way 
to control the vehicle. A greater automation 
level is usually provided with respect to 
manned aircraft.  
Datalink COMM 
Intended as communication with ATC and 
other operative scenario actors, and not 
between GCS and UAV.  
 
Radio COMM 
Radio management (e.g. frequency 
selection/storing). Distinction is done 
between GCS, on-board and satellite radios. 
On-board radios are used to avoid Line OF 
Sight limits in the communications 
(especially with the ATC). 
Transponder Management of the transponder (mounted 
on-board).  
Configuration Setting of some configuration/initialization parameters of the UAS.  
Table 10. UAS FMS functions 
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3 HUMAN FACTOR ISSUES FOR UAS 
 
 
3.1 HMI Deficiencies 
Developing a Flight Management System for an UAS, specific Human Factor (HF) issues have to 
be considered together with the HMI problems of manned aviation FMSs. In particular, these issues 
have a considerable impact on the UAS reliability. UAS, in fact, are still “young” with respect to 
manned aircraft, and so they have a significant lower reliability, as reported in the following table 
[27], [36]: 
 
 
UAS Mishaps Manned Aircraft Mishaps 
Predator – 32* F16 – 3 
Pioneer – 334* General Aviation – 1 
Hunter – 55* Regional Commuter – 0.1 
* much less than 100,000 flight hours (2004) Large Airliners – 0.01 
Table 11. Class A Mishap Rates Per 100,000 Flight Hours 
 
 
These data are relatively old (2004) and probably the situation is in part get better, due to the greater 
experience obtained in the last years with the flight hours increase, but the UASs still remain a step 
below with respect to manned aviation. This is however a problem of system maturity: comparing 
the F-16 mishap rate with those of Predator and Global Hawk at the same amount of flight hours, in 
fact, the values are nearly the same [36].  
The Pioneer has a greatest mishap rate with respect to the other two systems, but it is the oldest 
model and it is characterized by a particularly unreliable engine. Analyzing the mishap factors, in 
fact, the airframe failures are the main accident causes, as reported in the following figures relative 
to the USA (194000 flight hours) and Israeli (100000 flight hours) fleets in 2005 [2].  
 
 
 
Figure 32. Mishap Causes in USA fleet 
 
 
Summing the Flight Control and Power/Prop failures, in both cases an airframe percentage of nearly 
60% is reached. This is due in part to the use of non qualified/low quality components in order to 
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reduce the UAS cost. This choice reflects the standpoint according to which a UAV is an 
expendable vehicle due to the human absence. This consideration however is no longer applicable 
considering both the UAS integration in the civil air traffic and the cost of modern UAVs, that is 
increased due to the more complex payloads. 
The second voice, instead, is relative to the Human Factor, settled at nearly 20%. Analyzing the 
causal factors for some US UASs, the percentages oscillates according to the considered system. In 
particular, the HF varies from the 21% (Shadow 200) to the 67% (Predator). In Fig. 31, Human 
Factor causes are broken down for each UAS [37].  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. HF Mishap Causes  
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On the vertical axis of previous histograms there is the accident number. Summing the percentages 
of the histograms, the total is more than 100%, since some accidents have been classified in more 
categories.  
Analyzing the breakdown – apart from the mishaps due to the presence of an external pilot (i.e. an 
operator that controls the UAV with a radio flight-control box during take off and landing) or to 
crew coordination/procedure violation – we can note the presence of display design and alert & 
alarm deficiencies. Considering the Predator – one of the most diffuse UAS in the world – that has 
the worst percentage, in particular, several HMI design errors have been identified [38], [39]: 
• Sliding side bars in the HUD are not intuitive. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Predator HUD sliding side bars compare with B-777 PFD [39], [40] 
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• HUD read graphic on sky blue background involves chromostereopsis (i.e. difficulty to 
focus on an image that combines two colors because each colour is fuzzy when the other 
colour is in focus) and eye fatigue. 
 
 
Figure 35. Chromostereopsis example [38] 
 
• Insufficient field of view provided by the guidance camera for manual landing (30°). 
• In the Head Down Display (HDD) there are too many levels in the page structure (e.g. in 
order to change the autopilot mode, the operator must navigate through 4 submenus, 
spending nearly 7 s [38]). 
• In the HDD the information are displayed in a non optimized way. 
• In the HDD the operational value ranges are inconsistent within the display. 
• Critical commands are not protected. 
• In the keyboard, functional keys are next each other (e.g. the keys to control the lights and to 
cut off the engine), with consequent possible errors. 
• Alerts do not provide attention. 
• Audio warnings are not sufficient or absent. 
• Alerts do not provided enough situational awareness about the real problem. 
• Alerts are not correctly prioritized. 
• Data to be compared are not displayed in the same display (this is a problem especially in 
case of failures). 
• Engine cut-off and weapon release commands are co-located on the throttle, are similar in 
shape (i.e. similar tactile feedback) and require the same confirm: an error is so possible. 
• The stick can not be long hold by the grips, since this involves an unsupported arm fatigue. 
As reported above, the HMI lacks are not only relevant to display design or alert logic, but also to 
ergonomics aspects.  
 
 
 
Figure 36. Predator GCS 
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Analogous conclusions have been reached in an operative evaluation of the Global Hawk HMI for 
the Mission Control Element (MCE) station in 2001, with a low global rating on a discrete scale 
where the possible values are in order: Unacceptable, Poor, Adequate, Good or Excellent [41].  
 
 
 
Figure 37. Global Hawk MCE HMI Evaluation 
 
 
3.2 HMI Parameters 
In order to discuss the UAS specific Human Factor issues, it is important to fix the main parameters 
considered in the evaluation of a Human Machine Interface: Situational Awareness and Workload.  
 
3.2.1 Situational Awareness 
The Situational Awareness has been defined by Endsley (1988) as three increasing levels of 
operator comprehension about the operational scenario [42]: 
 
 
Figure 38. Situational Awareness 
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In particular, for the UAS context the Situational Awareness is relative to the operator 
understanding of the following relationships/elements [43]: 
• UAV position with respect to: 
o relevant fixes (e.g. waypoints, airports, etc.), 
o terrain (in order to avoid collisions), 
o other aircraft (for mission purposes and in order to avoid collisions), 
o targets. 
• Future projection of the previous UAV spatial relationship. 
• Weather in the mission area (e.g. wind, air temperature, clouds, turbulence, ice conditions, 
etc.). 
• UAV Health. 
• UAV Status (e.g. attitude, speed, fuel level, airframe configuration, payload state, etc.). 
• UAS logic (i.e. operator mental model about how the system works, used to predict the UAS 
responses to various conditions). 
• Operational threats (e.g. anti-aircraft defenses, fighters, etc.). 
• UAS Mission (i.e. operator understanding of the assigned mission goals and environment). 
• Mission Progress (i.e. operator mental model about the mission accomplishment progress). 
• Degree to which an UAS Trust can be trusted (i.e. operator evaluation about the probability 
that his/her commands are received by the UAV and correctness of UAV data). 
Original Endsley definition assumes that the human operator is the only intelligent part of the 
system. Considering UAVs with a high level of autonomy, however, the concept of situational 
awareness can be extended also to the vehicle. In order to execute an autonomous replanning, for 
example, an UAV requires detailed information about its position, status, health, replan pre-
programmed laws, threats, etc. 
 
3.2.2 Workload 
Workload is a very complex meaning and it is relative to the load felt by the operator in the 
execution of a task. Basically it is possible to distinguish between physical and mental workload 
components. In our analysis the second – relative to the human cognitive process load – has been 
mainly considered, since it is the more relevant in UAS context. According to Hart and Staveland, 
there is the following definition [44]: 
 
Workload is defined as a hypothetical construct that represents the cost incurred by a human 
operator to achieve a particular level of performance. 
 
This definition is human centered rather than task centered, since it involves several subjective 
parameters in addition to the objective task demand [44], like for example the operator 
training/experience or his/her psycho-physical stress level at the considered time. In particular, 
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considering the workload subjective rating scale NASA-TLX (Task Load Index), there are the 
following workload causes: 
 
 
  
Figure 39. NASA TLX Workload Parameters [44] 
 
 
Regarding the relationship between workload and performance, as the workload increases, 
performance keeps oneself at maximum value until the task demand is lower than the operator 
psycho-physical resources (zone “A” in Fig. 40). When the demand exceeds the available resources, 
instead, the performance starts to decrease (zone “B” in Fig. 40), until it reach a minimum 
asymptotic value (zone “C” in Fig. 40), maintained independently by further workload increase. A 
positive difference between resources and demand represents a pool of spare capacity that permits 
to the operator to face possible unexpected events like a failure. Designing a HMI, in particular, it is 
very important to guarantee this margin. In Fig. 40 for simplicity operator resources has been 
considered constant to their maximum value. In real life, however, they vary according to several 
parameters (e.g. personal motivation, stress, etc.), and in particular they decrease in time due to the 
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fatigue. Therefore operator shifts in GCS shall be properly defined in order to guarantee always the 
safety, in terms of positive spare capacities. 
 
 
 
Figure 40. Workload and Performance Relationship 
 
 
3.2.3 Situational Awareness and Workload Relationship 
Situational Awareness and Workload are characterized by a complex relationship: 
 
 
 
Figure 41. Situational Awareness and Workload Relationship [45] 
 
 
Although related, Situational Awareness and Workload are however independent constructs. About 
their relationship, four fundamental states can be identified: 
1. Vigilance: both Situational Awareness and Workload are low. This state is typical of 
monitoring task and can involve operator inattentiveness or low motivation. 
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2. Ideal State: optimum condition in which the operator achieves a high Situational Awareness 
with a low Workload. It corresponds to the HMI design goal. 
3. Challenged State: the operator is able to maintain a high Situational Awareness, although the 
workload is increased. 
4. Overload: task demand exceeds the operator resources, and hence the workload is so high 
that the operator is not able to maintain the Situational Awareness. 
 
 
3.3 UAS Specific Issues 
After having drawn attention about the current UAS HMI lacks and having defined the concepts of 
Situational Awareness and Workload, the specific UAS Human Factor issues due to physical 
separation between operators and vehicle will be analyzed in details. These issues make the design 
of a GCS HMI very challenging with respect to a manned aircraft cockpit, and the poor 
consideration received in the past has contributed to make the Human Factor one of the main UAS 
mishap causes. 
An improvement in this direction is so needed: just to do an example the NASA has recently started 
(2010) a broad research activities about this problem in the ambit of UAS integration in the civil 
airspace [46].  
In the following paragraphs, each issue is discussed in detail [27]. 
 
3.3.1 Different Functional Allocation between Human and Automation 
In an UAS the functions allocation between automation and operator is different with respect to 
manned aircraft. In fact not only the level of automation is usually greater on a UAS, but also the 
functional division is different, with in general more functions assigned to the automation in an 
unmanned aircraft. This involves a shift in the operator role from a “traditional” pilot figure charged 
of vehicle manual control, to a supervisor that monitors the automation behavior and controls the 
aircraft through high level commands. A similar pilot role changes has been also verified on 
airliners when the FMS was introduced, but on a UAS the shift is enhanced. The increasing 
automation authority is needed due to the physical separation between operator and UAV, to the 
latency that makes difficult (especially in BLOS) the remote manual control and to the possibility to 
control more vehicles from a single GCS. Besides on an UASs it is also possible to perform actions 
usually not allowed on a manned aircraft, like for example the capability to wipe out the on-board 
computer memory on Predator [37], [42].  
This different human-automation interaction of course involves several issues in the design of the 
HMI – that shall always guarantee an adequate situational awareness about the automation state 
with a low workload – and to the automation logic, that shall be transparent as much as possible to 
the operator. Unlucky, this issue has not been adequately taken into account in current UASs, that 
have several problems about it. A detailed discussion of human-automation interaction will be 
provided in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.2 Huge Disparity in Level Of Automation 
An UAV can be usually controlled with different Levels Of Automation, ranging from the remote 
manual control to advanced full automatic/autonomous modes. In particular this disparity is greater 
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than on manned aircraft. Since the HMI is strictly related to the considered LOA, having different 
levels can complicate the design. According to the level, in fact, the information presented to the 
operator, the available controls and the system feedbacks vary. It is very different in fact providing 
high level commands like the route to fly or the target to observe, rather than direct control 
surface/engine commands with stick, pedals and throttle. Adding this huge disparity in LOA to the 
others UAS specific HF issues, it is not obvious optimizing the interface, with consequent influence 
on the operator performances. This issue, in particular, is critical for an interoperable GCS able to 
control different types of UAV.  
 
3.3.3 Lack of Sensory Cues 
Since the operator is not physically on the aircraft that controls, he/she suffers of a lack of sensory 
cues, like ambient visual input, kinaesthetic (experience of bodily position, weight and body 
movement provided by tactile sensors), vestibular (sense of balance and equilibrium provided by 
the inner ear) and auditory information [27]. The resultant sensory isolation reduces the operator 
situational awareness, increasing the probability of a hazard.  
This is especially a problem for remote manual control of the vehicle, for which the determination 
of aircraft state (attitude, speed, engine status, etc.) can be difficult for the operator, since it is based 
only on the information provided by the instruments and not also to the physical feeling directly 
experienced by the operator (e.g. accelerations, engine sound, etc.). In particular, for manual flying 
it is very important to have a visual reference of the external environment, but usually an UAS 
operator can rely only on the image provided by a guidance camera mounted on the vehicle nose, 
limited in terms of field of view, resolution and refresh rate due to communication bandwidth 
constraints. Among the limitations, this absence of a peripheral vision makes manual landings hard, 
with increasing mishap rates (e.g. Predator [38]).  
In order to compensate these lacks, there was in the past the tendency to provide a lot of 
information to the operator about the aircraft status, generating a possible overload. Processing 
more data, in fact, can generate a high cognitive effort to the operator, especially when the response 
time is critical, with a consequent workload increase. Besides due to a bad display design, these 
information are spread in different formats that can require several steps to be visualized, with a 
further workload augmentation caused by the operator frustration.  
An another way to mitigate the problem is to consider a greater automation, removing all problems 
related to manual flying of the vehicle. In this case it is not needed neither the video provided by the 
guidance camera. It is not easy however to reach the same flexibility provided by the manual 
control. 
In any case the HMI shall be designed taking carefully into account the lack of sensory cues, 
presenting to the operator in a feasible way all the needed information for the achievement of a 
correct mental model about the aircraft state. For manual control, in particular, the displays (e.g. the 
Head Up Display – HUD – superimposed over the guidance camera video) have specific symbols 
not present on analogous manned aircraft formats, like for example a dedicated Angle Of Attack 
(AOA) indication (see Fig. 34). 
 
3.3.4 Latency 
The datalink (uplink and downlink channels) introduces a latency in the control loop that – added to 
the lack of sensory cues – makes more difficult an UAV control with respect to a manned aircraft. 
In particular, this is a problem for satellite BLOS control, for which the latency is greater than 1 s, 
54 
 
making manual control of the vehicle impractical. This is true also for the payload control (e.g. 
EO/IR camera orientation through manual input on a stick). So a LOA increment for BLOS 
operation is mandatory in order to shift the operator role to a supervisory figure. More in detail, the 
latency effects are [38]: 
• compensatory tracking performances deterioration for latency of about 300 ms, 
• “move and wait” operator control strategy when the latency is greater than 1 s, 
• placement task performance deterioration when latency is above 82 ms, 
• over actuation problems when the system delay is unpredictable. 
 
3.3.5 No Shared Fate 
Being separated from the vehicle, the operator does not share its fate. This point, together with the 
sensory isolation and the latency effects, increases the separation feeling in the operator mind. In 
particular, this issue becomes relevant in case of hazard conditions (failures and/or threats), since 
the operator could manage the situation with a greater risk-taking tendency than on a manned 
aircraft where he/she shares the vehicle fate.  
 
3.3.6 Long Duration Mission 
“Dull” missions typically assigned to UASs (e.g. searching, monitoring, communication relay, etc.) 
are characterized by a long persistence on area of operation. This requires a proper crew turnover in 
GCS in order to maintain an adequate level of performances. Humans, in fact, present poor 
performances on prolonged vigilance tasks. At this purpose, several studies have demonstrated a 
vigilance decrement after only 20-35 minutes from work initiation, with a decline in correct 
responses and/or an increment in reaction times [47]. In particular, analyzing the Predator” operator 
community, an increment of 7.1 – 17.8 % in reaction time have been found on a course of an 8-hour 
shift, associated to an increased fatigue subjective rating and decreased alertness ratings. More 92% 
of operators have also reported moderate to total boredom [47].  
 
3.3.7 Control Migration 
UASs are characterized by the possibility to transfer the UAV and/or payload control between 
different stations. This procedure is named “handover”. In particular, the handover is possible 
between two different GCSs, two stations in the same GCS, external and internal operators or 
finally between two operators in the same internal station (crew turnover). This procedure is 
complex and in the past it caused several mishaps due to procedural errors. A specific HMI is 
required in order to guarantee an adequate situational awareness during the control passage.  
 
3.3.8 Lack of Standardization 
Manned aviation has well established standards for the HMI (e.g. standard “T” for the 
instrument/formats arrangement in the cockpit), consolidated after the experience of millions of 
flight hours and mishap lessons learned. UAS are still young and so an analogous standardization 
has not been reached in the past. The recent increment of flight hours, however, permits to define a 
standardization for UASs. This is a quite difficult task, since the disparity in the Level Of 
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Automation and the peculiarity of each system (developed in a military context and so with poor 
attention to these aspects) make complex to define a common line. There can be in fact systems that 
require an external pilot, others with conventional flight controls (stick, pedals and throttle) or 
station with a desk station controlled with mouse and keyboard, and finally a mix of the previous 
solutions. A first attempt has been done with the STANAG 4671, that in the section relative to the 
Control Station defines some generic requirements about the control types, the mandatory 
information to display and so on. But a more detailed activity is needed in order to integrate the 
UASs in the civil airspaces. In particular, the definition of common guidelines for the HMI design 
and implementation – that takes into account the previous issues – can lead to a reduction in the 
hazards due to Human Factor. Besides this harmonization will be useful also in an interoperability 
context in which a GCS is able to control different UAVs/payloads.  
Generally speaking, however, therequested standardization goes beyond the simple HMI aspect, 
since for example also possible Level Of Automation constraints (e.g. mandatory manual control as 
safety back up) or operator qualification (see section 1.7) are not clearly specified. At the end this 
problem is responsible to the general rule lack about UASs (see section 1.6). 
 
3.3.9 Lack of Application of Manned Cockpit Know-How 
Current UASs consider marginally the traditional manned aviation know-how. In particular, from 
the HMI standpoint, a GCS is not an aircraft cockpit due to all previously exposed issues, but the 
HF principles establish in more than a century of flight are not to be rejected a priori, since they can 
increase the usability and hence the safety of the system. Some of design errors of current GCS, in 
fact, could be avoided if HMI standards accepted for manned aviation were be considered(e.g. MIL-
STD-1472G or DEF-STD-0025). Like for rules (see section 1.6), in fact, only a part of standards 
can be used without any change, while an another can be considered with some modifications and 
finally there is a not applicable part. This poor re-used of aeronautics know-how is also due to the 
fact that in the past the main UAS manufacturers were not aeronautical industries (e.g. General 
Atomics for the Predator). The optimum is to merge the traditional aviation background with the 
UAS specific issues/knowledge in order to define the new standards mentioned in section 3.3.8.  
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4 HUMAN AUTOMATION INTERACTION 
 
 
4.1 Definition of Automation 
Automation has been introduced to reduce the operator workload and to increase the safety, 
replacing humans in the execution of prolonged/repetitive or critical tasks. An example is the FMS 
that relieves pilots from the boredom task to keep the aircraft in route during the cruise phase, or the 
advanced autolanding guidance modes that permit to land in poor/null visibility conditions without 
loss in safety. More formally there is the following definition [48]: 
 
The automation is defined as the execution by a machine agent (usually a computer) of a function 
that was previously carried out by a human. 
 
Current automation in aeronautics concerns essentially physical functions – like the previous 
examples of navigation and autolanding guidance modes – freeing humans from time-consuming 
and laborious tasks. Automation of cognitive functions like decision making and planning processes 
(normally devoted to the operator), instead, is rarer [48]. At this purpose, speaking about 
automation it is possible to distinguish between the two macro concepts of automatic and 
autonomous systems, having the following definitions [49]: 
 
Automatic systems are fully pre-programmed and act in the same manner regardless of the 
situation and whether the solution is the most favorable. 
 
Autonomous systems optimize their behavior in a goal-directed manner in unforeseen situations 
(i.e. in a given situation, the autonomous system finds the best solution). 
 
Today’s Flight Management Systems belong essentially to the first category, since they act from 
external inputs according to fixed laws. For example, given deviations in azimuth/elevation from 
the landing path and the aircraft state, the guidance will react according to an establish control 
algorithm to annul the errors. But the mode activation and validity conditions check are assigned to 
the pilot. Autonomy, instead, is a wider concept, since it provides automation also in the decision 
making/planning activities, besides to the automatism in the execution of the taken decisions. Just 
to do an idea: a current FMS follows the route planned by the pilot, while an autonomous system 
first determines the optimum route according to the mission objectives and then follows it. In 
manned aviation this concept is not implemented due to the presence of pilots on-board, but for the 
UASs it is a fundamental characteristic in order to enhance the system capabilities, especially for 
BLOS operations and the control of multiple vehicles from a single GCS. Autonomy, in particular, 
sometime is confused with intelligence, but they are not the same thing. Intelligence in fact is 
defined as [50]: 
 
The Intelligence is the capability of discovering knowledge and using it to do something. 
 
To resume, an automatic system performs actions exactly as programmed without any degree of 
freedom, an autonomous system is able to choice the actions to perform according to the assigned 
objectives and fixed decision/planning rules, and finally an artificial intelligence is able to modify 
the decision/planning rules according to the knowledge learnt by mission environment. In any case, 
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there is not an universally accepted distinction between automatism, autonomy and intelligence, and 
these concepts can overlap. 
 
 
4.2 Level Of Automation 
In practice, it is not easy to classify a system as automatic, autonomous or intelligent – that is to 
determine the Level Of Automation (LOA) – since there are many intermediate conditions. 
Considering for example the performance optimization function of the FMS, it has the capability to 
determine the optimum altitude and the step climb points, but the acceptance of these suggestions is 
however delegated to the pilot. Comparing this situation with the previous definitions of automatic 
and autonomous systems, thus there is a middle situation in which the system is able to propose a 
decision to the operator if he/she requires it, but not to activate it without an authorization. Level Of 
Automation, in fact, can not be represent by three discrete categories, but it evolves along a 
continuum. Therefore in order to determine actually the LOA of a system several measure scales 
have been defined, discretizing the automation continuum with different criteria. One of the most 
diffuse scale has been created by Parasuraman, Sheridan et al. dividing the LOA in ten values 
according to the allocation of the decision making task: 
 
 
LOA Meaning 
10 Computer ignores the human. 
9 Computer reports only if it wants to. 
8 Computer only reports if asked. 
7 Computer executes, then reports to human. 
6 Human can veto computer decision within timeframe. 
5 Computer executes suggestion with approval. 
4 Computer suggest one alternative. 
3 Computer chooses a set of alternatives. 
2 Computer computes complete set of alternatives. 
1 Human makes all decisions. 
Table 12. Parasuraman, Sheridan et al. LOA scale 
 
 
Although extensively diffused, this scale has some limits, since it is limited to the decision making 
phase, that it is the core of automation, but does not represent the whole “cognitive” process 
performed by the automation. Besides it is more suitable to evaluate a single function than a 
complete system, and it does not consider the specific context. More details are provided by the 
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Autonomous Control Level (ACL) scale, developed by the USA Air Force Research Laboratory. It 
was developed specifically for UAS and it based not only on the analysis/decision making process, 
but also to perception/situational awareness and communication/cooperation features. Considering 
more parameters, it is able to distinguish better between the different UAS categories. At difference 
of Parasuraman and Sheridan scale, it provides eleven levels, ranging from the remotely piloted 
vehicle (level 0) to the human like UAS (level 10). 
 
 
Level Level Descriptor Perception/Situational Awareness Analysis/Decision Making Communication/Cooperation 
10 Human-Like / / / 
9 
Multi-Vehicle Tactical 
Performance 
Optimization 
Detection & Tracking of other 
air vehicles within airspace. 
Full decision making capability on-board. 
Dynamically optimize multi-ship group for 
tactical situation. 
Distributed cooperation with other 
air vehicles. On-board deconfliction 
and collision avoidance. Fully 
independent of supervision/control if 
desired. No centralized control 
within multi-UAV group. 
8 
Multi-Vehicle Mission 
Performance 
Optimization 
Detection & Tracking of other 
air vehicles within local 
airspace. 
OK to operate in controlled 
airspace w/o external control. 
Continuous mission/trajectory evaluation & 
replan – optimize for current mission 
situation. Avoid collisions and 
replan/optimize trajectory to meet goal, etc. 
External supervision – abort/recall or 
new overall goal. On-board 
deconfliction & collision avoidance. 
Distributed cooperation with other 
air vehicles. 
7 Real-Time Multi-Vehicle Cooperation 
Detection of other air vehicles 
in local airspace. Multi-threat 
detection/analysis on-board. 
Continuous flight path evaluation & replan. 
Compensate for anticipated system 
malfunctions, weather, etc. – optimize 
trajectory to meet goals, manager resources, 
avoid threats, etc. 
On-board collision avoidance. Uses 
off-board data sources for 
deconfliction & tracking. 
Hierarchical cooperation with other 
air vehicles. 
6 Real-Time Multi-Vehicle Coordination 
Detection of other air vehicles 
in local airspace. Single threat 
detection/analysis on-board. 
Event-driven on board. RT flight path 
replan – goal driven & avoid threats. 
RT health diagnosis. Ability to compensate 
for most failures and flight conditions – 
inner loop changes reflected in outer loop 
performance. 
On-board collision avoidance. Uses 
off-board data sources for 
deconfliction & tracking. Assumed 
acceptance of replan. External 
supervision – rejection of plan is an 
exception. Possible close air space 
separation (1-100 yds). 
5 Fault/Event Adaptive Vehicle 
Automated Aerial Refueling & 
Formation sensing. Situational 
Awareness supplemented by 
off-board data (threats, other 
air vehicles, etc). 
Event-driven on board. RT trajectory replan 
to new destination. RT Health Diagnosis. 
Ability to compensate for most failures and 
flight conditions and to predict onset of 
failures. On-board assessment of status vs. 
mission completion. 
On-board derived vehicle trajectory 
“corridors”. Uses off-board data 
sources for deconfliction & tracking. 
External supervision – accept/reject 
of replan. Possible close air space 
separation (1-100 yds) for automated 
aerial refueling, formation in non-
threat conditions. 
4 
Robust Response to 
Anticipated 
Faults/Events 
Threat Sensing on-board. 
RT Health Diagnosis. Ability to compensate 
for most failures and flight conditions. 
Automatic trajectory execution. On-board 
assessment of status vs. mission 
completion. 
Secure within LOS electronic theater 
to nearby friendlies. Offboard 
derived vehicle “corridors”. Medium 
vehicle airspace separation (100’s of 
yds). Threat analysis off-board. 
3 Limited Response to Real Time Faults/Events / 
RT Health Diagnosis. Ability to compensate 
for limited failures.  
Automatic trajectory execution. 
Health Status monitored by external 
supervision. Off-board replan/WP 
plan upload. Wide airspace 
separation requirements (miles). 
2 Pre-loaded Alternative Plans / 
RT Health Diagnosis. Automatic trajectory 
execution (via WPs). Preloaded alternative 
plans (e.g. abort). 
External commands – alternative 
plans, approvals, aborts. Report 
status on request or on schedule. 
Wide airspace separation 
requirements (miles). 
1 Execute Preplanned Mission 
Situational awareness via 
Remote Operator Flight 
Control and Navigation 
Sensing 
Robotic/Preprogrammed. 
Pre/post Flight BIT. 
External control via low level 
commands. Reports status on 
request. Wide Airspace separation 
requirements (miles). No on-board 
knowledge of other air vehicles-all 
actions are preplanned. 
0 Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
Flight Control (altitude, rates) 
sensing. Nose Camera. 
Situational Awareness via 
Remote Pilot. 
N/A Remotely Piloted. Vehicle status data via telemetry. 
Table 13. Initial ACL metrics chart [50] 
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Nevertheless the greater provided details with respect to the previous scales, the initial ACL metrics 
have some problems [50]: 
• the metrics are not broad enough to cover UAS acting on strategic knowledge: they are 
limited to the tactical level, 
• the cooperation (“what”) is mixed to the communication (“how”) in the same metric. 
In order to improve the scale resolution, a new version of the ACL metrics has been developed: 
 
 
Level Level Descriptor 
Observe 
Perception/ 
Situational Awareness 
Orient 
Analysis/Coordination 
Decide 
Decision Making 
Act 
Capability 
10 Fully Autonomous 
Cognizant of all within 
Battlespace Coordinates as necessary. 
Capable of total 
independence. 
Requires little guidance to do 
job. 
9 
Battlespace 
Swarm 
Cognizance 
Battlespace Inference – 
Intent of self and others. 
Complex/intense 
environment on-board 
tracking. 
Strategic group goals 
assigned. Enemy strategy 
inferred. 
Distributed tactical group 
planning. Individual 
determination of tactical 
goal. Individual task 
planning/execution. 
Choose tactical targets. 
Group accomplishment of 
strategic goal with no 
supervisory assistance. 
8 Battlespace Cognizance 
Proximity Inference – Intent 
of self and others. Reduced 
dependence upon off-board 
data. 
Strategic group goals 
assigned. Enemy tactics 
inferred ATR. 
Coordinated tactical group 
planning. Individual task 
planning/execution. 
Choose targets of 
opportunity. 
Group accomplishment of 
strategic goal with minimal 
supervisory assistance. 
7 Battlespace Knowledge 
Short track awareness. 
History and predictive 
Battlespace data in limited 
range, timeframe and 
numbers. limited inference 
supplemented by off-board 
data, 
Tactical group goals 
assigned. Enemy trajectory 
estimates. 
Individual task planning / 
execution to meet goals. 
Group accomplishment of 
tactical goal with minimal 
supervisory assistance. 
6 
Real Time Multi-
Vehicle 
Cooperation 
Ranged awareness – on 
board sensing for long range, 
supplemented by off-board 
data. 
Tactical group goals 
assigned. Enemy location 
sensed/ estimated. 
Coordinated trajectory 
replanning – group 
optimization. 
Group accomplishment of 
tactical goal with minimal 
supervisory assistance. 
Possible close air space 
separation (1-100 yds). 
5 
Real Time Multi-
Vehicle 
Coordination 
Sensed awareness – Local 
sensors to detect others, 
fused with off-board data. 
Tactical group plan assigned. 
RT Health diagnosis. Ability 
to compensate for most 
failures and flight conditions. 
Ability to predict onset of 
failures. Group diagnosis an 
resource management. 
On-board trajectory 
replanning – optimize for 
current and predictive 
conditions. Collision 
avoidance. 
Group accomplishment of 
tactical plan as externally 
assigned. Air collision 
avoidance. Possible close air 
space separation (1-100 yds) 
for air refueling, formation in 
non-threat conditions. 
4 Fault/Event Adaptive Vehicle 
Deliberate awareness – allies 
communicate data. 
Tactical plan assigned. 
Assigned rules of 
engagements. RT health 
diagnosis. Ability to 
compensate for most failures 
and flight conditions – inner 
loop changes reflected in 
outer loop performance. 
On-board trajectory 
replanning – event driven 
self resource management 
deconfliction. 
Self accomplishment of 
tactical plan as externally 
assigned. Medium vehicle 
airspace separation (100’s of 
yds). 
3 
Robust Response 
to Real Time 
Faults/Events 
Health/status history & 
models. 
Tactical plan assigned. RT 
health diagnosis. Ability to 
compensate for most control 
failures and flight conditions. 
Evaluate status vs. 
required mission 
capabilities. Abort/RTB 
insufficient. 
Self accomplishment of 
tactical plan as externally 
assigned. 
2 Changeable Mission Health/status sensors. 
RT Health diagnosis. Off-
board replan (as required). 
Execute preprogrammed 
or uploaded plans in 
response to mission and 
health conditions. 
Self accomplishment of 
tactical plan as externally 
assigned. 
1 
Execute 
Preplanned 
Mission 
Preloaded mission data. 
Flight Control and 
Navigation Sensing. 
Pre/Post flight BIT. Report 
status. 
Preprogrammed mission 
and abort plans. 
Wide airspace separation 
requirements (miles). 
0 Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
Flight Control (altitude, rate) 
sensing. Nose camera. 
Telemetered data. Remote 
pilot commands. N/A Control by remote pilot. 
Table 14. Final ACL Chart [50] 
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Since the final objective of the automation is to replace humans (level 10 of the initial chart), the 
idea that has driven the development of the new ACL scale is to consider a human effectiveness 
metric to evaluate the UAS Level Of Automation: the “Observe Orient Decide & Act” (OODA) 
loop. OODA – originally developed to model the human behavior in problem solving task – has 
been interpreted for the UAS context, associating each issue to the corresponding UAV step (e.g. 
observation phase is considered as the achieving of the situational awareness by the vehicle thanks 
to its sensors). Although developed for military context, the scale can be however used for civil 
UASs, since the capability to perceive the environment and to analyze the collected data is 
equivalent independently to be in a battlespace or in a generic operative scenario. Only the words 
change. 
Generally speaking the ACL charts is futuristic, since current UASs reach only a low LOA. 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Trend in UAS Level Of Automation [2] 
 
 
As reported in the previous figure, the Predator has an ACL of 2, while the more advanced Global 
Hawk reaches about 2.5. The curve in Fig.42 is relative to 2005, but the foreseen trend has not be 
realized since now there are not operative UASs with an ACL of nearly 7 (at least in MALE, HALE 
and UCAV categories). Develop an high Level Of Automation, in fact, is not a trivial task, due to 
the difficulty in the implementation of the relative algorithms, especially considering also the 
certification standpoint. In any case, as the LOA increases, the type of interaction between human 
operator and automation changes. In particular, the following types can be distinguished: 
• Direct manual control: the automation has no or very little role. 
• Assisted manual control: the automation helps the operator that keeps however the manual 
control of the system (e.g. Flight Director). 
• Shared control: automation and operator share the control of the vehicle (e.g. basic autopilot 
modes in which the operator set a demand, that is reached and kept by the system). 
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• Management by delegation: the operator delegates the automation to perform some tasks 
(e.g. advanced navigation guidance modes in which the vehicle follows automatically a path 
defined by the operator or the autolanding). The automation can not take the initiative. 
• Management by consent: automation proposes an action that will be executed only after the 
operator approval (e.g. new route proposed by the system according to a change in the 
operative scenario, first evaluated by the operator and then in case accepted). 
• Management by exception: automation proposes an action that will be executed if no 
stopped by the operator within a time frame (e.g. on-board route replan in case of 
emergency). Human approval is not mandatory. 
• Autonomous Operation: further advanced levels in which the automation decides 
autonomously to act, reporting or not the decision to the operator. 
Comparing these interaction types with the LOA and the Human involvement, there are the 
following situations: 
 
 
 
Figure 43. Human Automation Interaction Levels [42] 
 
 
It is quite easy to correlate the previous interaction types with the Parasuraman and Sheridan scale, 
since it considers only the decision-making allocation that is just the parameter used to discriminate 
the several human-automation relationships. For the ACL chart, instead, the correlation is more 
complicated, due to the fact that it is relative to the global system and do not consider explicitly 
who takes decision between human and automation. Besides, in a UAS there can be functions with 
different Levels Of Automation, and the ACL does not discriminate this situation. In any case, a 
possible classification of human-automation interactions for the ACL and Parasuraman-Sheridan 
scales is provided in Tab. 15. From the comparison between these scales, the futuristic vision of the 
ACL is reconfirmed, since more than half levels are relative to autonomous operation. Operative 
62 
 
UASs reach in fact only a Management by Delegation interaction, and so they can be classified as 
automatic system. 
 
 
LOA Parasuraman-Sheridan et al.  ACL 
10 Autonomous Operation Autonomous Operation 
9 Autonomous Operation Autonomous Operation 
8 Autonomous Operation Autonomous Operation 
7 Autonomous Operation Autonomous Operation 
6 Management by Exception Autonomous Operation 
5 Management by Consent Autonomous Operation 
4 Management by Consent Management by Exception 
3 Management by Consent Management by Consent 
2 Management by Consent Management by Delegation 
1 Direct, Assisted or Shared control, 
or Management by Delegation Management by Delegation 
0 N.A. Direct, Assisted or Shared control 
Table 15. LOA scales vs. Human-Automation interaction 
 
 
4.3 Human Supervisory Control 
According to the Human-Automation interaction type, the operator role changes. In particular, 
starting from the Management by Delegation strategy (i.e. automatic system), there is a shift from a 
direct controller figure to a supervisor role. As the automation increases further, the supervision 
switches to higher command levels. In particular between human and vehicle there are some 
computers as intermediates. This form of computer mediated control is named Human Supervisory 
Control (HSC), and it is particularly suitable to describe the control of an UAS 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Human Supervisory Control [51], [52] 
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More in detail HSC can be represented by four nested control loops.  
 
 
 
Figure 45. HSC nested control loops [51], [52] 
 
 
The inner loop is relative to the motion control/guidance of the vehicle, and it is directly related to 
the dynamics of the specific UAV. It comprises the management of autopilot (basic modes). The 
second loop extends the control to the navigation, that is vehicle position determination, route 
planning and its execution. Practically it involves many FMS functions. Finally outer loop considers 
the management of the mission and payload. In this case the operator provides only high level 
commands to the vehicle. Parallel to these three control loops, there is the system health and status 
monitoring loop, that is transversely to the previous ones.  
Each control loop can be allocated partially or totally to human or automation. According to this 
allocation there are all the possible LOA. In particular different LOA there could be also inside the 
same loop: for example the planning can be manual while the route execution is automatic.  
The reduction of human involvement in low level tasks execution permits to allocate the limited 
human resources to the more demanding knowledge based processes of monitoring, situation 
analysis and decision making. As the LOA increases, also part of these processes are allocated to 
the automation. This permits a quick system reaction in time pressure situations (e.g. a failures or 
new target detection), reducing further the operator workload. Besides automating the first two 
control loops is a fundamentals step in order to achieve the multi vehicle control. 
 
 
4.4 Automation Problems 
 
It is apparent that rather than eliminating human error; some of the new technology has simply 
resulted in creation of entirely new opportunities and entirely new categories of human error to 
occur” (Lauber, 1987). [38] 
 
Nevertheless the automation has been introduced to augment the system capabilities and safety, the 
poor attention to the HMI perspective has raised new Human Factor issues. In particular, in the last 
decades this matter has received greater attention for manned aviation after some catastrophic 
accidents that have thought over the way in which the automation has been integrated in the 
cockpit. This knowledge pool is directly applicable also on UAS, for which these issues are more 
critical due to the greater LOA. Some UAV losses, in fact, have been just caused by human-
automation interaction problems. In the following sections, the several Human Factor issues related 
to the automation are discussed. 
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4.4.1 Mode Awareness 
On 20th January 1992 an Airbus A-320 crashed during the landing to the Strasburg-Entzheim 
Airport in France due to an erroneous crew autopilot setting. The crew inserted 3.3 intending to fly 
with a 3.3 degree glide scope on the landing path convinced to be in autolanding mode, but at the 
moment the active autopilot mode was the vertical speed, and so the command resulted in a descent 
rate of 3300 ft/min with the consequent crash [52].  
This is only an example of one of the accidents caused by a poor crew situational awareness about 
the automation state and the way in which it works. This issue is named “mode awareness” 
(sometimes also “mode confusion”), and it is one of the main problems in human-automation 
interaction.  
A mode is defined as a system state that corresponds to an unique behavior [27]. The operator 
interacts with them in order to accomplish the assigned task. Comparing task description, user 
mental model about how automation work and feedback provided by the automation interface, the 
following diagram is obtained: 
 
 
 
Figure 46. Mode Awareness factors [53] 
 
 
Referring to Fig.46 the optimal situation is in the zone 1, where all factors are adequate. In order to 
keep a good mode awareness, in fact, three conditions shall occur simultaneously: the task shall be 
clearly specified (e.g. ATC constraints), the user shall have a comprehensive knowledge about the 
automation functioning and finally the interface shall provide an unambiguous feedback about the 
automation state. Current systems are improvable in all these aspects. Starting from the task 
specification, it depends only in part to the system, but having modes that permit to satisfy directly 
the assigned tasks helps. Unfortunately autopilots/FMSs are very complex systems and the pilot 
often has to reformulate the task in several steps that he/she has to perform. Complexity is related 
directly to the big number of available modes on airliners (in average 25 [54]) and to the transitions 
between them. Just to give an idea: in average the 80% of control laws code consists of logical 
statements [53].  
Modes are usually classified in three categories: pitch modes (i.e. modes relative to vertical plane 
motion through pitch commands), roll modes (i.e. modes relative to lateral plane motion through 
roll commands) and thrust modes (i.e. modes relative to vertical plane motion through autothrottle 
commands). In Fig. 47 it is reported an example relative to the Boeing B-747 400, that has 21 
different modes. The proliferation of guidance modes is due to the attempt to reproduce with 
automation the same flexibility provided by the pilot manual control, but this has complicates 
considerably the management of the system. Besides to the difficulty to choose the proper mode 
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combination to perform the assigned task on the three control channels (pitch, roll and autothrottle), 
there are other conditions that shall be monitored by the pilot. Each mode in fact is characterized by 
a set of conditions relative to [55]: 
• engagement, 
• arming, 
• disengagement, 
• control properties (subsystem involved, set of parameters controlled, control moding), 
• pilot overrides allowed. 
 
 
Figure 47. Boeing B-747 400 modes representation on PFD [34] 
 
 
Further complication is provided by the fact that some tasks can be performed in several ways: for 
example the speed can be controlled with a pitch mode or the autothrottle, and still the demand 
value can be taken from the flight plan or set by the pilot (eventually overriding the planned 
demand). Although pitch/thrust are the same parameters used in manual flight to control the speed, 
the pilots have shown difficulty to translate these concepts in relation to automation. 
Besides not all the available modes can be commanded by the pilot, since some of them are 
submodes used by the system to achieve the assigned task. For example the pilot usually activates 
the autolanding, and then the system passes automatically from the Glide Scope (G/S) during the 
descent phase to Flare before the touchdown. G/S and flare modes can not be activated directly by 
the crew. This automatic mode changes are very frequent and they are critical for the crew 
situational awareness. Researches on pilot community in fact have demonstrated as 30-40 % of 
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these changes go undetected with an increasing mishap probability [53], as occurred in some 
catastrophic events in the past.  
All previous considerations explains why it is difficult for the pilots to keep an adequate mental 
model about how the automation works. “What is the system doing?” and “What will the system 
perform?” are typical questions pondered by pilots. This has an impact also on training, since 
currently nearly 40% of an aircraft type rating course is devoted to learn the use of autopilot/FMS 
guidance [54].  
Also the poor Human Machine Interface contributes to decrease the mode awareness. The 
indication of active and armed modes is reported on the PFD (see Fig.47), but the automatic 
changes are not particularly highlighted. Besides the Autopilot Mode Panel on which the crew 
interacts directly with the guidance system often provides less information than PFD, and this can 
be misleading. As consequence the pilot is not assisted adequately by the system to understand what 
the automation is doing, and this could be dangerous. 
To resume: the poor attention to Human Factor perspective in the design of guidance laws (both in 
term of functional moding and HMI) has leaded to an issue about crew mode awareness, identified 
as main cause of several catastrophic accidents.  
 
4.4.2 Trust in Automation 
The reduced mode awareness can draw the operator trust in the automation. This is critical 
especially in cases where the automation is optional, and so the trust is one of the main factor 
affecting the decision whether use or not the automatisms. If the operator has a poor awareness 
about how the automation works and what it is doing, in fact, he/she can thinks that a so complex 
system is very reliable also if little transparent, or at the contrary he/she can maturate a poor trust in 
a system for which it is difficult to understand and predict the behavior. In any case an incorrect 
trust can be dangerous, because in a critical situations an operator could react in a wrong way due to 
his/her biases. An excessive trust in fact could lead the operator to blindly use the automation also if 
it is in fail or if it is more appropriate to take manual control, while a too low trust at the contrary 
could lead the operator to ignore system alerts (considered false) or to disengage the automation at 
the first demanding situation, also if it is safer. In the first case there is the so-called complacency 
phenomenon (also named automation misuse), while in the second case we speak about automation 
disuse. Complacency, in particular, is dangerous coupled to poor human vigilance capabilities, with 
consequent huge reaction time in case of sudden critical events.  
 
 
 
Figure 48. Trust-Automation Reliability relationship [42] 
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It is so very important for humans developing a calibrated trust level in the system. Assuming an 
adequate training of the operator, the trust in automation is directly proportional to its reliability, as 
reported in Fig. 48. Human Machine Interface however concurs to reach a correct trust. If the 
automation state, action feedbacks and health alerts are adequately presented to the operator, in fact, 
a greater mode awareness is provided and so he/she is more prone to develop an adequate trust. This 
issue is particularly critical for advanced UASs in which there is not the possibility of manual 
control. 
 
4.4.3 Switch from Physical to Cognitive Workload 
Passing from manually controlled to automated system, the cognitive workload component has 
gained relevance with respect to the physical one. This has involved a change in the cockpit design 
due to the new supervisor role of the operator. In particular the monitoring, planning and decision 
making activities can lead to a cognitive saturation of the operator (i.e. a very high workload) – 
especially when there is the need to process many information in a little time – with consequent 
detriment of performance and the safety. This problem is in particular applicable for the UASs, in 
which the operator is not physically on-board the vehicle. Therefore the automation and its relative 
interface shall be properly designed in order to aid the operator in these tasks.  
 
4.4.4 Unbalanced Workload 
Although automation has been introduced with the objective to reduce the operator workload, 
sometimes it provides an unexpected effect in which the workload is reduced when it is already low 
and increased when it is high.  
 
 
 
Figure 49. Workload distribution per phase of flight 
 
 
Considering the cruise phase for example, the introduction of the FMS has reduced further the 
workload in a low effort phase, automating some functions previously performed by pilots (e.g. 
NAVAIDs tuning). Therefore pilots are relegated to system monitoring tasks, falling in the 
vigilance case where humans perform poor. The resultant low attention can negatively affect the 
pilot reaction time to a sudden event (e.g. collision avoidance or failure).  
In the opposite case, in time critical situation interacting with automation could augment 
considerably the workload due to the poor HMI and to the system complexity. A NASA research 
about the FMS induced workload in the Terminal Area operations (evaluated with the NASA TLX 
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scale) [56], in fact, has demonstrated as the FMS is the more demanding way to control the aircraft, 
considering a route change and the communication with the ATC as reference tasks (see Fig. 50). In 
particular, in these cases the basic autopilot modes have been considered the less demanding 
controls by the pilots, and it is preferred with respect to manual control. In other words, an 
intermediate Level Of Automation has been considered more suitable by the interviewee crews to 
manage a quick aircraft path change in stressful conditions. 
For the UASs this is a crucial issue, especially for the most advanced systems that do not have the 
possibility to be manually controlled. In particular, due to the physical separation between vehicle 
and operator, for UASs the opposite solution to adopt a higher LOA can be a better solution. Off 
course a proper Human Machine Interface is needed to support this solution. 
 
 
 
Figure 50. Workload vs. LOA in Terminal Area operations [56] 
 
 
4.4.5 Increased Crew Coordination demand 
Due to the poor transparency provided by highly automated system, a greater crew coordination is 
required in order to provide an adequate situational awareness for the operators. If a pilot, in fact, 
reprograms the FMS without informs the other crew member, probably the second will not be aware 
of the change and so he/she will develop an incorrect mental model about what the aircraft will do. 
This situation has caused several mishaps in the past. Comparing the time required to share a FMS 
change with those relative to autopilot and manual control, it is in fact evident a clear disadvantage 
for the first due to its complexity. 
 
 
Figure 51. Crew Coordination Time vs. LOA in Terminal Area Operations [56] 
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Although this issue can be solved with a proper training and procedures, the interface can however 
help the crew providing a greater transparency about automation moding and notifying any 
performed change. For a UAS this is critical for the coordination between the several GCS 
operators, especially between UAV and payload operators. 
 
 
4.5 RAFIV Model 
In the previous sections the general Human Factor issues relative to automation have been 
presented, but the description of how exactly an operator interacts with automated system has not 
been provided. This knowledge is useful, since it provides many practical indications about the 
Human Machine Interface design.  
Among the several models present in literature the RAFIV model has been chosen, developed by a 
partnership between Honeywell (company active in the FMS design and production), the University 
of Colorado (Institute of Cognitive Science) and the NASA Ames Research Center [27], [57], [58]. 
RAFIV means “Reformulate Access Format Insert Verify & Monitor”, i.e. the five steps in which 
the human-automation interaction is broken down. Although RAFIV has a general validity, it has 
been specifically developed for the interaction with the MCDU of the FMS. Therefore it is 
particularly suitable for our purposes.  
Basic idea of the RAFIV models is that the efficiency and the robustness of the interface is function 
of the volume of actions memorized by the operator. 
 
 
 
Figure 52. RAFIV Model [57] 
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At each step corresponds the following operator actions [27], [57], [58]: 
1) Reformulate: the assigned task shall be reformulated in terms of data to communicate to the 
automation. In other words, in this phase the operator creates a mental model about how the 
system shall be used. For example an ATC altitude clearance is converted into the set of 
data to enter in order to modify the current VNAV profile.  
2) Access: once a mental description of the automation use has been defined, the correct 
interface (i.e. hierarchy of pages, format, panel, etc.) shall be accessed by the operator. This 
step corresponds to the operator mental orientation toward the correct interface to use, and 
to the identification of the required actions to display the field for the data entry. 
3) Format: identified the interface the operator enters the data with the proper format (e.g. L0.5 
for a left route offset, or N4515.345 for the latitude).  
4) Insert: once the data have been entered, the operator shall insert them in the proper field. 
This step is very typical of traditional MCDU in which the data are entered in a scratchpad 
and then inserted in the correct field acting on the line select keys. In case a data is directly 
entered in its field, the phases 3) and 4) can be joined in a single step. 
5) Verify & Monitor: finally the operator shall monitor that the command has been accepted by 
the automation, that the system performs correctly and that the command is appropriate to 
accomplish the assigned task. 
Each step can be accomplished by the operator recalling the appropriate actions from the long term 
memory or recognizing them from the visual cues provided by the interface [27]. Relying on too 
much on memory is not an advantageous strategy, especially for infrequent tasks. In these cases, in 
fact, it has been demonstrated that the success probability is lower than 50%, with consequent 
operator skills deterioration due to the low frequency of tasks execution and an increased 
complexity perceived by the crew [57]. Besides also the training time is 2-10 time greater [57]. 
Unlucky current MCDUs are poor from this standpoint, especially in terms of not adequately task 
support (with consequent needed reformulation) and poor guide provided by the interface in the 
data entry.  
 
 
 
Figure 53. Example of tasks directly supported/not supported by a FMS [58] 
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To aggravate the situation many tasks are not frequent: considering for example the Boeing B-777 
MCDU and a sample of 102 tasks, the74% of them of them need memorized action sequences and 
the 46% occurs infrequently [27].  
Therefore the weak human-automation interaction is due to the way in which the automation 
functions have been implemented and to the poor HMI. Display size and device layout are not 
considered as causes. 
From this analysis some guidelines for a new FMS interface can be derived [27]: 
• the interface shall support directly (as much as possible) the mission task execution to 
reduce the workload related to the reformulate step, 
• the operator shall be guided in the interface interaction with visual cues like labels, prompt, 
dialog boxes, pop up and so on, 
• the step of verity & monitor can be simplified displaying to the operator a visual 
representation of automation state. 
In particular for the second and third points, the adoption of a Graphical User Interface seems the 
solution (in fact the modern FMSs have it as reported in Fig. 33), but it is not enough alone. It is the 
careful design of the automation functions in support of mission tasks that makes the difference.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
5 STANAG 4586 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The STANAG 4586 is a NATO standard for the UAS interoperability that provides interfaces for 
the communications between GCS/UAV and GCS/C4I (Command Control Communication 
Computer Information center). External mission Planning stations and logistic support are included 
in C4Is. Today’s many UASs have been designed as systems with specific interfaces and unique 
software/hardware architectures, that do not permit the achievement of an adequate interoperability 
with different UASs. Considering that usually there are several UASs that cooperate to reach the 
mission goals, there could be a proliferation of GCSs and difficulty to share the collected mission 
data to the C4Is.  
 
 
 
Figure 54. Current UAV System Operation Example [1] 
 
 
In order to reduce the operative costs and enhance the mission effectiveness in terms of 
exploitation, dissemination and analysis of gathered data, a proper standard for UAS 
interoperability is therefore needed. At this purpose, the STANAG 4586 has been developed. 
According to it, a compliant GCS would be ideally able to control each compliant UAV/payload 
and exchanging information with compatible C4Is. In practice this is not directly possible due to the 
need of some specific modules, with the relative problems of integration and qualification (critical 
for the civil certification). Actually a GCS will be able to interact with all UAVs and C4Is for which 
it has been integrated and qualified. Following a standard, however, the processes of integration and 
qualification should be shorter and easier with respect to starting from zero with a specific solution. 
Although the STANAG 4586 has been conceived for military applications, it is directly applicable 
also to civil missions, since they have the same requirements of interoperability. The matter of UAS 
integration in civil air space however is not treated in the standard.  
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Currently the STANAG 4586 is still not very diffused in operative UASs, but it is adopted as 
reference in the design of many new systems, and therefore it is a very good candidate to become 
the universal standard in the near future.  
At the moment, there are two published editions of the STANAG 4586, and the third has been 
diffused in draft. In any case, due to the complexity and the broad of the subject, and to the early 
maturity of the standard, in practice the STANAG 4586 is difficult to implement since many design 
choices and solutions can be adopted. In order to help the designers, therefore, a relative 
Implementation Guide has been developed [59]. The guide however provides only suggestions to be 
compliant to the standard, but not mandatory requirements. 
The second edition has been adopted as reference for the FMS design, especially in terms of 
interface protocols. This differentiates further a FMS for UAS with respect to that for an airliner, 
since the STANAG 4586 philosophy is quite different from traditional manned aviation concepts 
due to many peculiarities of unmanned systems. Besides, nevertheless the STANAG 4586 provides 
directly only a guide to define the system internal interfaces, it affects as consequence also the 
design of the system architecture, functionalities and the relative HMI. Considering the interface 
between GCS and UAV (or better a specific module of the UAS control system as it is reported 
next), in fact, the STANAG 4586 provides a series of standard messages in both the link directions 
(uplink and downlink) plus the possibility to create new specific messages (private messages). 
However the use of a protocol (with the relative message structure and data) inevitably affects the 
design of the system functions and architectures especially considering the requirement to reduce as 
much as possible the vehicle specific elements in order to reach the greatest possible 
interoperability. 
 
 
5.2 Level Of Interoperability 
According to the STANAG 4586 there is the following definition of interoperability [1]: 
 
The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other nations to train, 
exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. 
 
This is a generic definition that does not discriminate the possible intermediate situations. At this 
purpose, the STANAG 4586 has created the concept of Level Of Interoperability (LOI) for the 
communication between GCS and UAVs. In particular there are the following five levels [1]: 
• LOI 1: indirect receipt of UAV related payload data. 
• LOI 2: direct receipt of UAV payload data. 
• LOI 3: control and monitoring of the UAV payload in addition to direct receipt of other data. 
• LOI 4: control and monitoring of the UAV, less launch and recovery. 
• LOI 5: control and monitoring of the UAV (level 4), plus launch and recovery functions. 
Note that higher levels do not necessarily include previous levels: for example it is possible to have 
the full control of the vehicle (LOI 5), without the payload control (LOI 3). Payload control (LOI 
3), instead, comprises the direct reception of relative data (LOI 2).  
Besides the LOI concept considers only the interoperability between GCS and UAV, and not 
between the GCS and C4Is. A GCS can implement different levels of interoperability for the same 
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UAV or for different vehicles (e.g. a GCS can be able to control the UAV “A” and its relative 
payload, or to control the payload of the UAV “B” and to have a direct receipt of UAV “C” data).  
For a FMS, the LOI 5 has been considered since the payload control is not demanded to it. In 
particular, fifth level permits to include also the autotakeoff and autolanding modes for the guidance 
function. Interoperability with the C4I is not treated, since it is not a FMS function. 
 
 
5.3 System Architecture 
In order to implement the interoperability requirement, a proper system architecture shall be 
adopted. In particular referring to the UAS definition provided in the Chapter 1, it is possible to 
distinguish the elements reported in Fig. 55. The communications between them are defined by 
several standards. In particular the STANAG 4586 is applicable to the Unmanned Control System 
(UCS), for which it specifies the requirements for the definition of the architecture and the 
interfaces. 
 
 
 
Figure 55. UAV System Interoperability Architecture [1] 
 
 
The UCS is composed by the following elements [1]: 
• Core UCS (CUCS), 
• Human Computer Interface (HCI), 
• Data Link Interface (DLI), 
• Command and Control Interface (CCI), 
• Vehicle Specific Module (VSM), 
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• Command and Control Interface Specific Module (CCISM). 
 
 
Figure 56. UCS Functional Architecture [1] 
 
 
CUCS is the “core” of the control system and it is responsible to provide the control functions 
according to the implemented LOI. In case an UAV has not been fully developed according to 
STANAG 4586, a VSM is added to the system. Vehicle Specific Module is mainly responsible to 
translate the standard STANAG protocol into unique/vehicle proprietary native language and vice 
versa, with the relative interface timing and data format conversions. The VSM is the key of the 
STANAG 4586 interoperability philosophy, since in order to enable the control of a new 
UAV/payload by a GCS it is sufficient to integrate the relative VSM with no changes or minor 
changes to the CUCS (due to specific messages in STANAG format and relative visualization on 
the HCI). Besides the “translator” role, the VSM performs other functions like [1]: 
• acting as repository for UAV specific information and functions, 
• optimizing datalink transmission bandwidth, 
• managing the interfaces to monitor and control the datalink, 
• managing the interfaces for the control of the Launch & Recovery Systems (specific of each 
UAV). 
Communications between CUCS and VSM are implemented by the Data Link Interface, with UAV 
proprietary interfaces between VSM and air vehicle elements (e.g. Flight Control Computers or 
Payload Control Computers). VSM can be hosted in the GCS, on the UAV or split in a ground 
VSM plus an airborne VSM (see Fig. 57). In the first case, the Data Link Interface is not actual 
connected to the datalink terminals, since it is relative to intra ground segment communications. 
Basically hosting the VSM in the GCS simplifies the design, but in order to increase the vehicle 
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Level of Autonomy it should be hosted on-board. Intermediate solutions are also possible, 
especially to control specific launch & recovery elements for which the airborne VSM has an 
excessive latency. Noting that in a GCS there could be more VSMs for many vehicles/payload or to 
implement different LOIs for the same vehicle (e.g. payload and vehicle control). In case of a 
ground VSM, it can be practically realized with the same, different or remote hardware with respect 
to the CUCS [1]. 
 
 
 
Figure 57. VSM allocation in the UCS [1] 
 
 
The Human Computer Interface (HCI) receives inputs directly by the CUCS. Vehicle specific data 
are displayed using the private messages. The STANAG 4586 specifies macro requirements about 
the HCI functionalities that the CUCS shall support for different LOIs, but it does not provide any 
impositions about the human factors (e.g. display layout) and ergonomics (e.g. physical 
arrangement of displays) standpoints. Therefore the issues presented in the previous chapters are not 
considered by the STANAG 4586. For the LOI 5, in particular, the following functions shall be 
provided to the operator [1]: 
• configuration, 
• mission planning, 
• air vehicle control, 
• operator control and monitoring, 
• communication management, 
• alert visualization and management. 
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The first five points are more or less directly related to the Flight Management System.  
Considering the Implementation Guide, it suggests some possible HMI standards to follow and 
provides a general guide to the design process that have been considered in our work [59]. As HMI 
standard, in particular, the MIL-STD-1472 has been adopted, considering that is a common diffused 
standard for several applications both in military and civil fields.  
To conclude the examination of the STANAG compliant system architecture, there are the CCI and 
the CCISM, that are the equivalent of the DLI and the VSM for the communications between a 
GCS and a C4I. 
 
 
5.4 Message Wrapper Structure 
STANAG 4586 defines a wrapper structure common to the standard and private messages, as 
reported in Fig. 58. 
 
 
 
Figure 58. STANAG 4586 Message Wrapper Structure [1] 
 
 
Three main areas can be distinguished: the header, the message data (message body) and the 
checksum. The header is composed by several fields [1]: 
• Interface Definition Document (IDD): number relative to the implemented STANAG 4586 
edition (e.g. 2.0 for the second edition). 
• Message Instance: progressive uniquely numerical identifier of the message instance (e.g. 
101 for the 101th message type “X” sent by the CUCS), 
• Message Type: numerical identifier of the type of message (e.g. Message 2100). Number 
under 2000 are reserved to the standard messages, while the greater ones are available to 
create private messages. 
• Message Length: number of bytes in the message body. 
• Stream Identifier (ID): reserved for future capabilities. 
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• Packet Sequence: not used and set to “-1”. 
Message body is the core of a message and contain different data according to the type. Unique 
common information are the time at which the message has been captured, and the ID of vehicle 
and CUCS. Finally the checksum is a bit sequence introduced in order to verify the message data 
integrity. In practice transmitter and receiver calculate this parameters with the same algorithm and 
so it is possible to detect an error comparing the calculated theoretical value with that actually 
received. As reported in Fig. 58, a private message is distinguished from a standard one only from 
the message type and the typology of contained data. 
For each message, the STANAG 4586 provides the detail of the contained data, the conditions 
relative to the message sending and a guideline to implement the relative moding. In particular each 
data is characterized by the following information [1]: 
• Unique ID, 
• Field in the message body (progressive number), 
• Data name and description, 
• Type (e.g. double, float, integer, unsigned, char, etc.), 
• unit of measure (in general the international system is considered), 
• admissible range of value. 
 
 
Figure 59. Example of STANAG 4586 message body [1] 
 
 
In general, the STANAG 4586 philosophy considers that for each message sent by the CUCS, there 
should be the relative response from the VSM (translation of the vehicle response in its native 
language), in order to be aware of the parameter actually active on the UAV.  
 
 
5.5 Guidance Implementation 
Guidance function is implemented by the CUCS and the VSM with the standard messages reported 
in Tab. 16. The moding foresees that the CUCS sends to the VSM the operator demand, and then 
the VSM responses to the CUCS according to the air vehicle states. An exception is relative to the 
loiter demand message (MSG #41), for which no standard response has been implemented by the 
STANAG 4586.  
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Object CUCS Demand VSM Response 
Guidance mode selection MSG #42 MSG #106 
Guidance mode demands selection MSG #43 MSG #104 
Guidance mode demand source 
(database/override) MSG #48 MSG #109 
Loiter parameter demands MSG #41  
From-To WPs State  MSG #110 
Table 16. Guidance related messages 
 
 
MSG #42 contains the guidance mode demanded by the operator. The following standard modes are 
considered by the STANAG 4586 [1], [59]: 
 
 
Mode Means 
No mode No guidance mode active. 
Flight Director Manual near real time UAV control using MSG #43 with autopilot disengaged. 
Waypoint Automatic steering in order to follow a WPs sequence. Equivalent to 
the sum of LNAV and VNAV modes of a manned FMS. 
Loiter Loiter around a point defined by MSG #41, #43. 
Autopilot Autopilot engaged (general terms) with a possibility of a near real time 
manual override by the operator using the MSG #43. 
Terrain Avoidance Autopilot engaged plus terrain avoidance with a given height safety 
margin. 
NAVAID navigation Slaved navigation with respect to NAVAID beacons. 
Autoland Engaging of automatic landing. 
Wave Off Automatic go around in case of aborted landing. 
Launch Engaging of automatic take off. 
Slave to sensor Slaved navigation with respect to the active payload (e.g. with respect 
to the observed point with an electro optical camera). 
Table 17. STANAG 4586 standard guidance modes 
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As reported in Tab. 17, these are very general modes adaptable to several UAV types. The 
STANAG 4586, however, foresees the possibility for the operator to define vehicle specific modes 
using always the MSG #42 through an enumerative fields.  
Guidance mode relative demands, instead, are specified in the MSG #43. This messages contains 
many parameters, but only a subset of them are used according to the mode selected in MSG #42 
and to the considered vehicle capability. In particular the following standard demands are available: 
• altitude, 
• vertical speed, 
• altitude + vertical speed to achieve it, 
• heading, 
• course, 
• heading rate, 
• turn rate, 
• roll rate, 
• roll angle, 
• speed, 
• destination waypoint (DWP) for the waypoint mode or other vehicle specific navigation 
mode (provided as an univocal numerical identifier as explained later for MSG #802), 
• loiter point coordinates for loiter guidance mode or other vehicle specific navigation mode. 
For vertical plane (altitude, vertical speed, altitude + vertical speed) or lateral (heading, course, 
heading + course, roll) demands, in particular, the MSG #43 specifies which is the parameter to 
consider between the available options. Besides it is possible to specify the type of altitude 
(pressure altitude, barometric altitude, GPS altitude or height) and speed (indicated, true or ground 
speed). For the barometric altitude is provided also a field to set the altimeter reference pressure. 
MSG #48 is used for waypoint and loiter modes in order to determine the source of altitude, speed 
and course/heading demands between the planned value (database – DB) or an override (OVR) 
value specified by the operator (sent through MSG #43).  
Finally MSG #41 contains the loiter parameters for the loiter guidance mode in terms of geometric 
characteristics of loiter path, altitude planned value and type, speed planned value and type. More 
details about the loiter waypoints is providing in the next paragraph. Loiter types and relative 
geometric characteristics will be explained later for the MSG #802 (Mission Concept paragraph). 
VSM responses (when available) are a copy of the CUCS messages, with the exception of the MSG 
#104 that contains less parameters with respect of the MSG #43. In particular no VSM echo about 
the vertical speed demand is provided. Another exception is the MSG #110, that is the VSM report 
about the Next/To Waypoint state when the UAV is in waypoint mode or about the loiter 
coordinates in loiter mode. MSG #110 can be also used for periodic report during navigation. 
The set of standard guidance messages therefore are flexible and adaptable to many different 
systems, with more options and a greater LOA with respect to a manned aircraft. No standard 
messages for remote manual control, in fact, are provided.  
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How using in detail each message and what data writing in them is left to each vehicle specific 
implementation and it depends also by the considered guidance mode. The STANAG 4586 
Implementation Guides limits oneself to suggest that CUCS sends required message for the relative 
mode, with the VSM that responds at each of them. Besides, for the scheduling, the guide suggests 
that CUCS and VSM send messages only when there is a mode/demand change in order to save 
communication bandwidth (i.e. asynchronous implementation) [59]. Just to clarify the moding, the 
paragraph is concluded with some examples relative to a possible guidance mode implementation. 
Other data contained in the involved messages and not specified below are not considered, since not 
applicable to the considered cases. 
 
 
Mode CUCS Messages VSM Messages 
Altitude 
Hold at 5000 ft (1524 m) 
• MSG #42→mode: autopilot. 
• MSG #43: 
- altitude demand = 1524 m 
- altitude type: GPS 
- demand type: altitude. 
• MSG #106→mode: autopilot. 
• MSG #104: 
- altitude demand = 1524 m 
- altitude type: GPS 
- demand type: altitude. 
LNAV + VNAV 
(route already loaded) 
• MSG #42→mode: waypoint. 
• MSG #43→DWP: 1157. 
• MSG #48: 
- altitude DMD source = DB 
- speed DMD source = DB 
- course DMD source = N.A. 
• MSG #106→mode: waypoint. 
• MSG #110→DWP: 1157. 
• MSG #109:  
- altitude DMD source = DB 
- speed DMD source = DB 
- course DMD source = N.A. 
Direct to Loiter 
• MSG #42→mode: loiter. 
• MSG #43: 
- altitude demand = 1524 m 
- altitude type: GPS 
- demand type: altitude 
- speed demand = 55 m/s 
- speed type = IAS 
- loiter latitude = 0.77 rad 
- loiter longitude = 0.131 rad 
• MSG #48: 
- altitude DMD source = OVR 
- speed DMD source = OVR 
- course DMD source = N.A. 
• MSG #41→loiter type and 
geometric characteristics. 
• MSG #106→mode: loiter. 
• MSG #104: 
- altitude demand = 1524 m 
- altitude type: GPS 
- demand type: altitude 
- speed demand = 55 m/s 
- speed type = IAS 
• MSG #109: 
- altitude DMD source = OVR 
- speed DMD source = OVR 
- course DMD source = N.A. 
• MSG #110: 
- loiter latitude = 0.77 rad 
- loiter longitude = 0.131 rad 
• Private message to respond to MSG #41. 
Table 18. Example of guidance mode selection according to STANAG 4586 
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5.6 Mission Concept 
5.6.1 STANAG 4586 Mission Structure 
An UAS shall extend the traditional flight plan of manned aircraft FMS to the concept of mission, 
due to the particular tasks assigned. The STANAG 4586 defines a mission as [1]: 
 
The route planning, payload planning, datalink planning (including frequency planning), and UAV 
emergency recovery planning (rules of safety) for an UAV flight. 
 
More in detail, plans composing the mission concern the following items [1]: 
 
 
Plan Means 
Route Plan 
Set of waypoints defining the path of the UAV. Other than 4D attributes, 
at each waypoint it is possible to define airframe actions. Taxi Plan can 
be included with the same form. 
Payload Plan 
Details about the sensor to use, the relative operative mode, image 
resolution, configuration and the associated target. It can be linked to the 
route plan through payload action specified at each waypoint. 
Datalink Plan 
Details about the bands and frequencies to use. It can be associated to the 
route plan through specific action specified for each WP (e.g. handover 
from a LOS datalink to a BLOS satellite link). 
Emergency Recovery 
Plan 
Details about the recovery actions that the UAV shall automatically 
perform in case of failures (e.g. link loss) according to the rule of safety 
defined during the mission planning. Typical examples of these actions 
are reaching contingency WPs or following contingency routes starting 
from the current active route. Emergency WPs/Routes are linked to the 
Route Plan.  
Table 19. Plans composing a mission according to the STANAG 4586 
 
 
In general, the STANAG 4586 does not consider the planning itself, but it rules the process of 
upload/download of a mission to/from a VSM. Data present in the relative standard messages 
however influences the concept of mission and its architecture. According to the involved standard 
messages, in particular, the STANAG 4586 mission is made by one or more routes, each of them 
composed by a sequence of waypoints (see Fig. 60).  
 
 
 
Figure 60. STANAG 4586 Mission Architecture [17] 
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Routes, in particular, represent the UAV path in a 4D space through broken lines (see Fig. 61), 
having the waypoint as vertexes. Fourth dimension is specified assigning a speed or a temporal 
demand to each WP. This is quite different from the ARINC 424 concept, since STANAG 4586 
specifies only the terminator (i.e. the waypoint) and not the mode in which a leg is flown, that 
depends by the specific implementation of the UAV navigation laws. Typically however the legs 
are flown in track mode. The track is determined considering the azimuth of each route segment 
with respect to the North. Besides at each WP can be added airframe, payload or other specific 
actions in order to increase the system LOA. This is a further difference with respect to manned 
FMS flight plans. 
 
 
 
Figure 61. Example of route 
 
 
Considering the communication protocol, apart the Datalink plan that is not directly relative to the 
FMS, there are the following standard messages for the other plans [1]: 
 
 
Message Object Affected Plan CUCS Use VSM Use 
#800 Mission Upload Command Mission level X  
#801 Route definition Route / Emergency Recovery Plans X X 
#802 WP definition Route / Emergency Recovery Plans X X 
#803 Loiter definition Route / Emergency Recovery Plans X X 
#804 Payload action definition Payload Plan X X 
#805 Airframe action definition Route / Emergency / Datalink Plans X X 
#806 Vehicle Specific Action Mission Level X X 
#900 Mission Upload/Download Status Mission Level  X 
Table 20. STANAG 4586 standard messages related to the Mission Upload/Download 
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5.6.2 MSG #800 
Examining more in detail the messages, the MSG #800 permits to execute the following actions [1]: 
• clear a mission on the VSM, 
• load a mission on the VSM, 
• download a mission from the VSM, 
• download a single waypoint from the VSM, 
• cancel upload/download process. 
Each mission is univocally identified by a string of 20 characters. Although the number of missions 
that can be uploaded on a VSM is not specified, it is logic that there is only a mission at time on the 
VSM (and therefore on-board the UAV). 
 
5.6.3 MSG #801 
Message #801, instead, defines a route, identified by a string of 33 characters. In particular, the 
following route types are distinguished [1]: 
• launch (i.e. take off route), 
• approach, 
• flight, 
• contingency A, 
• contingency B. 
Apart from the take off and landing specific routes, all other normal routes are categorized as 
“flight”, independently if they are related to a transit or to a mission phase (e.g. searching of a target 
in a given area). Contingency routes are relative to the emergency plans and are distinguished 
between A and B, since at each normal route WP can be associated two contingency WPs from 
which it is possible to define the relative routes. Contingency WPs assignment is done in MSG 
#802. Finally in MSG #801, it is specified the first WP of the route, that permits to rebuild the WP 
sequence composing the route. 
 
5.6.4 MSG #802 
MSG #802 defines a basic WP and it is the core of the STANAG mission protocol. It contains the 
following information [1]: 
• Waypoint number (univocal identifier of a WP), 
• 2D position: 
o Latitude/longitude data (WGS 84),  
o X, Y coordinates with respect to a relative reference frame. 
• altitude (third dimension), 
• altitude type: 
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o pressure altitude, 
o barometric altitude, 
o GPS altitude (WGS 84), 
o height. 
• speed type (fourth dimension): 
o Indicated Air Speed (IAS), 
o True Air Speed (TAS), 
o Ground Speed (GS), 
o Arrival time. 
• speed value (set only if speed type is equal to IAS, TAS or GS), 
• arrival time value (set only if speed type is equal to arrival time), 
• turn type: 
o short turn (i.e. Fly By WP), 
o flyover (i.e. Fly Through WP). 
• next WP number (data used to construct the routes), 
• Contingency “A” WP number, 
• Contingency “B” WP number. 
The WP number is used as univocal identifier and it is the key that permits to build the routes (plus 
Initial WP number in the MSG #801 plus next WP number in the MSG #802), to associate 
Contingency WP/route or a generic action to a WP. There shall not be two different WPs with the 
same number in a mission. WP number ranges from 1 to 65535. “0” indicates the end of route. 
Considering for example a route composed in order by the waypoints “WP1”, “WP2”, “WP3” and 
“WP4”, it is constructed by the following messages: 
 
 
MSG Instance Route Type Initial WP Number 
#801 1 Route 1 Flight 1157 
 
WP MSG Instance WP Number Next WP Number 
WP1 #802 1 1157 1158 
WP2 #802 2 1158 1159 
WP3 #802 3 1159 1160 
WP4 #802 4 1160 0 
Table 21. Example of route construction from MSG #801, #802 
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Although the WPs are identified by a number in the protocol, the operator usually identifies a WP 
through a short text (e.g. “WP1”). This data however is not needed to the VSM. The CUCS 
therefore performs the association between the text identifier and the WP number (not displayed to 
the operator). WP identifiers are managed differently by the Mission and Route ones, due to the fact 
that they are not only used by the VSM to distinguish an item, but also to actually construct a route 
with the relative actions associated from the series of received messages. For these operations a 
numerical ID is more efficient from the software standpoint with respect to a string. 
From the attributes standpoint, a WP is always defined in all four dimensions. Lateral position can 
be specified with Latitude and Longitude with respect to the WGS-84, or by Cartesian coordinates 
(X and Y values) with respect to a Relative reference frame. This is defined with the MSG #47, not 
reported here for simplicity. For the altitude, no info about how the altitude is reached on the leg is 
provided. The climb/descent laws are vehicle specific and so they are not treated by the STANAG 
4586. If a user wants to specify them, a dedicated private message shall be created. 
 
 
 
Figure 62. Examples of possible climb laws 
 
 
As fourth dimension on a WP, a speed demand or an arrival time are considered alternatively (i.e. a 
speed and a time can not be assigned together). The more common speed type is the IAS 
(considered as reference by the ATC), but also TAS and GS demands are available. GS, in 
particular, is used for mission purposes (e.g. sensor pointing) or to reach a certain time for UAVs 
that have not the capability to process time demand. Arrival time is an absolute value (e.g. 
15:59:25), expressed as number of seconds from the 1st January 1970 in order to provide info about 
the relative date.  
STANAG 4586 does not provide directly the possibility to assign altitude, speed or time constraint 
to a WP, at difference of traditional FMS.  
As WP type, instead, are considered only Fly By and Fly Through. Loiter path can be introduced 
through the MSG #803. 
Finally, contingency WPs/Routes are another differences with respect to manned aircraft flight 
plans, since for the UAV is needed to plan safe paths to be automatically flown by the vehicle in 
case of lost link condition (i.e. loss of uplink communication between the GCS and the UAV) or 
when some failures occur [17]. Contingency WPs or last Contingency Route WP can be also safe 
87 
 
crash points for the UAV termination if no recovery actions are possible, in order to reduce as much 
as possible damage to people and infrastructures. At this purpose, the STANAG 4586 foresees for 
each normal route WP the possibility to assign two Contingency WPs, named “A” and “B”. From 
them it is possible to define a Contingency Route as said before. Having two WPs permit to define 
different path according to the considered emergency: for example the path A can be relative to the 
lost link, while the “B” to a termination point due to a major failure of the vehicle. According to the 
STANAG philosophy many implementations are possible:  
 
 
 
Figure 63. Examples of Contingency WPs/Routes [17] 
 
 
Although advised for safety, it is not mandatory for STANAG protocol to have two Contingency 
WPs for each normal waypoint. Contingency WPs are always defined by a MSG #802. As example 
of Contingency route upload, the following example is provided: 
 
 
 
 
 
MSG Instance Route Type Initial WP Number 
#801 1 Route1 Flight 203 
#801 2 CNTG Route Contingency A 207 
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WP MSG Instance WP Number Next WP Number 
Contingency 
A Number 
Contingency 
B Number 
WP1 #802 1 203 204 0 0 
WP2 #802 2 204 205 206 0 
WP3 #802 3 205 0 208 209 
CNTG1 #802 4 206 207 0 0 
CNTG2 #802 5 207 0 0 0 
CNTG3 #802 6 208 0 0 0 
CNTG4 #802 7 209 0 0 0 
Table 22. Example of Contingency WPs/Routes upload 
 
 
5.6.5 MSG #803 
Message #803 specifies a loiter pattern for a WP. In particular, the STANAG 4586 considers four 
types of loiters: 
• Circular, 
• Racetrack, 
• Figure 8, 
• Hover (applicable only to rotorcraft or tilt-rotor vehicles). 
 
 
Figure 64. STANAG 4586 Loiter Patterns [1] 
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Loiter Center is defined by the relative WP coordinates (MSG #802), while the pattern type and the 
relative geometric characteristics are defined in the MSG #803 (see Fig. 64 and Tab. 23). 
 
 
Parameter Meaning Circle Racetrack Figure 8 Hover 
Radius Dimension of the circle or semi-
width for Racetrack and Figure 8 X X X  
Length Length of pattern in the bearing direction for Racetrack and Figure 8  X X  
Bearing Azimuth with respect to the North of 
the Racetrack/Figure 8 greater axis.  X X  
Table 23. Loiter Pattern Geometric Parameters [1] 
 
 
MSG #803 considers also the loitering direction between the following options [1]: 
• clockwise, 
• counter-clockwise, 
• into the wind, 
• vehicle-dependent. 
Although the direction is assigned, the way with which the UAV enters in loiter from the relative 
leg is not considered, since it is specific of the UAV navigation laws. As loiter exit condition, 
instead, is considered the expiring of a loitering time, reported in the MSG #803 as relative time 
from the loitering starting. 
 
5.6.6 MSG #805 
Relative to the Route, Emergency and Datalink Plans, at each normal and emergency WP can be 
associated an airframe action with the MSG #805. In particular, this message consider some 
standard actions for a series of vehicle functions: 
 
 
Action Functions 
• Turn Off 
• Turn On 
• Go to Standby 
• Receive Only 
• Transmit Only 
• Navigation/Strobe Lights, 
• Primary/Secondary Datalink, 
• Navigation/Strobe IR Lights, 
• NVD Compatible, 
• Landing, 
• Landing IR, 
• Vehicle Specific Action. 
Table 24. MSG #805 data 
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5.6.7 MSG #804 
For the Payload plan, it is possible to associate to a WP an action relative to a certain payload 
(identified by the relative station number) by the MSG #804. More in detail, the following options 
are available [1]: 
• set sensor 1/2 mode: 
o turn off, 
o turn on, 
o stand by. 
• sensor output:  
o sensor 1, 
o sensor 2, 
o both. 
• set sensor pointing mode: 
o nil, 
o angle relative to the vehicle, 
o slewing rate relative to the vehicle, 
o slewing rate relative to the inertial, 
o LAT/LON slaved, 
o target slaved, 
o stow, 
o line search start location, 
o line search end location. 
• set starepoint coordinates: 
o latitude, 
o longitude, 
o altitude, 
o altitude type (barometric, pressure, GPS altitude or height). 
• payload azimuth with respect to the vehicle, 
• payload elevation with respect to the vehicle, 
• payload sensor rotation angle. 
 
5.6.8 MSG #806 
Finally, the STANAG 4586 provides the MSG #806 to implement the execution of vehicle specific 
action. For each action – identified by a string – is possible to command the start and the end. 
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Actions specified by the MSGs #804, #805 and #806 are started when the relative WP is the current 
DWP. In other word, they are performed along the leg relative to the associated WP. 
At each WP is possible to associate more additional messages #803, #804, #805, #806, always 
using the field WP number.  
 
5.6.9 MSG #900 
As last message relative to the mission there is the #900, used by the VSM in order to provide 
feedback about the upload/download status (in progress, complete or aborted/rejected) and the 
complete percent.  
 
5.6.10 Mission Upload Protocol 
To conclude the section, in case of mission upload, the protocol starts with a MSG #800, followed 
by a #801 and relative WP MSGs (#802, #803, #804, #805, #806) for each route of the mission. The 
VSM responds with the #900 for the upload status. 
 
 
 
Figure 65. Mission upload according to STANAG 4586 
 
 
5.7 Navigation / Trajectory Prediction Related Messages 
In Chapter 2 some parameters relative to the “Navigation” and “Trajectory Prediction” functions of 
a traditional manned aircraft FMS have been identified (see section 2.3.1). They are perfectly 
applicable also to UAS, and being calculated on-board they are affected by the STANAG 4586 
protocol. Unlucky not all of these data are present in the common messages. In some case, it is 
possible to calculate the data from other parameters (e.g. the Ground Speed and the Track from the 
North and East speed components), but in others the data is missing. In Tab. 25 it is reported an 
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analysis about the data availability, considering a sample of typical FMS parameters. As reported in 
Tab. 25, only the UAV position is directly presented in the common messages, while other data can 
be determined by the NED vehicle and wind speed components. Greater part however is not 
available, forcing the designer to use private messages since many of the missing data shall be 
displayed to the operator according to the STANAG 4671. Some of missing parameters could be 
calculated, but it is more correct that they are determined on-board as output of the 
navigation/trajectory prediction algorithms. For example cross track and track angle errors can be 
calculated by the CUCS comparing the current UAV position and track with respect to the planned 
leg (i.e. geometric segment joining two WPs). This however could introduce some errors, since the 
navigation/trajectory prediction laws can consider some virtual leg during the flight, not known on 
ground. 
 
 
Data Present Calculable from 
other standard data 
Not Present & Not 
Calculable 
UAV Position (Latitude, 
Longitude, Altitude) X   
Ground Speed  X  
Track Angle  X  
Drift Angle  X  
Wind Speed/Direction  X  
Estimation Position 
Uncertainty   X 
Source of Best Data (i.e. 
sensor used to determine the 
Navigation data) 
  X 
Cross Track Angle   X 
Track Angle Error   X 
Predicted Fuel Consumption   X 
Arrival time at WP   X 
Distance to travel at WP   X 
Point of Non Return   X 
Equal Time Point   X 
Table 25. Navigation and Trajectory Prediction data availability 
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5.8 STANAG 4586 Limitations 
The STANAG 4586 represents an admirable effort in order to develop an universal interface 
protocol that permits the control from a single GCS of different types of UAVs. Taking into account 
for example the differences from a tactical rotorcraft UAV and a turbojet HALE, the complexity to 
define an unique standard interface can be understood, with the relative system architecture and 
message structure that enable also to add private messages.  
Despite its merits, the STANAG 4586 presents several limitations that complicate its adoption as 
design reference. These issues are probably due to the early maturity of the standard and to its 
limited diffusion, with the consequent poor data and practical experience about its implementation. 
Besides STANAG 4586 suffers of “aeronautical culture” lacks, since many practices well 
established in the manned aircraft have not been considered in the development of the standard, 
with consequent problems especially in terms of operational effectiveness. However these 
limitations are not critical and in many cases they can be solved adopting a private message. 
Anyway in order to enable a further greater interoperability this is not a good solution, since private 
messages should be ideally limited as much as possible. It is desirable that future editions of the 
STANAG 4586 remove these problems. Unlucky the edition 3 draft does not solve the whole list 
[60]. Below the main issues discovered implementing the STANAG 4586 in our work are reported. 
 
5.8.1 Remote Manual Control 
Remote manual control is not considered by the STANAG 4586 standard messages, with the 
absence of the relative mode in MSGs #42/#106 and demands (pitch, roll, yaw, engine commands) 
in MSGs #43/#104. Roll command is present in MSGs #43/#104, but it is relative to a 
semiautomatic autopilot mode and not to a remote stick input of the operator. Besides also the 
autothrottle activation/deactivation is not provided. STANAG 4586 philosophy (although not 
roundly reported) considers a good level of automation for the compliant vehicles (at least ACL = 
2) in order to reaching a high LOI. There are however many UAVs that although fully automatic, 
can be also manually flown, and more generally this type of basic control should be considered to 
be as interoperable as possible. Besides is not cleat at the moment if the capability of remote manual 
control will be mandatory (at least for emergency operations) to operate in civil airspaces. Adding 
these information in the standard interface requires to distinguish between aircraft and rotorcraft 
control surfaces commands, and between different engine types (piston, turboprop, turboshaft, 
turbojet/turbofan). 
 
5.8.2 Guidance Messages Implementation  
Guidance implementation with eight asynchronous messages (#42, #43, #48 and #41 from the 
CUCS, and #106, #104, #109 and #110 from the VSM) complicates the software design and 
integration, due to the risk that one or more messages of protocol will be not received by the 
CUCS/VSM, especially when they communicate through datalink. In other words although efficient 
from the bandwidth saving standpoint, it is more difficult to make it robust. In any case, also with 
the asynchronous solution, the messages could be reformulated in a more efficient way. For 
example, for the loiter mode it is not optimized having the loiter point coordinates in the MSG #43 
and the geometric characteristics in the MSG #41. 
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5.8.3 Guidance VSM Responses 
VSM standard messages do not provide full response to the CUCS demands. In particular MSG 
#104 does not contain the feedback to the commanded vertical speed, while the CUCS MSG #41 
does not have a standard response (added in the edition 3 of the standard [60]). 
 
5.8.4 Fourth Dimension Definition at WP 
MSG #802 assigns at each WP an arrival time or a speed. It is not possible to not define the 4D 
attributes. This can be a problem in some operative cases, where there is an assigned time on target 
on a given WP, with no rigid constraints to the previous time. In this case a manned aircraft 
typically adjust the Ground Speed on the previous legs in order to satisfy the time on target. 
According to the STANAG view, instead, in order to reach the assigned time, at the previous WPs a 
compatible time or speed should be assigned, complicating the planning phase. Differences between 
aeronautical traditional implementation and STANAG 4586 are reported in Fig. 66. A possible way 
to bypass the problem could be consider a certain speed/time value in the MSG #802 (e.g. the speed 
lower limit of 0 m/s) as indication of no 4D demand. However this could rise an other problems in 
case of checks of admissible planned value by CUCS or VSM, that will reject the zero value. 
Optimum solution could be adding a new type of speed type: “system commanded GS”, leaving to 
the system the responsibility of the 4D management for a part of route. In this way however the 
predictability of the actual route path/state is reduced. 
 
 
 
Figure 66. Traditional vs. STANAG 4586 Time On Target Implementation 
 
 
Besides, there is not the possibility in MSG #43 to perform a manual override of an arrival time, 
forcing the operator to modify the WP attributes and then upload again the route if he/she wants to 
modify a time. 
 
5.8.5 Additional Attributes/Action to WP 
Actual implementation of MSG #803, #804, #805 and #805 is not robust, since it considers only the 
WP number as link to the relative MSG #802. On the MSG #802, however, there is not an 
indication that it will be followed by other related messages. Therefore, in case one of the additional 
messages is lost during the mission upload/download, this will not be detected by the VSM/CUCS 
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with consequent incomplete routes construction. In order to solve this issue, the edition 3 proposes 
to add this info to the MSG #802 [60].  
 
5.8.6 Loiter Attributes in MSG #803 
MSG #803 does not provide the capability to enter a loiter speed different from the speed or time 
assigned in the relative #802. Therefore, at least of automatic aircraft speed change to a predefined 
value or manual operator command, the UAV flies the loiter with the same speed used in the 
relative leg, and this is not an optimum solution since usually a loiter is flown with the best 
endurance speed in order to save fuel. Besides as loiter exit condition is specified only the time, and 
therefore the actual UAV path is not predictable during the planning if a navigation/flight control 
laws model is not used to check the route. In some practical cases, in fact, it is requested the 
possibility to specify the exit radial from a loiter, especially considering the future integration in the 
civil airspace. Another not considered exit condition could be the number of loiter rounds.  
 
5.8.7 No Contingency WPs/Routes for All Guidance Modes 
The STANAG 4586 provides definition of UAV emergency paths in case of Waypoint guidance 
mode. No general definition of contingency WPs/Routes is provided for other modes. Although the 
vehicle behavior in these cases is usually specific of each system, a standardization is required 
especially for future civil certification.  
 
5.8.8 No Standard Target Characterization 
No common messages for the target upload are provided by STANAG 4586. This lack limits the 
Payload plan detail and definitively the achievable LOA. 
 
5.8.9 No Mission Zones Characterization 
Analogously to the previous point, the upload of Mission Zones (e.g. area of operation or No Fly 
Zones) has not be foreseen by the STANAG 4586. This can be an interoperability limitation for 
more autonomous vehicles having replanning or navigation algorithms that check the respect of 
these zones, since a private protocol would be implemented.  
 
5.8.10 Route/Waypoint Repetition Attribute 
In MSG #801 there is not an attribute that define the number of route repetitions, i.e. the number of 
times that a route is flown. The same for the MSG #802, in order to implement the repetition 
function only for a route portion. This attribute would be useful for an UAV involved in monitoring 
or searching task along a planned path. Without it, it is needed an operator’s command or the 
creation of a private message to repeat the route. 
 
5.8.11 Navigation / Trajectory Prediction Parameters 
As reported in the section 5.7, standard messages do not consider all navigation / trajectory 
prediction data. In any case the problem can be easily bypassed through private messages, although 
it would be more desirable the definition of common messages in order to reach a greater level of 
interoperability. 
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5.8.12 Differences between STANAG 4586 and ARINC 424 
STANAG 4586 route format is quite different from traditional manned aviation flight plan. In 
particular there are not comprised the instrumental flight procedures (SID, STAR, holding pattern, 
NAVAID approach, etc.), as defined for example by the ARINC 424. Besides common messages 
do not consider the possibility to specify altitude, speed or time constraints to the WPs. A study 
with the civil aviation authorities would be performed in the future – when the UAS integration in 
Common airspaces will be closer – to evaluate the needed to add these items to the UAS route 
concept. In positive case, the STANAG 4586 should be accordingly modified. This issue affects 
especially the UAVs of Class III.  
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6 NEW FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HMI 
 
 
6.1 Work Scope 
Research activity has been practically concretized with the study of an innovative HMI for a Flight 
Management System relatively to a MALE UAS. Referring to the FMS functional allocation 
reported in Tab. 10, a subset of GCS macro functions on which concentrating the work has been 
identified: 
• guidance, 
• merging of navigation and trajectory prediction, 
• radio communication, 
• configuration, 
• mission planning, 
• autonomous replanning, 
• performance. 
For each of these macro functions a new HMI solution has been designed in order to be compliant 
to the STANAG 4586 and to reduce UAS mishap rate due to human factor, taking into account the 
problems/limitations of current interfaces exposed in the first four chapters of the thesis. HMI 
development cycle will be presented in detail in the next section 6.3, but just as introduction it has 
not been limited to the symbology standpoint, since the Graphical User Interface (GUI) design 
derives from an analysis of the related operative concept and the definition of the functions to 
provide at the operator (linked to the messages of STANAG 4586 protocol). More in detail, design 
activity has been concretized in the realization of an interface prototype that has been integrated in a 
real GCS to validate the proposed concepts, arriving to the flight tests. As test bench the Alenia 
Aermacchi MALE UAS Sky-Y has been considered.  
 
 
6.2 Alenia Aermacchi Sky-Y 
The Alenia Aermacchi Sky-Y is a MALE technological demonstrator used to validated key 
enabling technologies for a surveillance UAS [61]. It is characterized by the following data [61]: 
 
 
 
Dimensions 
• length = 9.725 m, 
• wing span = 9.937 m, 
• wing area = 10.785 m2. 
Weights 
• MTOW = 1200 kg, 
• OEW = 850 kg, 
• Fuel = 200 kg, 
• Typical Payload = 150 kg. 
Performances 
• LOS radius = 100 NM, 
• Range = 500 NM, 
• Ceiling Altitude = 25000 ft, 
• Endurance = 14 h 
Table 26. Sky-Y Characteristics 
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Figure 67. Alenia Aermacchi Sky-Y 
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6.3 HMI Development Process Cycle 
The following design process has been followed for the development of the new Human Machine 
Interface: 
 
 
 
Figure 68. HMI Design Process 
 
 
First phase coincides with a preliminary study about the subject, the in service systems and the 
relative defects/problems. Obtained results have been presented in the first five chapters. Passing to 
the practical realization, the high level design involves the definition of the HMI architecture, the 
macro functions that shall be performed by the system and the style guide according to which the 
symbology will be developed. In other words, in this phase the frame around which actually 
developing the interface is built, starting from the initial considerations and the analysis of the 
assigned system high level requirements. Defined the frame, it is possible to do the detailed 
functional and symbol design for each considered format. Link between GUI elements and 
STANAG messages is done in this phase. In particular, to realize the format draws, the free drawing 
software “Inkscape” has been used.  
Detailed design output then is checked, and if the results are negative it is modified until reaching a 
complete system validation and integration. Testing and integration, in particular, has been an 
iterative process involving several environments with an incremental level of integration. The 
iterative characteristic is due to the fact that if an integration problem is found after a test, a design 
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change that solving it is done, and hence a new test that verifies the bug absence of new software is 
needed.  
In particular the following items are verified: 
• correct GUI functioning according to the design, 
• GUI integration in the real GCS and with other UAS elements, 
• operator evaluation. 
Testing & Integration process will be detailed presented in Chapter 11. 
 
 
6.4 High Level System Specifications 
Design activity starts with the analysis of the high level system specifications, that is a series of 
assumption – done before starting the design – about the operative environment and reference UAS 
for which studying the new FMS interface. An interface, in fact, can not be created independently 
by the context and the specific system in which it will be used. 
 
6.4.1 Mission 
A generic MALE UAS designed to perform monitoring, surveillance and searching missions has 
been considered. Typical operative tasks, therefore, are characterized by a long endurance.  
In terms of flight permission, currently only operations into reserved areas are considered, due to 
the absence of rules to fly in common airspaces. At this purpose, the concept of Area Of Operation 
(AOO) – i.e. an area in which the UAV is free (or near free) to move in order to satisfy the assigned 
tasks – has been considered, joined to airports by safe corridors. Particular areas for which an 
overfly is prohibited by the Authority (e.g. high populated areas) are identified as No Fly Zones 
(NFZs). NFZs can be also present inside corridors and AOO. It is also possible the case in which 
there are more AOOs connected by corridors.  
Finally, for the mission range, currently only LOS operations are considered, but many 
considerations are perfectly applicable also to the BLOS case. 
 
6.4.2 Crew 
A crew made up by a pilot and a payload operator has been assumed. Pilot operator is responsible 
of the vehicle control and he/she is usually the mission commander, while payload operator is 
charged of payload control. FMS HMI, in particular, is only relative to pilot station.  
For the operator qualification, the Italian civil aviation authority (Ente Nazionale Aviazione Civile – 
ENAC) requires rated test pilot/navigator as crew. According to this, rated test pilots have been 
considered as main stakeholders for the development. In the following part of the thesis, the terms 
“operator” and “pilot” will be considered equivalent. Finally, a provision to extend the new 
interface to enable a single operator to control both vehicle and payload have been considered. 
 
6.4.3 Civil Certification 
As critical design constraints, the civil certification for the FMS has been considered according to 
the STANAG 4671. The DO-178B has been followed for the software certification. In particular, 
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using certifiable hardware, operative system, programming language and graphic libraries makes 
more difficult the realization of safety critical interfaces. Seeing section 1.6 for more details. 
 
6.4.4 Interoperability 
Together with the certification, the second key assumed design constraint is developing the FMS in 
order to reach the LOI 5 according to the STANAG 4586 Edition 2. 
 
6.4.5 HMI Upgradability 
Having realized a subset of full FMS functions and considering the Interoperability requirement, the 
new HMI shall be developed with an open structure in order to have the possibility to easily add 
new specific functions in the future keeping a format commonality. In other words, the interface 
shall be realized modular and parametric as much as possible.  
 
6.4.6 Level Of Automation 
Having as goal the development of a new interface that overcomes many human factor issues of 
operative UASs, we have assumed as reference Level Of Automation an ACL of 2, that is the best 
reached value of current systems. In particular, the possibility to control the vehicle in several ways  
has been considered (i.e. manual, semi and fully automatic). Manual control capability has been 
included also because it is not clear if future civil regulations will require or not a manual mode as 
emergency backup in order to operate in common airspace (at least for LOS operations).  
A provision to increase the LOA to an ACL of 3 has been considered relatively to the autonomous 
replanning function. Seeing section 4.2 for further details about ACL.  
 
 
6.5 HMI Architecture 
The two considered operators (see section 6.4.2) have been assumed to be sit in two stations 
disposed side by side like on manned cockpit. Usually pilot sits in right seat in order to have the 
stick in right hand for manual control.  
 
 
 
Figure 69. New GCS general layout 
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More in detail each operator station is made up by the following elements: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 70. Station Layout [27] 
 
 
 
Referring to the pilot station for which the FMS is developed, the studied interface philosophy is to 
display all information about the current UAV status on the Main Display (26”), and using two 10” 
Touchscreen Displays (TSD) as data entry interfaces. Besides touchscreens have also a secondary 
role of displaying information about the future state of the vehicle. No data, instead, are entered 
through the Main Display. A TSD and the Main Display are considered Safety Critical (SC), while 
the other TSD is dedicated to the Non Safety Critical (NSC) functions [27]. In particular, all 
functions involving a communication between GCS and UAV or other actors (e.g. ATC) have been 
assumed as safety critical. SC touchscreen has been considered in the opposite side with respect to 
the stick, in order to permit actuations on it during manual flight.  
The use of TSD as input device enables the adoption of a Graphical User Interface (GUI), that is the 
natural solution considering the requirements of HMI upgradability and the complexity of the 
involved functions. Adopting a GUI, in fact, it is possible to host more software formats/controls in 
the same hardware device, with high flexibility in adding new items or modifying others. Besides 
the interface is able to support the operator during the execution of mission tasks, through for 
example prompts, pop-up and other visual cues. Finally also the operator workload due to the visual 
searching of the control to actuate is reduced.  
Central panel contains hard switches relative to the safety critical functions for which a quick access 
shall be provided, and hence interacting with the GUI menu is not suitable. 
Flight Controls (i.e. stick, throttle and pedals) are used for manual control. Besides some switches 
on stick and throttle – Hands On Throttle And Stick (HOTAS) concept – enables the operator to 
execute some actions in a quick way (e.g. change the display zoom or the autopilot demands), 
avoiding the possible workload related to TSD page change to perform frequent operations. 
Finally, from the STANAG 4586 standpoint the VSM has been assumed on-board, and therefore 
the HMI (HCI in STANAG language) has been considered speaking directly with the vehicle. 
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6.6 FMS Input Device Selection 
Touchscreens have been selected after a comparison with other possible solutions, taking into 
account operative and certification aspects. Input device choice is not a trivial issues, since it 
significantly affects the SW design and realization. In particular, common GCS solutions adopt only 
a keyboard, but it has not been judged as completely satisfactory by the operators for the following 
reasons: 
• Quick selection of a function could be difficult (although time critical functions are not 
controlled through keyboard, but by panel switches). 
• Keys are very close each other and so errors are possible. 
• In order to avoid errors, keys combination (e.g. CTRL + A) are used, with consequent 
mnemonic load for the operator and further difficulty to perform quick actions. 
 
The following two alternative options have been considered, assuming in both cases to have always 
one Main Display and the Flight Controls: 
1. touchscreens, 
2. keyboard plus a Cursor Control Device (CCD) acting on the Main Display. 
 
 
Traditional MCDU has not been taken into account for the reasons reported in the Chapter 2, while 
innovative MCDU (like that of A-380) conceptually relapsing into the second case. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 71. Alternatively FMS Input Devices 
 
 
 
In the following tables, advantages and disadvantages of each solution with respect to the others are 
presented. In particular, for the CCD three different types have been taken in exam. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
• More Instinctive Interactions. 
• Operator verifies the results of his/her actions in 
the same interface where the inputs are entered. 
• Possibility to adopt new types of interaction like 
for example the scroll movement on the sliders. 
• Alphanumeric keyboards are displayed only 
when necessary. 
• Greater display dimension with respect to a 
traditional MCDU, due to the absence of line 
select keys and fixed keyboards. 
• Possibility to have a back-up of the Main Display 
in case of failures. 
• Main Display is devoted only to the monitoring, 
without input interactions on it (i.e. there are not 
pop-ups or windows that cover the UAV status 
information). 
• Current UAV state is always displayed in the 
Main Display, giving the capability to see on the 
Touch Screens other information about the 
mission (e.g. future UAV status). 
• No size issues related to the keyboard and CCD 
positions, particularly critical due to flight control 
presence. 
• Touchscreens are more expensive than keyboard 
and CCD. 
• For prolonged interactions the TSD is not the best 
interface, especially considering the arrangement 
due to the presence of the flight controls. 
• Input entering happens at “head down”, that is with 
a temporary loss of visibility on main display. 
• Touchscreen use in aviation is at the beginnings, 
and therefore there is very limited know-how, 
especially in terms of reference standard and civil 
certification. 
• Finger size limits the number of controls in a page, 
and the interaction quality when an accurate 
pointing is required. 
• Fingers could obstruct the display view. 
Table 27. Touchscreen Advantages and Disadvantages [27] 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• More cheaper than touchscreens. 
• Writing with a hard keyboard is more ergonomic 
than use the virtual one.  
• More controls on a page and a greater interaction 
quality in case of accurate pointing can be 
obtained due to the smaller size of a pointer with 
respect to the finger. 
• GUI can potentially have greater dimensions, 
since it is allocated on the Main Display, 
compatibly with the current UAV status info. 
• Potential Situational Awareness reduction when 
the operator enters inputs on Main Display. 
• Less information are provided to the operator, 
since there is only a display.  
• It is difficult placing keyboard and CCD taking 
into account the flight controls. 
• No Main Display backup is available. 
• Keyboard is used essentially to writing and so it is 
very little used. 
Table 28. Keyboard + CCD Advantages and Disadvantages 
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Figure 72. Possible CCDs 
 
 
Device Advantages Disadvantages 
Mouse • It’s a very common device: high 
acceptance from the operator. 
• It is difficult to use in GCS, since 
the lack of a proper space.  
Trackball 
• Smaller than a touchpad. 
• Fixed device. 
• More difficult to use than a mouse. 
• Not much usable in a big display. 
Touchpad 
• More instinctive than a trackball. 
• Usually present in notebooks: more 
acceptance from the operator with 
respect to a trackball. 
• Fixed device. 
• Not much usable in a big display. 
Table 29. CCD Comparison 
 
 
Comparing the two solutions, the most suitable for our case is the touchscreens, due to its 
flexibility, instinctively and further information provided with respect to the keyboard plus CCD. 
Besides the touchscreen modularity permits to reduce the number of interfaces on which the 
operators controls the vehicle, lowering in this way the workload and increasing the operator 
performances. An example of overmuch controls is reported in Fig. 73, relative to the Predator 
GCS, for which there are two Multi Function Displays (MFD) controlled by a keyboard and a CCD, 
two main displays (not present in the figure), plus other optionally displays.  
Examining the touchscreen disadvantages, the assumption that the operator does not interact 
continuosly on them, but only when a system state change or a specific information is required, has 
been done, especially considering that common operations can be performed on HOTAS. In this 
way, there are not ergonomic problems (e.g. arm fatigue) or situational awareness losses due to 
“head down” operations. This assumption has been then confirmed by simulator and flight tests.  
Regarding the limited know-how, currently there are very few examples of touchscreen in aviation, 
like the cockpit of the F-35, the Garmin G-5000/G-3000/G-2000 MCDU for business jets and 
general aviation, and some IPad ®and IPhone ® tools for general aviation and sailplane pilots. 
However the fast growing rate of the relative technologies – in terms of performance, size, weight 
and reliability – makes really interesting the use of touchscreen on manned cockpit, and in fact there 
are several research activities about that (e.g. ODICIS and ALICIA at European level). It is 
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therefore natural extending their use at the GCS, especially since in this case there are not vibration, 
sun reflection and ergonomics (due to aircraft maneuvers and glove use) problems. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 73. Predator Pilot Control Station 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74.Examples of Touchscreen in Aviation 
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With respect to a traditional cockpit, a GUI on touchscreens represents a significant change in the 
interaction way for pilots, but the instinctively of touchscreens plus their diffusion in everyday life 
(e.g. smartphone, tablet, cash dispenser, satellite navigation device, etc.) reducing the training time 
and increasing the operator feeling about them. HMI design standards and certification rules, 
however, are still lacking on these issues, and new rule editions will be required in the future as 
TSD use for safety critical applications increases.  
Finally, the number of controls in a TSD page is limited by the finger size, but a proper design and 
the reduced required inputs due to the system automation make this issue not critical for us. Besides 
an accurate symbol/formats arrangement in each page permits to avoid also the problem of critical 
page view obstruction by the operator finger/hand.  
This input device analysis was performed in the Spring of 2010 and its results have been confirmed 
by a new issue of the MIL-STD-1472 (edition G) in the January 11, 2012 as reported below: 
 
 
 
Table 30. Touchscreen Advantages and Disadvantages According to MIL-STD-1472G [63] 
 
 
In particular, MIL-STD-1472G suggest to use touchscreens for intermittent actions, and not when 
continuous data entry is required[63]. 
In any case, a GUI on touchscreen permits also to reduce the number of interfaces with respect to a 
manned cockpit, since in a single device can be concentrated several controls, that are usually 
separated on a traditional cockpit (e.g. MCDU, radio and autopilot panels). 
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6.7 Touchscreen Type Selection 
Touchscreens can be realized with different technologies, affecting the type of control supported 
and in general the interaction quality. Therefore as second step of input device selection, there have 
been the choice of TSD type. In the following sections the common touchscreen technologies are 
presented with the relative advantages/disadvantages in order to justify the final choice. 
 
6.7.1 Touchscreen Elements 
 
 
Figure 75. Example of Touchscreen Elements [64] 
 
 
Each TSD – independently by the type – is made up by the following three elements: 
1. Sensor: device joined to the screen that detects the operator touches in terms of display 
coordinates (X,Y). It is the element that discriminates the different touchscreen types. 
2. Controller: electronic interface between the sensor and the computer at which the 
touchscreen is connected. 
3. Drivers: firmware enabling the interaction between touchscreen and computer.  
 
6.7.2 Resistive Touchscreen 
Resistive touchscreen is the most common type. Practically, it is realized with two layers each 
coated with a transparent resistive material (Indium Tin Oxide – ITO). Bottom layer is rigid and it 
usually made in glass, while the upper is flexible and made in plastic. They are separated by spacing 
dots and run by an electric current. When the operator touches the screen, he/she pushes in contact 
the two layers closing the circuit. From the electric current variations, the touching point 
coordinates are detected. Several variants can be realized according to the way in which the 
coordinates are measured. In other words, this type of TSD is based on electric resistance property. 
In Tab. 31 the relative advantages and disadvantages are reported.  
 
6.7.3 Capacitive Touchscreen 
A capacitive touchscreen is basically made up by an insulator like a glass layer coated with ITO, at 
which a potential difference is applied. In this way a uniform electric field on the screen is obtained, 
and in general the display acts as a capacitor. When the operator touches the screen, it alters the 
electric field, since the human finger has very different dielectric properties with respect to the air. 
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Figure 76. Resistive and Capacitive Touchscreen Working Principles [65] 
 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• It is cheaper with respect to the other types. 
• It can be used also with fingernails, gloves or a 
pen stylus.  
• It can work with a wide temperature range: from 
-15° to 45° in average. Besides there are no 
humidity constraints.  
• External layer is resistant to crash. 
• It is not affected by grease, moisture, liquids or 
other contaminants. 
• Precision is strictly correlated to the pointing 
device. In case of hand actuation, it is limited to 
the finger size. 
• Poor image contrast in some lighting conditions 
(especially in external environment) due to the 
flexible layer. 
• External layer can be liable to damage or wearing 
by sharp object 
• Multi-touch is not supported, unless to do a re-
engineering of the device. 
• The reactivity is lower with respect to other types 
(e.g. capacity TSD) due to the need to press down 
the upper layer. 
• Quality interaction is lower than capacity types, 
especially in sliding movement or double click 
interactions. 
Table 31. Resistive Touchscreen Advantages/Disadvantages 
 
 
Electric field distortion is measured in terms of capacitance variation and permits to determine the 
touching point coordinates. According to the way with which the capacitance is measured and to the 
glass/conductive layer structure, there are different variants of capacitive TSD. In Tab. 32, the 
relative advantages/disadvantages are reported.  
Resistive and capacitive touchscreens, in particular, are the most diffused types. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
• It has a better reactivity and in general a greater 
interaction quality, since it is sufficient to accost 
the screen: no pressure is required. 
• Multi-touch is directly supported. 
• Greater image quality due to the absence of 
external layer (glass layer usually transmit almost 
the 90% of the display light). 
• It is resistant to wear. 
• It is expansive with respect to the other types (also 
50% more than a resistive TSD). 
• It can not be used with a non conductive material, 
like fingernail, glove or pen stylus. 
• It is easier to be damaged by crashes. 
• It works in a little temperature range (typically 
from 0° to 35°), and it requires at least a humidity 
of 5%. 
• It can be affected by moisture, grease, liquids or 
other contaminants. 
• Precision is limited by the finger size. 
Table 32. Capacitive Touchscreen Advantages/Disadvantages 
 
 
6.7.4 Surface Acoustic Wave Touchscreen 
 
 
 
Figure 77. Sound Acoustic Wave Touchscreen Working Principle [66] 
 
 
Surface Acoustic Wave touchscreen is based on sound wave properties and not on electric ones. 
Practically it is realized placing two transducers (a transmitter and a receiver) on each screen axis 
(X and Y), plus a reflector on the glass. TSD controller generates electric signals that are converted 
in ultrasonic waves (not perceived by human hearing) by the transmitter and emitting toward the 
receiver through the reflector. Waves are reflected by the receiver to the transmitter, that converts 
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them again in electric signals sent to the controller. In other words a web of ultrasonic waves is 
created on the screen. When the operator touches the screen, the wave beam is interrupted and part 
of its energy is absorbed. The controller detects the touching point coordinates measuring the 
variation in the sound wave amplitude due to the energy reduction. Peculiarities of this touchscreen 
are reported in the table below: 
 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• It provides a very good image quality (100 % of 
display light transmitted) due to the absence of a 
metallic conductive layer. 
• It supports the multi-touch. 
• It can be used with fingernails, gloves or in 
general soft tip stylus. 
• It is very expensive with respect to the other types. 
• It can not be used with hard tip stylus. 
• It can be affect by dirt, dust, liquid and other 
contaminants. 
• Precision is strictly correlated to the pointing 
device. In case of hand actuation, it is limited to 
the finger size. 
• Glass can be damaged by crashes. 
Table 33. Surface Acoustic Wave Touchscreen Advantages/Disadvantages 
 
 
6.7.5 Infrared Touchscreen 
 
 
 
Figure 78. Infrared Touchscreen Working Principle [66] 
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This type of touchscreen detects the operator touches by the interruption of an infrared beams grid 
over the screen. The grid is obtained by two arrays on the screen sides of Light Emission Diodes 
(LEDs) and photodetector pairs.  
Relative advantages/disadvantages are reported in the table below: 
 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• It provides a very good image quality (100 % of 
display light transmitted) due to the absence of a 
metallic conductive layer. 
• It supports the multi-touch. 
• It can be used with fingernails, gloves or any 
stylus. 
• It can be affected by dirt, dust or other 
contaminants that interrupt the beams. 
• It can suffer of parallax in curved screen. 
• There can be an accidental pressure when the 
operator hovers his/her fingers over the surface 
while searching the correct control to push. 
Table 34. Infrared Touchscreen Advantages/Disadvantages 
 
 
6.7.6 Touchscreen Selection 
Comparing the previous types, the resistive touchscreen has been chosen for the following main 
reasons: 
• It has the better environmental properties in terms of operative temperature, humidity and 
contaminant resistance. Although the GCS is a closed space with an environmental control 
system, in fact, it is a mobile shelter and therefore can operate in different climatic zones. 
• MIL-STD-1472 requires a resistance to the TSD actuation, and therefore the unique 
compliant type is the resistive (see section 7.2.4 for more details). 
• It is cheaper with respect to the others. 
Reactivity and in general quality interaction reduction does not significantly affect the system 
operability with respect to others types (e.g. capacitive). In any case, the lower reactivity could be a 
further protection from undesired inputs by the operators, more probably for example with a 
capacitive touchscreen in which it is sufficient to approach the screen to actuate a command. This 
issue, in particular, is critical for the touchscreen use in a mobile vehicle (aircraft, ships, etc.), but it 
could be also considered in a static GCS. The multi-touch absence is not critical and can be 
substituted by other types of interaction/graphical formats.  
Besides, working in a close environment with a properly lighting, there are no problem of image 
contrast due to the external flexible layer. Finally, the TSD is manually actuates by the operator, 
without using gloves (not required due to the GCS environmental control system) or stylus (not 
practical for operative use), and therefore all types have the same limitation of finger size in the 
GUI design.  
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7 HMI STYLE GUIDE 
 
 
7.1 General Principles 
A GUI is usually developed according to a set of general guidelines defined before to start the 
detailed format design. Some of these rules are common to every GUI and present in literature, 
while others are specific design choices that derive in part from the firsts and in part from the 
application context. The whole of these rules defines the “HMI Style Guide”. In particular, the 
design process (see Fig. 68) is compliant to the “User Centered Design” (UCD) principles 
(Woodson, 1981) [67]. UCD puts the user at the center of design in order to be sure that the 
developed product satisfy as much as possible his/her needs. In other words, the human is not 
considered as the final element with which verifying the product compatibility, but at the contrary 
the core around which the system shall be designed since the early stages.  
Standards, rules and guidelines present in literature help to design a good GUI providing some 
advices to the designers, but they are not rigid “checklists” that guarantees the achievement of a 
good interface. More in detail, the following heuristics have been considered for GUI design[67]: 
• Display the data in a usable and consistent form in order to avoid 
reformulations/transpositions by the operator with consequent workload increase (see also 
section 4.5). 
• Maintain a display layout commonality for different formats in order to reduce the 
mnemonic operator load, the error possibility and the training time. 
• Use simple and natural dialogue. 
• Use the operator language (i.e. aeronautic language). 
• Minimize the mnemonic load (see section 4.5). 
• Provide feedback about the given commands and system status. 
• Provide clear way to exit from a format. 
• Prevents error (e.g. asking confirm for relevant actions). 
• Provide adequate error messages. 
• Design the interface as simple as possible. 
• Optimize the visibility, conspicuousness (ability to attract attention and distinguishability 
from other symbols/background interference and distraction) and legibility. 
• Compatibility of data display with data entry. 
• Standardize abbreviations. 
• Present only data useful to the operator. 
• Present information in analog (i.e. graphic symbology) and/or digital (i.e. numerical value or 
string) way according to the specific case and not with fixed rules. 
• Involve directly the operator in the design. 
• Use an underlying layout grid. 
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• Standardize the screen layout. 
• Related element should have similar format and should be grouped. Vice versa for not 
related elements. 
• Provide an initial focus for the operator attention, directs attention to important, secondary 
or peripheral items and assist in navigation (see section 4.5 for the assistance). 
• Use clear and unambiguous symbols and icons. 
• Use familiar references when possible (taking into account the operator culture and 
training). 
• Colors shall be used in a clear and unambiguous way, focusing the operator attention on 
critical information and respecting cultural and professional usage. In other words, colors 
are information and not decors. 
• Adopt a color coding with the minimum possible number of color (considering the human 
cognitive limitations in the short memory, at maximum 7 ± 2 color should be adopted). 
• All the information required during a transaction should be available on the current display. 
• When display are partitioned in pages/folders, related information should be displayed 
together. 
• Feedback should be provided to indicate that an input has been correctly received and that 
the system performs as intended by the operator. 
• Display should be designed in order to minimize eye movements. 
• The information to display should be prioritized so that the most critical are always 
displayed, while the others are available upon operator request. 
• User should always feel in control of the system. 
• Make all available objects accessible at all times. 
 
 
7.2 Specific Design Issues 
In this section, the specific choices of the style guide are reported. In particular, the touchscreen 
adoption has risen several peculiar issues that have requested a particular care in the design. As 
reference to tailor the GUI design for the TSD, the MIL-STD-1472F has been considered (1999) 
[68]. In January 2012, the edition G was published, but it does not modify the data presents in the 
previous edition.  
 
7.2.1 Types of Controls 
Apart specific cases, the following generic types of touchscreen controls have been considered: 
• Pushbutton: used to select functions/system modes. Several types of pushbuttons are 
provided, different in terms of size and color. 
• Data Entering Field: used to display a function parameter or a mode demand. Several types 
are provided, different in terms of size, color and active area. Pushing on an active field, the 
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relative alphanumeric/numeric keyboard is opened in order to modify the 
parameter/demand. 
• Radio button: used to select a parameter/item when different fixed options are available. 
• Slider: used to select an item between variable lists. 
• Scrollbar: coupled to sliders with many possible rows (i.e. possible options for the operator), 
when a quick navigation is required. 
• Alphanumeric/Numeric keyboard: used to enter parameters/demands. Several types are 
provided, with specific pushbuttons for the relative functions. Each of them is made up by 
some pushbuttons and a not interactive parameter field (i.e. the keyboard scratch pad). 
• Combo Box: used to open a submenu with fixed options relative to HMI setting and not to 
the communication with the VSM. 
 
 
Figure 79. TSD Control Types 
 
7.2.2 Symbol Definition 
Apart the assigned functions and specific moding that vary in each case, the following set of 
information have been chosen to graphically describe a symbol: 
• Position with respect to the format in terms of display X, Y coordinates. 
• Active Area (only for TSD symbols). 
• Type and Range of Movement. 
• Resolution (the step changes for continuous variable data). 
• Default Color. 
• Change Color. 
• Text Size. 
• Layout. 
• Line Thickness. 
• Occult (conditions for which the symbol is occulted). 
• Window Required. 
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• Priority (i.e. order with which displaying the symbol in case of superimposition with other 
symbols). 
• Flash Rate. 
• Update Rate (i.e. rate with which the symbol status shall be updated). 
 
7.2.3 Modular and Parametric Interface 
In order to satisfy the interoperability (STANAG 4586) and upgradability requirements, macro 
control categories have been defined as much as possible (e.g. pushbutton type 1, numeric keyboard 
type 3, and so on), in order to use them for several purposes. For example, considering the 
equivalent of the autopilot mode control panel, all mode pushbuttons are of the same type, also if 
they controls different guidance modes. Besides the same pushbutton can be used for different 
purposes. This parametric structure of the design is then reflected in the software. 
 
7.2.4 Touch Area Dimensions 
First critical issue in the GUI design for a touchscreen is the sizing of the controls, particularly 
critical since they are virtual. Having no a physical pushbutton, in fact, may increase the error 
possibility and operator frustration if the controls have not a sufficient active area (i.e. the area in 
which the operator touch triggers an effect) or if they are not adequately separated. At this purpose, 
the MIL-STD-1472 proposes possible values, distinguishing between virtual alphanumeric/numeric 
keyboard or other functions related pushbuttons. 
 
 
 
Figure 80. MIL-STD-1472 TSD Active Area Dimensions [68] 
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As reported in Fig. 79, the standard considers only square active area. For the separation, different 
values are considered according to the actuation strategy (see section 7.2.5). Noting the presence of 
a column relative to the control resistance, that is minimum and maximum admissible loads that the 
operator shall apply to activate the TSD. This could prevent the use of some touchscreens. 
According to these issues, the MIL-STD-1472 is quite restrictive, and in fact some adjustments 
have been done in practice. First of all also rectangular active area have been considered, respecting 
always the standard limits for the two sides. This is related to the fact that when the dimensions 
were sufficient, an active area equal to the pushbutton geometrical area has been implemented, in 
order to simplify the interaction with the operator. When this is not possible, the active area is 
however centered with respect to the control. An example of this solutions is reported below, with 
the active area is represent in red. 
 
 
 
Figure 81. Active Area vs. Control Dimension 
 
 
As regarding the separation for generic pushbuttons and similar controls (e.g. radio buttons or data 
entered fields), when possible the maximum separation has been used both for alphanumeric 
keyboards and other applications, in order to reduce the possibility of an erroneous selection. Some 
exceptions have bee done for the Mission Planners due to specific layout constraints. In any case 
this concerns specific functions not frequently actuated (e.g. the creation of a new route in a 
mission) in a not safety critical application.  
The problem arises for the sliders, that are not considered by the standard. Trying to match the 
MIL-STD-1472 with these controls, it is obtained a situation in which each slider row has an active 
area smaller than the geometric one. This case is to avoid since it can create confusion to the 
operator when he/she pushes on a not active part of the control obtaining no effect. Besides, the 
operator can be habituated to use sliders on smartphones, and differences can generate further 
confusion. Adding the consequent frustration to the cognitive load due to the need to recognize each 
time the active part of the slider, as result there is a workload increment and a minor feeling of the 
operator with the interface. Finally, adopting rigidly the MIL-STD-1472 brings to a global active 
area on the touchscreen little smaller than the geometric area, and therefore there is not a real 
advantages in terms of control separations. Therefore taking into account the previous 
considerations, the whole slider area has been considered active. 
Different, instead, the situation of a scrollbar, for which only the moving part is active.  
Test pilots have rated positively these solutions. 
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Figure 82. Slider Active Area 
 
 
 
Figure 83. Scrollbar Active Area 
 
 
Unlucky Sliders are not taken into account also by the recent Edition G and therefore a new issue 
considering also this type of control is needed in the future. Besides also the actuation resistance 
requirement can be discussed, since in some application can be interesting to adopt a capacitive or a 
sound acoustic wave touchscreen. A similar reasoning has been done for Combo Box rows. 
To conclude, a diffused touchscreen critic is the greater required virtual control size to avoid errors 
with respect to traditional control panel. At this purpose, it is interesting a comparison with hard 
pushbuttons, considering the case of fingertip actuation in analogy to the touchscreen. As reported 
in Fig. 84, the dimensions are lower, but the separation is greater with respect to the TSD. Therefore 
it is possible concluding that there are no real disadvantages adopting virtual controls with respect 
to hard ones in terms of interface sizing.  
 
7.2.5 Touchscreen Type of Contact 
Second issue of touchscreen use is the choice of the type of contact strategy required to active a 
control. Generally speaking the two following types can be distinguished: 
• First Contact: the control is actuated when the operator pushes the TSD. 
• Last Contact: the control is actuated when the operator release the pressure from the TSD. 
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Figure 84. Hard Pushbutton Sizing Parameters According to the MIL-STD-1472F [68] 
 
 
 
As generic rule, the last contact interaction has been adopted in order to avoid undesired commands. 
In particular if the operator releases the pressure out of control active area, it is considered a null 
command. In this way, keeping pushed a control, no effects are scheduled (apart some exceptions) 
and the operator has a feedback of his/her action from the color coding of the pressed control. 
Besides this solution is particularly suitable for airborne touchscreen. 
Some exceptions have been done for alphanumeric/numeric keyboard pushbuttons, data entering 
fields and radio buttons, for which a first contact interaction has been adopted. For Data Entering 
field, in particular, the pressure feedback is given by the relative keyboard opening, and if the 
control was not desired it is sufficient to close the keyboard. This solution permits a quicker 
interaction and avoids the need to define a proper color coding for the pressed data entering field. 
Of course, the keyboard appears in a different position with respect to the relative field if possible, 
but in any case no undesired commands are possible since a new pressure on TSD is required to 
actuate the keyboard. For the keyboards a similar reasoning has been done, since in this case the 
feedback of the first contact pressure is given by the selected digit in the keyboard scratch pad. A 
graphic pushbutton pushed state has been however implemented as redundant information. 
Keyboard confirm pushbuttons however have a last contact strategy. Finally, radio buttons are 
usually used to choose alternative options, and therefore the selection feedback is provided by the 
graphic state change of the corresponding button with respect to the pushed one.  
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7.2.6 Touchscreen Type of Interaction 
Generally all controls are activated by a single click interaction, independently if they are based on 
first or last contact strategy. Prolonged pressure on a control does not usually provides effects, with 
the exceptions of some pushbuttons for which a long pressure opens a submenu, or the 
alphanumeric/numeric keyboard delete pushbutton for which the long pressure deletes all the 
entered digits/characters. Again the problem has been raised by the sliders, for which there are two 
different types of interaction: 
• single click and drag to move the slider, 
• double click to select a slider row. 
The adoption of double click has been considered in order to avoid erroneous selection when the 
slider is moved with a single click. This is different with respect to the classical smartphone 
implementation in which movement and selection are distinguished by the drag movement 
associated to a single click: if it is lower than a threshold the command is a selection, while if it is 
greater it is interpreted as a sliding command. Errors however are quite frequently with this 
solution. According to this, the double click has bee adopted for the selection, especially 
considering the use of a resistive touchscreen for which the sliding movement requires a continuous 
pressure on the screen. Similarly, a scrollbar is moved with a click and drag interaction. 
Combo Box rows, instead, are selected with a single click since for them there is not the sliding 
movement. 
 
7.2.7 Tactile Feedback 
One of major touchscreen drawback is the absence of a command tactile feedback. This involves 
“head down” operations and a greater workload, since the sight is the unique sensorial channel that 
provides information to the operator about the interface status. A partial fix can be obtained 
adopting TSD with tactile feedback. This technology is usually realized making movable the 
external screen of the TSD with some actuators in order to provide a direct feedback (i.e. a 
vibration) that a control has been pushed. In particular, varying the vibration parameters (i.e. 
frequency, amplitude, wave shape, duration), it is possible to associate a specific feedback to each 
control. In the early phase of the research, a prototype of a sound acoustic wave TSD with this 
technology has been evaluated. Several vibration profiles were available, and in particular some of 
them reproduced the feeling of actuating the virtual equivalent of hard switches (e.g. a rotary 
knobs).  
In a first analysis three different profiles have been identified, associated to the following three 
actions: 
• normal operations, 
• command confirmations, 
• error message acknowledgement. 
More in detail, the associated vibration parameters are reported in Tab. 35. In a successive analysis, 
involving also the test pilots, it has been recognized that providing the tactile feedback for all 
interactions may be annoying for the operator, since the vibration is however an artificial feedback 
different from the real feeling of pushing a control, and repeated frequently may frustrate the user. 
Therefore the decision to remove the feedback for normal operations has been taken, leaving it only 
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for the command confirmations and error acknowledgement. In this way, the vibration is associated 
uniquely to critical commands, for which the operator shall be sure about their actuation.  
 
 
Operation Frequency Amplitude Shape Duration 
Normal high weak smooth short 
Confirm low strong sharp short 
Error high strong sharp long 
Table 35. Tactile Feedback Vibration Parameters 
 
 
Adopting last contact interactions, however, raises further issues about tactile feedback, since in this 
case it provides a feedback that the control has been correctly pushed by the operator, but not that 
the command is actually sent (it depends by the release point that shall be in the pushed active area). 
In any case, unlucky, tactile feedback technology is still immature for several reasons: 
• it is expensive, 
• the Mean Time Between Failure is lower than that of a pure TSD, 
• actuator dimension makes really bigger the TSD. 
According to the previous points and in particular to the third, this technology has been leaved. 
Format layout and a proper color coding, in fact, have been rated as sufficient by test pilots to keep 
a good situational awareness. In any case, tactile feedback technology will be surely to consider 
when it will reach an adequate level of maturity. 
 
7.2.8 Graphic Feedback Actuation 
In order to provide a feedback that a last contact or a keyboard pushbutton has been pushed, a 
proper color coding is adopted (background inversion, outline and text bolded): 
 
 
 
Figure 85. Pushed Graphic State 
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Pushbutton dimensions are sufficient to make visible the graphic change when pushed nevertheless 
the presence of the operator finger. Besides as further indication a marker is displayed above the 
touching point. On the NSC TSD the marker is the “mouse” cursor, since the screen is controlled by 
a “commercial” workstation. The cursor therefore is always present at the last touched position. On 
the SC TSD, at the contrary, there is not an analogous indication, and an apposite marker has been 
created. At difference of the previous case, when the operator does not touch the screen it is parked 
in a display corner (default position).  
A further feedback is provided by the general logic of the GUI: generic selectable pushbuttons (i.e. 
“other functions” in MIL-STD-1472 language), in fact, when pushed change always their state (e.g. 
passing in active state).  
 
 
 
Figure 86. Pushbutton State Change 
 
 
A similar moding has been also implemented for slider rows and Combo Box options selection. 
In case of Confirmation Pushbuttons, they change their state while pushed, and then disappear from 
the page if the VSM answer is received or return in selectable state if no answer is received. 
Finally for first contact controls the results of an actuation are immediately displayed (e.g. digit in 
the numeric keyboard scratchpad), and hence no graphic state change has been provided. 
However, color coding is not used only to highlight a pressure or a state, but also to drive the 
operator in the selection of the correct pushbutton to push. In particular, different layout in terms of 
size and color is used to distinguish between a generic pushbutton and a confirmation. 
 
 
 
Figure 87. Generic vs. Confirmation Pushbuttons 
 
 
Besides, in some cases there can be momentary not active pushbuttons, and this is communicated to 
the operator again with a proper color coding: 
 
 
 
Figure 88. Not Active Pushbutton 
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This graphic coding, in particular, has been rated sufficient by test pilots to provide an adequate 
situational awareness about the system state, without adopting the tactile feedback. 
 
7.2.9 Pushbutton Background 
Besides the absence of a tactile feedback, a virtual control lacks also of depth feeling, being 
represented by a two-dimensional shape on the screen. In order to partially supply at this deficiency, 
pushbuttons have been realized with a linear color gradient as background instead of a transparent 
or uniform color background.  
 
 
 
Figure 89. Different Pushbutton Background Color 
 
 
As reported in Fig. 89, the linear gradient provides a sort of three-dimensional feeling, making more 
recognizable a control from other format element and increasing the operator feeling about the 
interface. Besides linear gradient permits a more distinguishable graphic layout when the 
pushbutton is pressed (see Fig. 85).  
 
7.2.10 Critical Commands 
Another relevant issue in the TSD use is the realization of critical commands, i.e. controls that shall 
be protected from a non desired actuation of the operator. In a traditional cockpit they are protected 
by a guard, but in a TSD this is not possible.  
 
 
 
Figure 90. Example of covered switch 
 
 
According to the MIL-STD-1472, the following two solutions to actuate these commands have been 
adopted: 
• two pressures on different and distant pushbuttons, 
• confirm pop-up. 
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The first solution is used to provide relevant commands to the vehicle, like for example the 
guidance ones. In this case a confirmation pushbutton is placed in the right bottom corner of the 
screen, very distant from the function selection pushbuttons. In this way the command activation 
requires a voluntary double action by the operator and can be difficulty the result of an error. In 
particular the position of confirmation pushbutton is the same in all formats.  
 
 
 
Figure 91. Example of Action Sequence to Activate a Critical Command 
 
 
This solution has been preferred to the second in order to avoid a pop-up that could cover the 
parameters of the function to activate (not yet displayed on the Main Display), and to its higher 
instinctively. Confirmation pushbutton, in particular, is displayed only when a function to activate 
is selected and in the same position for all formats. To annul the operation, it is sufficient to deselect 
the relative function pushbutton.  
In the opposite case – i.e. to deactivate a function – it has been instead chosen a confirm pop-up that 
appears when the relative function pushbutton is pressed. It is more suitable in this case, since it 
asks to the operator if he/she really wants to perform the selected action, without modifying the 
active graphic state of the relative function pushbutton. Covering function parameters it is not a 
problem since they are already displayed on the Main Display, and the pop-up is displayed for a 
short time until the operator decision. Pop-Up are made up by a text and two pushbuttons: “Yes” 
and “No” relative to the possible user decisions. It is automatically closed when a pushbutton is 
pressed. 
 
 
 
Figure 92. Example of Confirmation Pop-Up [27] 
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7.2.11 Graphics Status Monitoring 
In order to be sure that the graphics is not slowed down or frozen due to computational/hardware 
problems, the following indications have been added to each display: 
• Frames per second: it is a graphic refresh rate in Hertz, and it provides an indication about 
possible slowdowns of the graphics. 
• Cyclic counter: used to indicate to the operator a graphics frozen. 
 
7.2.12 Alphanumeric/Numerical Keyboard Layout 
For alphanumeric keyboard, the “QWERTY” format has been assumed as default since the greater 
operator feeling with this layout thanks to the computer and smartphone use, but it also possible to 
change the layout to “ABCDEF” format. Numbers are placed above the letters, just below the 
scratchpad. Since it is possible to enter long string, a cursor is provided in the scratchpad, with the 
possibility to move it along the entered data thanks to arrow pushbuttons. Also Cape Lock, minus, 
point and space pushbutton are provided. Alphanumeric keyboard is used only in the NSC TSD for 
the Mission Planner, since in other formats only numeric data are entered, and therefore it is 
sufficient a numeric keyboard, more practical for the operator if he/she has to enter only numbers. 
 
 
 
Figure 93. Example of Alphanumeric Keyboard 
 
 
Considering the Numeric Keyboard, instead, number pushbuttons can be arranged in two different 
layouts: 
• telephone layout, 
• adding machine layout. 
In our work the first layout has been adopted, due to the greater user feeling with the mobile phone 
use. In particular, several types of numeric keyboard have been implemented, differing for few 
pushbuttons specific of their use: for example minus pushbutton for integer values, point 
pushbutton for real values, letters “N”/”S”/”E”/”W” for Latitude/Longitude and so on. 
For data with a complex format the operator is helped in the data entering in order to reduce the 
required mnemonic load. Considering for example the latitude, until one between “N” or “S” is 
selected, the number pushbuttons are not selectable. After the hemisphere selection, when the 
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second digit is entered the “°” symbol and a space are automatically entered to remember at the 
operator that the degree field is complete and the minute have to be entered. The same for the 
remaining digits. A similar moding is present also in alphanumeric keyboards.  
 
 
 
Figure 94. Possible Numeric Keyboard Layout 
 
 
Figure 95. Examples of Different Numeric Keyboards 
 
7.2.13 Error Protection During Data Entering 
Alphanumeric or Numeric keyboards are used by the operators to enter data. In order to aid the user 
and preventing possible errors, a protection has been considered directly in the keyboards. If the 
operator, in fact, enters a value out of range or in an erroneous format, the keyboard scratchpad is 
showed in error state and it is not possible to confirm the entered data. Below, an example relative 
to an erroneous entering of Longitude Minutes: 
 
 
 
Figure 96. Example of Numerical Keyboard in Error State 
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Deleting the erroneous data (in the previous example the “7”), the Error State is removed.  
 
7.2.14 Number of Opened Windows 
At difference for example of a traditional Personal Computer GUI that permits to open several 
windows at the same time, in our case at maximum one pop-up or keyboard can be displayed at 
time, in order to keep a quick access to the page control and avoiding errors.  
 
7.2.15 Font 
Many fonts are available for a GUI development, with different characteristics in terms of shape, 
size, character spacing, and ultimately legibility. Some examples are reported below: 
 
 
Font Lowercase Alphabet Uppercase Alphabet Numbers  
Arial abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789  
Calibri abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789  
Courier abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789  
Microsoft 
Sans 
Serif 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789 
 
Tahoma abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789  
Times 
New 
Roman 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789  
Table 36. Examples of Possible Fonts at 10 Pt 
 
 
As reported in Tab. 36, nevertheless the same dimension in terms of points (Pt), the presented fonts 
are quite different from each other. In particular the “Tahoma”  has been chosen, developed by 
Matthew Carter for Microsoft in 1994 [69]. It is particularly suitable for GUI applications, thanks to 
its legibility with respect to dimensions. In particular, the lowercase “l” is distinguished from the 
uppercase “I”, avoiding errors in technical texts. 
As general rules of use, the uppercase has been adopted only for word fist letter and acronyms, 
preferring the lowercase for full text due to its greater legibility. For the dimensions, seven 
categories have been defined, ranging from nearly 3 mm to 6 mm of height, considering the 
distance at which the operator seats with respect to the screen and the different type of text to 
display. Bold is used to rise the attention on a text (e.g. active pushbutton name), while the italics is 
avoided since it is not very legible. 
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7.2.16 Units of Measure 
In the GUI design, the following units of measure have been adopted considering the standards in 
aeronautics: 
 
 
Parameter Unit of Measure 
Accelerations Number of “g” (g) 
Air/Ground Speed Knots (kts) 
Altitude/Height Feet (ft) 
Angles Degrees (Deg) 
Distance Nautical Miles (NM) 
Latitude Longitude Degrees Minutes.Millesimals (Deg Min.mmm) 
Mass Kilogram (kg) 
Pressure Millibar (mbar) 
Temperature Celsius Degrees (°C) 
Time Hours:Minutes:Seconds (hh:mm:ss) 
Vertical Speed Feet Per Minute (fpm) 
Table 37. Units of Measure 
 
 
Noting the difference with respect to the units considered by the STANAG-4586 (International 
System). A conversion is therefore performed by the CUCS software. 
 
7.2.17 Touchscreen Menu Organization 
Generally speaking, Multi Function Displays – the TSD is in every respect a MFD finger actuated – 
had reduced the operator workload due to the visual search of the apposite format in the cockpit, 
raising instead the cognitive load due to the navigation in the hierarchy of pages. Hierarchy can be 
organized in two different ways [67]: 
• Depth organization: there are more sub-menus accessible in sequence (i.e. a hierarchy tree), 
with few selectable items for each level. A sub-menu, in other words, can be accessed only 
from the node that lies above it. 
• Breath organization: there are few submenus with many items in each level.  
In the first case, the operator has to recall the position of the needed function and accessing it 
passing through the previous pages. This can increase the workload and reducing the reaction time, 
critical when a quick access to a control is required. However a depth structure can also provided 
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some advantages, especially in the cases where there are many possible options (especially if the 
processing time for each of them is long), and a little screen size.  
Breath organization, instead, is more suitable when there are relative few possible options (with a 
little processing time), and a quick access is needed. In particular, it has been experimentally 
demonstrated that the maximum number of items per breath level should range between 4 and 13, in 
order to maximize the operator performance [67].  
According to the previous considerations, a breath organization has been adopted, in which from a 
main menu is possible to select the desired page. Each page has a left blue bar in which its name is 
reported in order to aid the operator in the menu navigation. In case of complex function with many 
possible related controls, the relative TSD page is organized in folders (maximum 5). In each 
folders no further sub-menus are provided. Besides, from each page/folder it is always possible to 
return in the main menu pushing the menu button (white triangle on the blue bar). Folder navigation 
is provided pushing on the relative name, with a proper color coding showing the current folder. In 
other words, a structure with two depth levels has been realized.  
At the moment, in each menu (SC and NSC TSDs) there are few pushbuttons to access to the 
implemented function. In the future, adding new FMS functionalities or other function controls, the 
number of options will increase, taking however into account the maximum suggested numbers of 
13. At this purpose, the possibility to group related function pushbuttons and/or using different 
color coding has been considered to quicker distinguish the several menu options.  
 
 
 
Figure 97. Menu Structure 
 
 
130 
 
7.2.18 Main Display Layout 
Typically a GCS has two main displays for each station, like for example the Predator (see Fig. 36). 
In our case, adopting a single Main Display the operator visual search workload has been reduced, 
but the design has been complicated since there are many data to display with different priorities 
according to the performed task. In order to avoid an operator cognitive overload and to put greater 
relevance to the most used information in each context, a reconfigurable Main Display according to 
Phase of Flight has been studied in a previous research activity [70].  
 
 
 
Figure 98. Main Display in Take Off and Landing Configuration 
 
 
 
Figure 99. Main Display in Cruise Configuration 
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In particular the two following phases have been distinguished: 
• Take Off & Landing: greater relevance to the Head Up Display (HUD) format, i.e. Primary 
Flight Display information (attitude, altitude, speed, heading, etc.) superimposed to the 
image of the guidance camera, at detriment of Navigation Format.  
• Cruise: greater relevance to the Navigation Format with a little HUD. 
In particular, the first layout is thought to be used for the departure and approach phases, in which it 
is important to have a greater image of the external world. The little navigation format it is to be 
used to visualize the situation at short range around the vehicle, and therefore the reduced size is 
sufficient. In any case, this format is most suitable when the system is manually piloted. 
Cruise format, instead, would be the standard layout for the mission execution, with the aircraft 
controlled in automatic way and hence with greater relevance on the navigation format.  
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8 VEHICLE CONTROL RELATED FUNCTIONS 
 
 
In this section the formats relative to guidance, navigation (extending the term to include also 
trajectory prediction), communication and configuration functions are presented. In particular, these 
formats are hosted in Main Display and SC touchscreen. 
 
 
8.1 Guidance Formats 
8.1.1 Operative Concept 
As required by the initial assumptions (see section 6.4.6), the vehicle can be controlled in manual, 
semiautomatic or automatic ways (see Fig. 10). A further distinction is done between basic autopilot 
and navigation related modes. First are relative to semiautomatic guidance, in which the operator 
specifies discrete demands about the vehicle state variables (i.e. altitude, speed, heading, etc.) that 
are then acquired automatically by the system. Seconds, instead, involves the fully automatic 
following of a planned path in four dimensions. Hybrids between basic autopilot and navigation 
modes are possible, for example with the LNAV determined by the route and 3th, 4th dimensions 
assigned dynamically by the pilot like in semiautomatic guidance (see STANAG 4586 MSG #48 in 
section 5.5). Operatively, semiautomatic guidance permits a more flexible way to control the 
vehicle, with the possibility to change the vehicle state with discrete commands on a single or more 
parameters. Besides this type of control is the most suitable to fly under direct ATC control and 
therefore it shall be considered in the design for a future integration in the civil airspace. Automatic 
modes, instead, are thought as main guidance type along planned route or user defined loiter WPs 
(i.e. STANAG 4586 waypoints and loiter modes). Replanning capabilities in terms of guidance – 
that is the possibility to upload a new route while the vehicle is flying – is required in order to 
provide operative flexibility. Although foreseen by STANAG 4586, this is not a trivial capability: 
for example the first blocks of the Global Hawk does not have this option [41]. Further flexibility is 
obtained by the autopilot/navigation hybrids mentioned above.  
In a second phase also a Slaved Navigation to Sensor (SNS) mode has been considered according to 
STANAG 4586. It is a quite different mode with respect the others, since in this case the aircraft 
position is determined by the sensor observation point. This involves a strict crew coordination 
between pilot and sensor operators, since it is the second that – although indirectly – controls the 
vehicle. This is a very different situation with respect to the standard way in which it is the pilot that 
decides where the aircraft goes according also to the sensor operator requests. Apart its operative 
value, the SNS mode represents also a step toward the realization of a single station that controls 
both vehicle and payload. In any case it has been naturally added to the interface, thanks to its 
modularity. 
 
8.1.2 Functional Design 
In the functional design the study of guidance functions to provide at the operator has been done. 
Critical issues presented in section 4.4 have been taken into account in order to realize a better 
interface with respect to the current ones. In particular, in order to reduce the Mode Awareness 
problem, the available guidance modes for the operator have been reduced only to 5 with respect to 
the 20 or more of an airliner, simplifying the system moding. Also considering possible new future 
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functions, the final number will remain significantly lower than 20. At this purpose the concept of 
mode can be distinguished at three different levels: 
• HMI: modes presented and selectable by the operator. 
• System: modes at FCS/navigation laws level (e.g. modes foresee by STANAG 4586). 
• Control Laws: basic control loops in flight mechanics control laws. 
These three levels can coincide (e.g. in case of altitude hold function) or diverge, especially for 
complex mode. As example of the second case, an example is reported below about a possible 
division for a 4D navigation mode: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 100. Example of Guidance Mode Definition At Several Levels 
 
 
 
According to the previous example, apparently there are few differences between the HMI and 
system levels (just the mode name), but in many case the system discriminates from a mode to an 
another one using more information with a complex logic (for example considering the mode 
demands not reported above for simplicity). Besides the same system mode can correspond to 
different HMI level modes, due to the demands selected by the operator. The real differences 
however is with respect to the control loops, for which there could be a greater mode number than 
the HMI level, since there could be a mode for each of the following references: vertical plane, 
lateral plane, throttle/speed axis.  
Instead in an airliners – always according to the example of Fig. 100 – at HMI level there would be 
a situation in which LNAV, VNAV and AT are reported active on the mode control panel and the 
PFD, reflecting the situation at the lowest level of the control laws. However having a triple 
indication for a single macro mode is not exactly a clear information for the operator, with a 
reduction in system transparency and a consequent increasing of workload. This situation is due to 
the need (raised when high automation was introduced on aircraft) to report at the pilots the system 
behavior with the greatest possible detail – like was the human to control the aircraft and not the 
automation – in order to have the maximum number of information about the automation state.  
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On a UAS, however, the same detail is not requested, especially considering the greater level of 
automation with respect to a classic manned aircraft. Besides realizing a system with a transparent 
unambiguous moding helps to reduce the detail in system feedback, simplifying the interface and 
reducing error possibility. In particular, modes reduction has been done at two levels: HMI and 
system.  
Starting from the latter and considering the semiautomatic guidance, hold and acquiring functions 
on lateral/vertical planes and throttle/speed axis demands have been joined together in single 
modes. Distinction between “hold” (i.e. keeping the current vehicle state) or “acquire” (i.e. achieve 
the set value) functions is performed according to the mode demand. With these two modes, an 
operator is fully able to control the aircraft position in the space with discrete commands. It is not 
possible therefore activating modes on a single reference (e.g. a pure altitude hold without modes 
on lateral plane and throttle/speed axis). For an UAS, however, this is not a limitation, since it is not 
useful having an automatic control on a single plane/axis, and manual on the others. Instead to have 
a great flexibility, in fact, this could increase the error probability.  
For the automatic guidance, it has been operated at HMI levels adopting a single mode for all the 
possible VNAV demand combinations reported in the MSG #48. In particular this solution has been 
preferred by the test pilots with respect to have different modes with relative pushbuttons and 
parameters.  
Having coupled semiautomatic or fully automatic guidance modes, however, increases the system 
complexity making less predictable the vehicle behavior. Possible situations typically involve the 
VNAV and are relative for example to conflict between altitude/speed demands (e.g. climbing and 
accelerating at the same time) or to the way with which a new altitude is acquired. To solve this 
issue, the control laws have implemented fixed rules for climb and descent, making very easy for 
the operator to keep a situational awareness about the aircraft. Initially, the pilots have requested a 
degree of freedom in the setting of climb/descent parameters, bringing back to the familiar case of 
manned aircraft, but eventually they have accepted the automatic solution since it is more suitable 
to the unmanned contexts. Besides this implementation has permitted to avoid automatic mode 
changes, that are a relevant source of poor understanding about the vehicle state.  
Finally 5 modes have been obtained at HMI level, 7 at system level and 7 at control laws levels. For 
each system level, in particular, 2 or 3 control loops are involved each time. 
Another aspects affecting mode awareness are the arming and engagement/disengagement 
conditions. To avoid related problems, our proposal permits always to arm and then engage (if all 
the relative parameters have been set) a mode. If not all needed demands have been entered, in fact, 
the GUI prevents the mode activation. This is different from many manned aircraft, for which a 
mode can not be always engaged. For example many liners does not activate LNAV mode if the 
aircraft has cross-track and track angle errors greater than some thresholds. Automatic 
disengagement, instead, are not foreseen in our case: a mode change in fact is always commanded 
by the operator, at difference of manned aircraft. Automation disengagements, in particular, are in 
contrast with the UAS concept of operation that foresees an automatic/autonomous control, for 
which a reversion to manual remote control is meaningless.  
Mode activation is therefore performed in two steps, requiring an arming before the engagement in 
order to enable operator demand overrides before the activation. 
More in detail, arming a semiautomatic mode, default demands (equal to the current UAV values) 
are armed. If the mode is activated in this conditions, the “hold” function is obtained. The operator, 
however, is able to armed a different value for one or more demands before engaging the mode, 
realizing the acquire “function” for the affected values. Therefore it is possible to have hybrid in 
which some parameter are held and others acquired.  
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For the navigation management standpoint, instead, the following specific functions are available 
[27]: 
• upload of a route (chosen from the available route list of the current mission) to the vehicle 
maintaining the current active guidance mode, 
• route upload plus engaging from a selected WP, 
• upload of a route in reverse order (useful for example during monitoring or searching tasks), 
• changing of the active route destination waypoint considering both next WPs (i.e. still to be 
flown) and flown WPs (i.e. WP already flown), 
• revert to semiautomatic control for VNAV, 
• route waypoints characteristics visualization for the operator, 
• realizing a direct to toward a loiter WP. 
 
 
8.1.3 GUI Implementation 
The STANAG 4671 requires that the active guidance mode and the relative demands are always 
displayed to the operator, like on the PFD of a manned aircraft. Starting from this requirements, it 
has been designed the GUI allocating these information on the Main Display, that is the primary 
monitoring interface for the operator. Noting that no information about armed modes are displayed 
on Main Display. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 101. Example of Guidance Data on Main Display 
 
 
 
On the SC TSD, the equivalent of the Mode Control Panel plus MCDU page to control the current 
route has been implemented in the same interface. The developing of this format has been very 
complex, since many versions have been designed in the time before reaching the final 
configuration. Below an examples of the final implementation is reported. 
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Figure 102. Example of Guidance format on TSD [27] 
 
 
Having a single format requires a dynamical page reconfiguration capability. As default, the page is 
relative to the active mode, but when a mode is armed it is reconfigured in order to display the 
relative data enabling operator setting. This reconfiguration, however, is not total. Nevertheless the 
indication on Main Display, in fact, it has been preferred to maintain always visible the guidance 
mode pushbuttons in order to provide a fixed indication of armed and engaged mode also in the 
TSD. In this way the operator keeps an adequate situational awareness about the vehicle state 
during “head down” operations and can quickly modify/annul the arming selection. Besides, in the 
Reconfigurable Area, functional items (e.g. demand fields, numeric keyboards, navigation data pop-
ups, confirmation pushbuttons, etc.) are displayed always in the same position independently by the 
armed/engaged mode in order to maintain a layout commonality and hence increasing the operator 
feeling with the interface. According to this design assumption, the adoption of two folders in this 
page (one for the semiautomatic modes and another for the navigation ones) has been rejected, since 
in this case no all mode pushbuttons are visible at the same time and the mode changing time 
increases. This final layout is schematically reported in Fig. 103. 
 
 
 
Figure 103. Guidance Format Layout on TSD 
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Considering the demand fields – displayed in the reconfigurable area – the initial idea was to 
provide indications only about armed and engaged states, but the test pilots have requested a further 
distinction between the engaged demands in acquisition by the system and that already achieved in 
order to have a greater situational awareness about the vehicle state. Besides also demands 
commanded by the system during altitude variation are presented to the operator with an apposite 
graphical layout. This information is helpful to avoid mode awareness problem. Altitude acquisition 
laws are fixed and hence easily predictable by the operators, but providing an indication is however 
preferable in order to increase the system behavior understanding. In the figure below, possible 
graphical states of a guidance demand field is reported. An analogous indication is also provided on 
Main Display (see Fig. 101). 
 
 
 
Figure 104. Guidance Demands Layout in the TSD 
 
 
Demands are aligned from left to right at the top of the Reconfigurable area, with an order that 
recalls the standard “T” of the traditional cockpit. This is the classical disposition of main 
analogical instruments adopted in all aircraft (i.e.. anemometer, attitude indicator, altimeter and 
directional gyro indicator). and then borrowed also on multi function display and HUD symbology 
for commonality with traditional analogical panels.  
Apart the attitude information that are not pertinent in our case, this rule has been followed for the 
demand disposition in order to reduce the operator visual search workload. A pilot in fact is skilled 
to find information in fixed zone of the screen, and therefore he/she will find “natural” this layout. 
An exception to the previous rule has been done for the demands that has not the 
acquisition/achieved attribute, like for example the geometric characteristics of a loiter WP. In these 
cases, therefore, there is not the magenta/green outline. Besides these demands are arranged into 
apposite box relative to the navigation function and not at the top of the screen to distinguish them 
by the demands relative to the UAV state. 
 
 
 
Figure 105. Example of Standard “T” Layout in a Traditional Cockpit 
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In order to avoid errors during data entering, numeric keyboards are opened in a free position that 
do not cover the current demand values, so that the user is able to see at the same time old and the 
values. Besides until a keyboard is opened, it is not possible to activate a mode/demand. 
For the navigation related functions, the operator can select a route from a list relative to the current 
mission received from the Mission Planner. No geographic or type WP attribute modifications are 
possible in this format. From the graphics standpoint, route and WP lists of the selected route are 
visualized through sliders. In particular, an indication of armed and engaged route/waypoint is 
provided with a color coding common to demands and modes pushbutton. Besides also a graphical 
indication of on-board but not active route is given. For the current armed WP – or engaged WP if 
no arming is done – the relative attributes are presented to increase the operator situational 
awareness. The possibility to change the DWP of the active route in both the route direction, in 
particular, provides a high flexibility to the system since the operator is able to conduct the vehicle 
to any route WP at difference of typical manned aviation system. In particular, it is possible to 
upload and engaged a new route, while the vehicle is already in navigation guidance mode, without 
the requirement to disengage it. Further flexibility is obtained by the possibility to revert to a 
semiautomatic VNAV profile control, i.e. the capability to set discrete altitude and speed demand 
while the LNAV is automatically followed by the system. 
Engaged status of mode pushbutton, demands and slider rows is triggered by the reception of VSM 
response at the CUCS command and not by the upload of the command itself, since they shall 
present to the operator the vehicle status and not the user requests.  
To conclude the presentation of the guidance interface, the possibility to change some demands 
through HOTAS has been considered in order to avoid the workload relative to the TSD page 
change is an another format is visualized, and to enable frequent operations to be performed at 
“head up”.  
From the STANAG 4586 standpoint, the GUI has been realized with a modular structure that 
enables easily further updates. If a new mode has to be implement, in fact, it is sufficient to add a 
new standard pushbutton in the apposite free space with the relative demand, and then linking the 
symbology with the relative common and/or private STANAG messages to realize the function.  
 
 
8.2 Navigation Format 
8.2.1 General Layout 
Like on manned aircraft (see Fig. 23 for an example), the Navigation Format is the main navigation 
interface for the operator, providing the awareness about the horizontal situation around the vehicle. 
In particular both navigation and trajectory prediction information are presented together in this 
format, named only “navigation” for simplicity. It is hosted on Main Display and therefore it has 
different layout according to its format. In particular, in both cases it is possible to distinguish 
between an upper zone in which a symbolic representation of the external environment is provided, 
and a lower zone in which the navigation/trajectory prediction data are displayed. Besides at the 
corners of the upper zone there are some fixed symbols like for example wind symbol and format 
scale indicator.  
This format responds to the STANAG 4671 requirements about the visualization of vehicle position 
with respect to the mission environment, absolute time reference and wind direction/speed data. 
From the STANAG 4586 standpoint, the Environment Representation is applicable to any vehicle 
since many symbols are directly generated by the CUCS from the mission database (e.g. No Fly 
Zones), while vehicle position/orientation and active route are provided by standard messages. Off 
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course if an UAV requires the visualization of a specific symbol for its mission, a change will be 
needed. For the data, instead, they are usually provided by private messages and so they are vehicle 
related (see section 5.7 for more details). These data, however, are common to any navigation 
system, and so the effort to adapt the format to a new vehicle should be low. 
 
 
 
Figure 106. Main Display Navigation Format Layout 
 
 
Finally, on manned aircraft also a Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) is present – usually 
integrated in the lower part of the PFD (see Fig. 24 for an example) – as further navigation 
reference, especially for NAVAID procedures. It has not been included, since UAVs typically do 
not navigate with NAVAIDs, but if needed it can be easily added to the interface in the future. 
 
8.2.2 Environment Representation 
The core of the upper zone is the aircraft symbol around which it is displayed a Compass Rose (see 
Fig. 107), that is a format that permits to determinate the polar coordinates in terms of range and 
bearing (with respect to the True North) of an object with respect to the vehicle. Compass Rose 
radius varies according to the zoom level of the format. With respect to classical manned aircraft 
implementation (see section 2.4.2 for more details), only the center configuration (i.e. rose layout) 
has been considered, and not the offset one. This is due to the type of mission performed by UASs – 
for example monitoring or searching task – that requires a 360° monitoring around the vehicle since 
the flight path can be complex with frequent direction inversions and for mission purposes. An 
airliner, instead, performs transit tasks from an airport to an another with a near straight path that 
does not foresee an inversion, except in case of failures or problems. Offset layout in this case is 
more suitable, since it provides a broader vision of the environment ahead the aircraft.  
Likewise classical implementation, the Compass Rose and the external environment can be 
represented with different orientations: North Up, Track Up and Heading Up. In North Up, the 
Navigation Format is oriented with the North direction upwards. Therefore in this case the Compass 
Rose is fixed in the format, while the aircraft symbol rotates according to the current vehicle 
heading. A track symbol rotating around the Compass Rose is also displayed in order to visualize 
the current vehicle track, permitting to the operator an easier evaluation of the wind drift effect. In 
Track Up orientation, instead, the environment representation rotates to be aligned at the track, that 
is kept upwards. At the contrary with respect to the previous case, the aircraft symbol is fixed and it 
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is the external circle of the Compass Rose to rotate according to the track. No Heading symbol is 
provided in this case. From the operative standpoint, the North Up orientation is more useful for 
landmark searching or in general when the operator wants to correlate the vehicle 
position/orientation with respect to an external item. Track Up orientation, instead, offers an ego-
centered representation of the environment to the operator, making easy a correlation between 
Navigation Format representation and guidance camera image.  
 
 
 
Figure 107. Example of Compass Rose 
 
 
Comparing these two options, rated test pilots prefer the Track Up layout, that it is demonstrated to 
provide lower reaction time and workload to pilots on manned aircraft, as reported in Fig. 108. This 
result show the relevance of pilot skills on flying an aircraft, that are transposed to the unmanned 
context also when they are not completely applicable. In many missions typical of UAS, in fact, 
North Up orientation is more suitable, like for example to correlate vehicle, sensor footprint and 
targets positions. From the experience at the simulator, our opinion of no pilot operators is that 
Track Up format is more preferable for manual remote and semiautomatic control, while in 
navigation the North Up permits a greater Situational Awareness. This is an example of differences 
between rated pilots or operators in terms of mental model about the way to operate the system, and 
hence of interface type to support the user. In any case, having the possibility to choose the 
orientation, the HMI can be arranged to meet the expectation of each category of user, according 
also to the specific task to perform. 
 
 
 
Figure 108. Track Up and North Up Orientation Comparison for Manned Aircraft[67] 
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Finally, the Heading Up orientation has been included (not common on manned aircraft), that could 
be a useful reference when the aircraft position is commanded through discrete heading demands, 
especially when there is a high drift angle that makes significantly different heading and track. In 
this last case, Heading Up orientation permits also a better correlation between guidance camera 
image and Navigation Format representation. 
Basic Navigation Format functioning mode considers the aircraft symbol fixed at its center, with the 
external environment representation that slides and rotates according to the vehicle position, like on 
traditional implementation on manned aircraft. For monitoring or searching missions, however, can 
be interesting for the operator to focus his/her attention on a given zone also if the vehicle is going 
away from it, or still analyze a zone ahead the UAV that has not been yet reached. For this reason, it 
is possible to move the navigation format through apposite control on a dedicated TSD page, fixing 
its center in any desired position. When the Navigation Format is not centered on the vehicle, 
aircraft symbol and Compass Rose move according to the vehicle position, until to exit also from 
the screen. There is however a quick control to center again the format on the vehicle. Off course 
this geographic position centered mode is to use in North Up orientation, since in the other two 
cases at each aircraft turn the format rotates, making more difficult for the operator the analysis. 
From the scenario representation standpoint, routes/WPs representation and mission relevant 
symbology have been implemented. As format background it is possible to display a certifiable 
aeronautical map. In particular, for routes/WPs it is possible to distinguish between “armed”, “on-
board but not engaged” and “on-board engaged” states. These are the only armed parameters 
presented on the Main Display, in order to permits at the operator to evaluate the future aircraft 
position before to engage them. An example of Navigation Format symbols is reported in Fig. 109.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 109. Example of Navigation Format Symbology 
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8.2.3 Navigation Format Setting 
The operator is able to configure some Navigation Format setting with an apposite TSD folder, like 
for example the orientation, zoom level or the center moving. An example is reported in Fig. 110. 
Zoom level has been considered also with HOTAS in order to avoid the workload and frustration 
relatively to the TSD page for a very frequent operation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 110. Example of Navigation Format Setting Folder 
 
 
 
8.3 Vertical Profile 
8.3.1 General Layout 
Vertical Profile provides situational awareness about the aircraft state on vertical plane, in terms of 
terrain separation and route altitude profile. Basically it is a Cartesian graph with the ground 
distance on the horizontal axis and the altitude on the vertical one. A vehicle marker moves along 
vertical axis according to the current vehicle altitude. A lubber line (starting from the vehicle 
marker) provides an information about the current ramp angle, and hence of the future vehicle 
altitude. On the graph the terrain profile is displayed as background. It is generated by the Digital 
Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) and slides from left to right according to the aircraft position. In 
particular, for the profile creation the DTED are queried to get terrain altitude for some intermediate 
point coordinates along the considered direction. More details about DTED are provided in 
Appendix A. According to the considered directions for the terrain profile generation, two working 
modes have been implemented: 
• track, 
• auto route. 
Like on manned aircraft Vertical Profile is displayed beneath the Navigation Format, with different 
dimensions according to the Main Display layout. 
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Figure 111. Example of Vertical Profile 
 
 
In particular, for the terrain separation this format is an aid for the operator since it provides a 
prediction of the future vehicle altitude, but no collision alerts are raised. Alert generation should be 
allocated to a Ground Proximity Warning System on-board, that is better able to evaluate the safety 
margin of the vehicle from the terrain taking into account also the pull-up capability. In this way 
also automatic recovery action should be implemented. 
Finally, STANAG 4671 does not put any statement about vertical profile, while for the STANAG 
4586 this is a common format since it requires information provided by standard messages. 
Changes would be only required to add specific symbols. 
 
8.3.2 Track Mode 
This is the basic mode, in which the terrain profile is create considering the intersection of the 
terrain model with the vertical plane determined by the current vehicle track.  
 
 
 
Figure 112. Terrain Profile Generation in Track Mode 
 
 
To generate the terrain profile, a plane – and not the highest terrain altitudes in a volume centered 
on the plane – has been considered for the following reasons: 
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• A MALE operates typically above the terrain with a safety separation margin. Its missions in 
fact do not require to fly into valley or canyon. 
• Terrain has not typically discontinuities and therefore the altitude values on the track plane 
are similar to ones of the nearest parallel planes (at least of canyons or sharp valley, not 
considered for the point above). 
• 2D terrain information can be available on demand also on Main Display, integrating the 
Vertical Profile when the vehicle flies over a rough orography.  
According to this implementation, the profile varies each time the aircraft turns. The effect of 
continuous variations present for example flying at low altitude above the Alps do not annoy the 
pilots, and in any case it is realistic. 
In this mode the horizontal axis distances are perfectly coherent with the Compass Rose radius. 
 
8.3.3 Auto Route Mode 
This mode is automatically activated when a route is engaged in order to provide situation 
awareness about the VNAV and the orography along the route. Mode awareness is provided by the 
Vertical Profile mode annunciator at the top left of the format, and by the route visualization. At 
difference of the previous case, the terrain is not generated along the track plane, but arranging side 
by side the terrain profiles generated on the planes identified by the route legs. In case of Lost 
Uplink condition, Contingency WPs are considered in the generation. 
 
 
 
Figure 113. Terrain Profile Generation in Auto Route Mode 
 
 
When a route is flown, however, the vehicle does not ever follow exactly its horizontal path: apart 
the engagement, in fact, there are fillings due to Fly-By/Fly Through WPs, loiters, change DWP 
commands and so on. In these conditions representing the terrain along the route could be 
misunderstand for the operator, and so the track mode is the more correct. At this purpose an 
automatic switching has been implemented between auto route and track modes according to 
distance and orientation thresholds of the vehicle with respect to the route. More in detail, if the 
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vehicle is within the thresholds, the auto route will be considered, while if at least a threshold is 
passed the profile returns in auto track. This moding is therefore valid also if the route direction is 
inverted. In particular, in this case the horizontal distance is relative to the leg lengths and it is not 
comparable to the Compass Rose radius.  
Auto route implementation has been positively judged by the pilots, that have appreciated the great 
situational awareness provided by the format. 
 
 
8.4 Radio Communications 
8.4.1 Generalities on UAS Communications 
Radio Communications page has been studied in order to realize a GUI for the control of the GCS 
radio and interphone system. 
Generally speaking the Communications system of an UAS can be made up by several elements 
according to specific case: 
• Ground Communications segment 
o GCS radios 
 LOS aeronautical radios (VHF, UHF) 
 BLOS aeronautical radios (HF) 
 Satellite Communication (SATCOM) 
 Ground radios 
o Interphone system 
• On-board Communications segment 
o LOS aeronautical radios (VHF, UHF) 
o BLOS aeronautical radios (HF) 
• Communication Relay (on-board payload) 
• Transponder. 
GCS aeronautical radios are used to communicate with the ATC – in particular with the airport 
tower/radar since the GCS is usually placed near them – and with other actors in the scenario. 
SATCOM increases the UAS operational flexibility in BLOS, enabling direct communication of the 
GCS with others actors (ground teams in operational areas, aircraft, etc.), without using the vehicle 
as repeater. Ground radios, finally, are used by the crew to communicate with the UAS ground team 
during airport operations.  
Interphone is the manager of the ground communication segment, enabling/disabling the 
communications of each crew member (pilot, sensor operator or other members like mission 
commander, image analyst, etc.) with the others and the external users (UAS ground team, ATC, 
C4I, etc.), according to the selected configuration.  
On-board radios, instead, permits an extension of the communication range on traditional 
aeronautical frequencies in BLOS operations, with the radio controls in GCS and the antennas on 
the vehicle, using the datalink to transfer the operator commands. In particular it is possible to 
distinguish between the on-board radios used by the operators to communicate with external user – 
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that is a part of the FMS – and the communication repeaters used by external user to extend their 
communication network (e.g. to replace damaged ground telephonic repeaters) – that are considered 
as payload and not as part of the FMS. 
Transponder, finally, is mandatory to operate in controlled airspaces. 
Our preliminary design has concerned the development of interfaces to control ground aeronautical 
radios and interphone system. STANAG 4671 does not have requirements about Communications 
system, while the STANAG 4586 is not affected since only ground equipments have been 
considered. Standard messages to control on-board radios, communication repeaters and transported 
are instead provided. 
 
8.4.2 Radio Control  
Radio control function has been studied considering three LOS radios. As key design driver we 
have considered that each operator should be able to be in reception on more channels, while 
obviously he/she can transmit only with a radio at time. Besides a single format to control the 
communication settings for both operators has been considered, like a common radio panel in a 
manned cockpit. This operative concept is based on the assumption that all interphone 
configurations enable both the operators to use the radios. More in detail, radio management 
involves the following functions [27]: 
• transmitter setting, 
• receiver setting, 
• frequency setting, 
• frequency storing, 
• frequency loading in a DB, 
• squelch enable/disable, 
• Build In Test (BIT), 
• Quick Emergency Frequencies Selection (121.5 MHz for VHF radios and 243 MHz for 
UHF radios). 
For audio volume regulation and Push To Talk (PTT) – i.e. the pushbutton to press in order to 
transmit on the radio set as transmitter – functions, hard controls have been assumed in order to 
make these very frequent functions quick to executed, without forcing the operator to interact with 
the GUI. According to the operative concept, if the operator transmits on a channel, he/she will be 
also in reception on it, while on other channels the only reception can be enabled without 
transmission. Besides being the radios common to the crew, the GUI enables the configuration 
setting for both the stations. A strict crew coordination is therefore required like on manned aircraft.  
Passing to the GUI study, the current status is displayed on Main Display and the controls on TSD 
like for other considered macro functions. An example is reported in Fig. 114.  
On the SC TSD, instead, the Communication managing page is made up by two folders: one 
relative to the radio and the other to the interphone. In particular, the radio folder has a structure that 
recalls the assumed operator arrangement in the GCS. Left station controls are in fact allocated in 
the left part of the page, right station controls in the right part and common/other controls at the 
center. This solution increases user feeling with the interface, reducing the visual search workload. 
Some examples are reported in Fig. 115. The page has been positively rated by test pilots. 
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Figure 114. Example of Communication Information on Main Display 
 
 
 
 
Figure 115. Example of Radio Folder 
 
 
8.4.3 Interphone Control 
Interphone management is strictly correlated to radio management, and hence it has been 
considered. Interphone folder enables the operator to arm and then engaging one of the stored 
configurations. A test function of the interphone is also provided. Mechanism of arming/engaging, 
in particular, permits to see a preview of the selected configuration before its activation. Creating a 
new configurations and storing it has been considered a maintenance level operation, and therefore 
it is not performed by the operator. An example of the folder is reported in Fig. 116. 
 
 
8.5 Configuration 
Configuration functions permits to set some parameters of the GCS and the On-board segments. 
This is a very specific function, developed essentially for flight tests. STANAG 4671, in fact, is not 
involved, while for the STANAG 4586 standpoint it has been realized with private messages. It is 
performed through a TSD page divided in five folders, each of them with a moding analogous to 
that of guidance and communication pages. An example is reported in Fig. 117. 
 
148 
 
 
Figure 116. Example of Interphone Folder 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 117. Example of Configuration Page 
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9 MISSION PLANNING 
 
 
9.1 Enlarged Mission Concept for UAS 
9.1.1 Mission Definition 
STANAG 4586 mission concept reported in section 5.6.1 provides a mission definition based on the 
data exchanged between CUCS and VSM. In a broader sense, however, a mission is a collection of 
data comprising also information not transmitted to the VSM, like for example target images or 
radio frequency database for the GCS radio. According to this statement, a new definition can be: 
 
Mission is a kind of folder containing all information needed to perform the assigned goals. 
 
Besides, the plans considered by STANAG 4586 (see Tab. 19) are not fully exhaustive of all the 
possible operative conditions and needs of an advanced UAS. A more complete and general set of 
plans with respect to the STANAG 4586 is reported below: 
 
 
 
Figure 118. Mission Elements 
 
 
With respect to STANAG 4585 concept, Taxi and Airframe plans have been treated as independent 
items, while the following plans have been added: MSZ, Targets, COMM, Handover, Configuration 
parameter and weather.  
The number of considered items provides an idea of the mission planning complexity for an UAS 
with respect to a manned aircraft, due to the human-machine physical separation and the greater 
Level of Automation. As the LOA increases, in fact, nevertheless the system replaces the human in 
the execution of several tasks, the relevance of planning phase before the flight increases since the 
system shall be “instructed” about the mission targets, the way to reach them and relative 
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constraints. Realizing a detailed mission plan, in particular, permits to exploit as much as possible 
the UAS capabilities and reduces the operative risks. This is particularly true for vehicles that can 
not be guided in semiautomatic or manual way. The issues can be further complicated if multiple 
UAV control is considered, but in our work the discussion has been limited to a single UAV. In the 
following sections, each plan is analyzed more in detail. 
 
9.1.2 Route Plan 
It is analogous to the STANAG 4586 concept, without the part relative to the taxi or the automatic 
vehicle actions. At difference of an airliner that has a transit mission from a departure airport to a 
destination one, for an UAS the routes profile is more complex. 
 
 
 
Figure 119. Classic Airliner Mission Profile [71] 
 
 
Considering the assigned goals, in fact, for an UAS two different types of route plans can be 
realized: 
• Single route that cover the whole mission from the take off to landing (in the same or 
different airports), plus one or more diversions toward alternate airports. 
• More routes that cover all possible operative situations. Usually there are ingress/egress 
routes joining the airports with the Area Of Operation, and more alternative routes inside it. 
 
 
Figure 120. UAS Route Plan Profile [17] 
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Single Route profile is used for monitoring missions on fixed targets or searching missions along a 
planned path. More Route profile, instead, is more suitable when targets/searching paths are not 
known a priori, but depend by the operative conditions. It is near mandatory, in particular, for UAS 
that does not have the capability to upload a new route to the vehicle in order to provide a minimum 
of flexibility. A variant of the Single Route profile typical of HALE UAS – but applicable in certain 
conditions also to MALEs – foresees a big loiter over the Area of Operation, on which the vehicle 
stands to monitor an area expectant an opportunity target (i.e. a not planned target) to execute a 
diversion. Sensor with a quite wide range are obviously required to implement this type of operative 
route. In particular, this is the standard profile when the UAV acts as communication repeater for 
other users. An example is reported in the figure below. 
 
 
 
Figure 121. Loitering Route Profile [72] 
 
 
Contingency Routes/WPs are included. In particular, our FMS implementation permits to realize all 
the three presented profiles. 
 
9.1.3 Mission Zones (MSZ) Plan 
Mission Zones are particular areas relevant to the UAV fly permission. In particular, the following 
items have been considered (see also section 6.4.1): 
• Area of Operation: area in which the UAV performs its operative tasks. Currently it 
coincides usually with the restricted area in which the vehicle can operate safely. 
• Corridors: safe path from the airport to the Area of Operation and vice versa. 
• No Fly Zones: zones for which is prohibited the overfly. They can be also placed inside 
Corridors or Areas of Operation. 
 
9.1.4 Emergency Plan 
Analogous to the STANAG concept. Its outputs (in terms of Contingency WPs/Routes) are 
included in the Route Plan. 
 
9.1.5 Taxi Plan 
It is relative to the ground vehicle movements during taxi before take off and after landing. It has 
been separated by the Route Plan (relative to the flight path of the UAV) due to its peculiarities, at 
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difference of STANAG 4586 that joints them. Besides automatic taxi is an advance functions, that 
could not be available on a vehicle. In this case, although there are not data exchange between 
CUCS and VSM, the operator plans however the ground path in order to have a visual reference on 
the displays during the manual execution. 
 
9.1.6 Airframe Plan 
Airframe Plan is relative to automatic actions performed by the vehicle at certain WP of Route and 
Taxi plans. It has been separated from the Route Plan, since it is an advanced function that involves 
specific planning logics. 
 
9.1.7 Payload Plan 
It is similar to the STANAG 4586 concept. It is strictly related to route and target plans. 
 
9.1.8 Target Plan 
Target Plan is made up by the list of potential targets to monitor during the mission. This plan shall 
be always included in monitoring mission, also if there is not a payload plan. In particular the 
following type of targets have been basically considered: 
• Target Point: fix identified by its coordinates (LAT, LON, ALT). 
• Target Line: broken line identified by vertex coordinates. 
• Target Area: area identified by perimeter vertex coordinates. 
 
 
 
Figure 122. Considered Types of Targets [17] 
 
 
Besides, each target is also characterized by a name, descriptive attributes and target images to 
simplify the target recognition (optionally). 
 
9.1.9 COMM Plan 
It is relative to the planning of interphone configuration, radios and relative frequencies to use in the 
current mission. Available frequencies on the SC TSD Communication page are defined here. A 
link of the available frequencies to the route plan could be considered in order to reduce the 
workload. Besides, a possible subset of the frequency DB could be also uploaded to the UAV for 
the on-board radios according to its specific implementation. 
If a new interphone configuration is required for the mission execution, it will be included in this 
plan. 
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9.1.10 Datalink Plan 
Datalink plan it is relative to the definition of the LOS and BLOS datalink parameters, like 
frequencies, code, hop pattern, channel, etc. Check about possible electromagnetic interferences on 
datalinks in the considered area is comprised. It is similar to the STANAG Datalink plan, with the 
exception that the handover is treated apart. 
 
9.1.11 Handover Plan 
Generally speaking, handover is the procedure to pass the vehicle control from an operator/station 
to an another. In particular the following types of handover (“old/new” controller) can be 
distinguished: 
• GCS/GCS (both in LOS or BLOS), 
• datalink/datalink with the same GCS, 
• operator/operator in the same GCS station, 
• operator/operator in two different operator stations of the same GCS 
• LOS datalink repeater/LOS datalink repeater with the same GCS. 
First case is the most typical in the UAS context, especially considering the passage from LOS to 
BLOS control. For long range operations, in fact, usually there is a GCS in the airport that manages 
the phases of departure and arrival for which low transmission latencies are required, while the en-
route phase is controlled by another GCS in BLOS or another station in the same GCS (usually with 
a satellite datalink). The passage of control is a critical procedure that shall be carefully planned in 
order to avoid mishaps, and it is strictly related to the datalink plan. Another possibility is to 
perform the handover between two different datalink (typically from LOS to satellite BLOS) in the 
same GCS. 
The third case is relative to operator alternation for prolonged missions in order to avoid human 
fatigue issues, and should be however taken into account in the planning. The fourth case, instead, 
can be relative to the passage from LOS to BLOS as previously exposed, or to a control handover 
from a failed operator station to a back up one in the same GCS. 
Finally, there is the handover between different datalink repeaters. Datalink repeaters are a different 
way to operate BLOS without using satellite communications. Also in this case the handovers shall 
be accurately planned. In particular, according to the system LOA, they can be performed 
automatically by the vehicle when specific planned WPs are reached. 
 
9.1.12 UAS Configuration Parameter 
Finally, there is the setting of the possible configuration parameters, very specific of each system 
and operative context. Vehicle weight and fuel definition are comprised. 
 
9.1.13 Weather Plan 
Collection of all forecast weather data pertinent to the mission. Examples can be: 
• airport air temperature and wind, 
• air temperature and wind at different altitudes, 
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• turbulence, 
• hazardous phenomenon (e.g. thunderstorms, sandstorms, volcanic ash cloud, etc.), 
• cloud covering, 
• rainfall, 
• visibility, 
• ice conditions, 
• ephemeris, 
• ionosphere perturbations (possible impact on datalink communication especially for satellite 
control). 
 
 
9.2 Mission Planners 
9.2.1 Classification 
Mission Planner is the dedicated device to perform a mission planning – that is the process with 
which a new mission is created (see Fig. 118) – or to modify a previously created mission. In the 
second case, when the modification is done during the mission execution, we speak about mission 
replan. A replan typically involves a change in the route plan plus related actions. Anti collision on-
board devices are considered apart and not in the replan category, since relative path is intended as a 
momentary deviation from the planned route and not an its permanent change. According to the 
previous considerations, the following planner types can be distinguished: 
• external, 
• embedded in a GCS, 
• on-board an UAV. 
 
9.2.2 Ground Based Planners 
External and GCS embedded planners are classified as ground based. More in detail, an external 
planner can be hosted in a fixed workstation or a laptop, and can be a part of the UAS ground 
segment (according to the STANAG 4586 UAS definition presented in section 1.1) or of a C4I. It is 
the main device to plan a mission, since the planning of a scheduled mission is usually done some 
days before its execution. In any case, also for last minute planning, it is the most suitable device 
since it has several specific tools that enable a more detailed planning with a reduced user 
workload. Also from the ergonomic standpoint it is preferable, since a workstation is usually placed 
in an office (more comfortable than a GCS), while the laptop can be used everywhere. Beside, if an 
internet connection is available, the user will be able to access a lot of information and other tools 
(e.g. Google Maps), that simplify further the planning.  
A GCS embedded planner, instead, is mainly used to import an externally generated plan and 
modify it just before or during the flight (i.e. to perform a replan). However it is usually possible 
creating a mission from zero directly in an embedded planner, also if it is not the most suitable 
interface to do it in terms of ergonomics and available tools/data. It is in fact integrated in the 
operator station displays, that have a small screen with respect to a standalone computer and require 
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a prolonged “head down” interaction. Besides, an internet connection is not usually present in a 
GCS due to security constraints. This situation is analogous to that of manned aviation, in which the 
flight is usually planned on external devices and then loaded in the FMS. The MCDU keeps the 
possibility to create a flight plan from zero, but it is a quite boring and long operation. Returning to 
the UAS context, it is also possible to have hybrid configuration in which an external planner is 
used by the user inside the GCS, but not on the vehicle/payload operator stations. 
In both cases, however, creating a complete mission results a very complex and long activity, due to 
the amount of information to process. Just to provide an example, first “Global Hawk” blocks 
required nearly nine months to plan a complete mission (2000) [41]. In particular, obtaining an 
optimum result could be difficult. At this purpose, advanced route creation algorithms can be an aid 
for the operator, producing in output a route optimized according to certain paradigms (e.g. payload 
performance, fuel consumption, datalink coverage, etc.), that respects the assigned constraints. 
These algorithms however can create only a portion of the route plan. The complexity of the 
subject, in fact, makes really difficult realizing a single algorithm that takes into account all mission 
elements, mission constraints, air rules and operator expectations of how a mission (and in 
particular a route) should be planned. Therefore in case of mission planning these algorithms are 
commanded by the operator and do not run automatically.  
The situation could be different for a mission replan – usually restricted to a mission portion – that 
can be performed both by the operator or autonomously by the system. First case is analogous to the 
initial planning presented above, while the second is quite different since it is a more complex 
function that involves also a monitoring module. Considering the OODA loop (see section 4.2 for 
more detail), autonomous ground replan function can be modeled as follow: 
 
 
 
Figure 123. Autonomous Ground Replan Functional Architecture 
 
 
“Decide” loop phase has been considered coincident with the route creation, leaving the operator 
evaluation as part of the final “Act” phase. The human remains directly in the control loop, since 
the operator keeps the responsibility of replan route approval. Human authority on automation is a 
very complex matter, especially considering operations in the civil airspace that require the plan 
sharing with the ATC. At the moment, the STANAG 4671 provides only a generic indication about 
the fact that automated mission planning calculations must not lead to unsafe conditions [19], but 
more detailed indications are needed. A proposal is reported in Fig. 123, with the human that has 
156 
 
the unique final capability to approve or not the automation proposal. In other words, an automatic 
ground replan module is implement with a “Management By Consent” logic (see section 4.2 for 
more details).  
Considering a complete ground based mission planner, it can work with different LOA – according 
to the human selection during the initial planning and manual replanning – while advanced 
autonomously advanced function requires a greater value. In particular, considering the 
Parasuraman-Sheridan and ACL scales (see sections 4.2 for more details), the following values are 
applicable for ground based planners: 
 
 
Planning Context Parasuraman Sheridan et al.  ACL 
• Initial Mission Planning 
• Manual Replanning 
1 ÷ 5 0 ÷ 2 
• Autonomous Replanning 5 3 
Table 38. LOA for Ground Based Planners 
 
 
Having a great LOA, however, makes really important adopting a HMI that keeps the operator 
inside the control loop, in order to avoid a “split” between user and system. At this purpose, there 
was a “famous” accident to a Global Hawk during taxi, due to an erroneous taxi speed of 155 kts. 
The misbehavior was mainly due to a bug in the mission planning software, but the operator failed 
in the result monitoring, not helped by the interface that presented the plan data in hexadecimal 
code [17], [41]. 
 
9.2.3 On-board Planner 
Finally there is the possibility of an on-board replan. This is an advanced function typical of UAS 
that requires a vehicle with a high LOA. In particular it is adopted to provide a quick system 
reaction in critical conditions. It can be also needed for multi-vehicle control, not considered here. 
The main difference with respect to the ground based replan is that the human approval is not 
needed: the operator in fact has usually a timeout to stop the automatism and after it the proposed 
action is executed. Considering the OODA loop, the replan model is reported in Fig. 124. The 
automation, therefore, is controlled with a “Management by Exception” logic. This raises several 
issues especially in terms of civil certification and integration in the common airspace. Considering 
the automation scales, the following values are applicable: 
• Parasuraman-Sheridan: 6, 
• ACL: 4. 
Higher LOA are still more complicated to be adopted, since they do not foresee a direct human 
control, at least to revert at lower LOA. Using “Management By Consent” logic like in ground 
replanners, instead, is not advantageous, since in the best case there are nearly the same number of 
interactions in terms of route upload/download and operator evaluation, while in the worst (i.e. the 
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operator modifies the automatism proposal) they are greater in the on-board case. This can be 
critical when a quick response is required, especially considering the latencies in BLOS 
communications.  
 
 
 
Figure 124. Autonomous On-board Replan Functional Architecture 
 
 
In the next figures, two examples are reported relative to the comparison between on-board and 
ground based replanners with a “Management By Consent” logic. 
 
 
 
Figure 125. Ground vs. On-board Replan Without Operator Modification 
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Figure 126. Ground vs. On-board Replan With Operator Modification 
 
 
9.3 General Issues on Planning Algorithms 
In the following sections general issues relative to the definition of route creation and validation 
algorithms will be discussed. These algorithms are an helpful aid for the operator in manual mission 
creation, and one of the two main modules of ground and on-board replanners (see Fig. 123, 124). 
 
9.3.1 Route Creation Algorithms 
Creating an optimum route for an UAV is not an easy task, since several parameters have to be 
considered, many time in contrast between them, with further constraints that limit the admissible 
solutions. When a route is manually created, the operator is responsible to weight the several 
aspects to obtain the global optimum, taking into account its operative experience and the specific 
mission context. Reproducing this knowledge based decision process with an algorithm is not a 
trivial issue, especially considering constraints in the computational time [17]. From the 
mathematical standpoint, this is a multi-objective optimization problem. To solve it, there are two 
possible approaches according to the desired result: 
1. Identifying a main paradigm according to which optimize the result. In case of complex 
route, its parts can be created according to different parameters (e.g. fuel consumption for 
transit phase and payload performance in the operational area). 
2. Running several algorithms that optimize the route according to different objectives, and 
then combines the result with proper weights to obtain a globally optimized final route.  
In any case, also when a main objective has been identified, there can be many secondary 
parameters to consider, in order to obtain a result similar to a manually created routes, remaining in 
the case of multi-objective optimization. A list of possible parameters is reported below [17]: 
• minimum time, 
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• minimum distance, 
• minimum vehicle turns, 
• minimum vehicle altitude variations, 
• minimum risk considering given threats to avoid (each of them characterized by a risk 
probability), 
• best range, 
• best endurance, 
• best image visualization (considering a given type of payload), 
• best data-link coverage. 
Besides, as reported above, the admissible solutions are further limited by mission constraints. At 
this purpose, it is possible to distinguish between general constraints (e.g. terrain separation) or 
constraints embedded in the objective (e.g. best range considering a given fuel quantity). A list of 
typical mission constraints is reported below [17]: 
• obstacles (terrains, threats, No Fly Zones) avoidance, 
• operating inside the assigned areas of operation and corridors, 
• altitude limitations, 
• fuel available, 
• aircraft performance, 
• datalink coverage, 
• respect of the air rules, 
• time constraints. 
Practically, to solve a multi objective optimization problem randomized search methods must be 
used – like for example simulated annealing, evolutionary or genetic algorithms – in order to avoid 
the possibility to be trapped in local minimums [17]. Cost function is constructed according to the 
assigned objectives, and it is evaluated on the samples route, properly created taking into account 
the problem constraints. Apart the 3D coordinates, each WP is characterized by other attributes, and 
therefore some rules shall be defined in order to reduced the degrees of freedom and hence the 
problem complexity (e.g. the logic with which the WP type is chosen).  
Finally, there are limits to the admissible computational time, especially for the GCS embedded and 
on-board planners due to operative needs. This constraints can be achieved for example limiting the 
maximum number of interactions in the algorithms, balancing the time with the risk to not find a 
good solution. 
 
9.3.2 Plan Validation Algorithms 
A relevant issue for all type of planners is the mission validation – in terms of goals reaching, route 
profile feasibility, constraints satisfaction, safety, etc. – critical due to the absence of a pilot on-
board. Also in manned aviation, in fact, a flight plan is checked before the mission execution, but 
for UAS this aspect is more important and a detailed analysis is often required by civil aviation 
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authority. At this purpose, route validation algorithms are included to check both manually create 
plans and autonomously ones with respect to the constraints reported above.  
 
9.3.3 Algorithm Certification 
Adoption of advanced route creation algorithms for the initial planning and in particular for the 
mission replanning raises several issues in terms of civil certification, since they are not present in 
manned aircraft FMS and therefore there is not specific rules. As reported above, in fact, the 
STANAG 4671 reports only the indication that automatic planning shall not lead the vehicle to 
unsafe conditions, but not further indications are provided. Considering the current manned aviation 
standards, there are generic requirements about mission algorithms that require deterministic results 
(i.e. running more times the algorithm with the same inputs, the outputs and the computational 
times shall be the same) and put constraints on computational time [17], [73]. Determinism, 
however, could be difficult to obtain, since many optimization functions are probabilistic. If the 
civil aviation authorities will not accept this behavior, a solution can be validating the routes with 
deterministic check algorithms before making them available for the engaging. In any case, 
dedicated and universally accepted rules shall be defined by the authorities at this purpose. 
 
 
9.4 Mission Planning Functional Design 
Starting from an existent initial design relative to an another research activity [70], a GCS 
embedded mission planner have been developed taking into account the previous considerations. 
Mission Planning has been considered a not safety critical applications, in order to obtain a more 
flexible interface being free in the use of maps and admissible software libraries to code the 
graphics. The main idea is to manage the whole mission in the planner and then exporting a subset 
of information to the safety critical guidance module of the GCS, from which the operator is able to 
provide navigation commands. The functional chain is reported below in Fig. 127: 
 
 
 
Figure 127. UAS Mission Management Functional Chain 
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More in detail the following macro functions can be performed on the planner: 
• import of an externally created mission into planner DB, 
• creation of a new mission from zero, 
• import of a mission from the planner DB and modification, 
• delete a whole mission from planner DB, 
• export of a mission to the guidance module, 
• export of a mission to an external user (e.g. a C4I or an external planner), 
• mission validation. 
The core of the planner is the database, that has been structured starting from the STANAG 4586 
mission concept for the subset exported to the guidance module, and then adding the information 
not involved in the communication between CUCS and VSM. STANAG 4671, instead, does not 
specify requirements for the mission planning design.  
Mission validation checks have been added to the planner in order to provide an immediate 
feedback of erroneous WP positions directly during the route creation and validating the final 
mission. Besides also advanced route creation algorithms have been taken into account. More 
details about the algorithms are provided in Chapter 10.  
 
 
9.5 Mission Planning GUI Design 
Mission Planner has been designed with some deviations from the common graphical layout due to 
its specific function and to the fact that TSD page can have a digital map and not a dark uniform 
color as background. The pilots have positively evaluated this design choice. Loaded map, in 
particular, are hosted in a specific folder of the computer and hence can be easily changed.  
Any mission item (e.g. waypoints) can be entered by the operator in two different ways: 
• directly on the map, 
• through the alphanumeric keyboard. 
In the first case, considering for example a route generation, the operator enters the Waypoint (the 
leg are automatically displayed for each WP couple) directly on the map defining therefore the 2D 
profile of the route. Symbol layout, in particular, is the same of the Main Display Navigation 
Format in order to increase the operator feeling with the interface, reducing the error possibility and 
the training time. When the WP entering is finished, other WP attributes (i.e. altitude, speed, arrival 
time, type, loiter attribute, etc.) are entered through an apposite sliding table. In particular from each 
table cell, it is possible to open the alphanumeric keyboard or a pop-up according to the selected 
cell. Alternatively, the entering can be directly performed on the table. Comparing the two 
solutions, the first is the most intuitive and easy for the operator, since he/she has a direct feedback 
of WP positions not only in absolute terms but also relatively to the other mission items. Besides, 
typing all information on the virtual keyboard could be a long an boring operation for the user. This 
could be a preferable solution when the coordinates are known a priori or for short new 
entering/modifications. While the operator enters items on the map, in particular, the interaction 
laws are more complicated with respect to the nominal state, as reported in the table below: 
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Type of Interaction Result 
Single click on a map free space. A new item is entered in the pushed position. 
Single click plus drug movement over a 
threshold on a map free space (threshold is used 
to discriminate a single click by a single click 
and drag movement). 
Map panning. 
Single click plus drag movement over a 
threshold on a previously entered item.  Selected item panning. 
Table 39. Interaction Laws During Manual Item Entering on Map 
 
 
 
Apart pan moving, during the manual entering the operator is also able to change the map zoom. At 
this purposes, in every day life – using smartphones, tablets or satellite navigators – an operator is 
felt to change the map zoom though a particular double touch interaction named Pinch (see the next 
picture for an example).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 128. Pinch Interaction to Change the Map Zoom 
 
 
 
First time that our TSD is used, every user tries to adopt the pinch interaction and this provides an 
idea of how touchscreen technology is diffused in few years. Using a resistive touchscreen, 
however, double click is not available, and therefore different solutions shall be adopted to vary the 
map scale , like “zoom in” and “zoom out” pushbuttons.  
Finally the operator is able to delete an item from the mission, to declutter the symbology on the 
map and to measure linear distances on map (very useful tool during the mission creation). Some 
page examples are reported below in Fig. 129. 
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Figure 129. Examples of Mission Planner Page 
 
 
The interface has been designed taking into account the conclusions of the RAFIV model (see 
section 4.5 for more details) in order to realize a good interface. In particular the following solutions 
have been adopted to guide the operator in the mission creation: 
• Several fields in alphanumeric keyboard (e.g. coordinates or time) are formatted to 
remember at the operator the correct format. 
• If an out of range value has been entered in the keyboard, the error is immediately shown to 
the operator. 
• Mandatory fields to be filled are properly colored in order to help the operator recognizing. 
• Icons in the pop-ups help the operator to recognize the several options. 
• Feedback pop-ups provide details to the user about his/her command status and failure 
conditions (e.g. details about the causes of a not passed validation check). 
An example of these solutions is reported below: 
 
 
 
Figure 130. Example of Graphical Aids for the Operator in the Mission Planner 
 
 
9.6 Navigation Format on Digital Map 
Having developed a digital map for the planning, it has been exploited to create another Navigation 
Format on the NSC TSD providing a more detailed spatial situational awareness to the operator  
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Figure 131. Example of Navigation Format on NSC TSD 
 
 
From the functional and graphic standpoints, it is analogous to the Main Display Navigation 
Format, but it provides a greater flexibility about the usable type of maps (not forced to be 
certifiable) and the easiness of interaction for the user being on TSD. In particular, it can be used as 
interface to make a quick replan during the mission, without passing from Mission Planner. Without 
it, in fact, a mission change should be performed on the mission planner page, that requires more 
interactions and does not show the aircraft position. Navigation Format on digital map, therefore, 
acts as the classical MCDU page that manages the current flight plan. This solution has been 
preferred to a more rigid modification in the guidance page, considering the greater flexibility and 
situational awareness provided by the navigation format on touch map. 
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10 ADVANCED PLANNING ALGORITHMS 
 
 
10.1 Algorithm Work Scope 
As first step to increase the Level Of Automation to an ACL of 3, a set of advanced algorithms have 
been studied about mission creation and validation. These functions form a software library from 
which it is possible to realize automatic options for manual planning or autonomous replanner 
modules. Besides they have been designed with a parametric and modular structure in order to be as 
much as possible independent by the considered UAS. This modularity permits in fact to host these 
functions both on external, GCS embedded and on-board planners. In particular, referring to ground 
(see Fig. 123) and on-board (see Fig. 124) replanners, these algorithms represent part of the 
“decision” module. More in detail, the following paradigms have been considered for the route 
creation/validation:  
• Datalink Coverage 
o Line Of Sight 
o Link Budget 
• Standard Search Patterns 
• Electro Optical / Infra Red Cameras performance 
o target line observation 
o target area observation 
• Fuel Consumption and Performances, 
• Mission Zone 
• Emergency Route in case of vehicle failure. 
Practically, these algorithms have been studied from the functional point of view, covering the 
aspects closer to the operative and HMI standpoints. Design at software level and in particular the 
definition of the optimization methods have been demanded to software team that has coded the 
functions.  
 
 
10.2 Datalink Coverage 
10.2.1 Line Of Sight 
This function provides a map of the available Line Of Sight (LOS) given the Ground Datalink 
Terminal (GDT) position. Practically it is realized intersecting the terrain model (obtained by 
DTED) with a plane at fixed altitude, and then checking the LOS for each DTED point with respect 
to the GDT position. In other words, the map shows at a given altitude which zones are terrain 
obstacle free and within the horizon line for LOS datalink communications. A complete 
representation is obtained merging a set of map created for some discrete altitudes. These maps can 
be used as an aid for route manual creation, an input for another creation algorithm or for a 
validation check. An example of the LOS check is reported below in Fig. 132. 
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Figure 132. Example of LOS check 
 
 
This function has been integrated in an external mission planner (hosted on a commercial PC) with 
a test interface in order to validate it. An example is reported below in Fig. 133, with the free zone 
in red superimposed to the cartography (South Piedmont): 
 
 
 
Figure 133. Los Map 
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In particular, the computation is performed at 360° around the GDT. This function is thought to 
create a DB relative to the mission zone, at which accessing for several purposes (e.g. during 
manual route creation or as input for another algorithms). Finally computation time can be long for 
high precision DTED (i.e. Level 2) and large considered zones, while with lowest precision DTED 
(i.e. Level 0) the computation is near real-time. Results have been checked by the comparison of the 
map provided by the free software “Radio Mobile Deluxe” that make the same computation, but 
does not permit to export the data in a usable form. An example is reported below in Fig. 134, again 
with the LOS map in red. 
 
 
 
Figure 134. Example of Radio Deluxe LOS Map 
 
 
10.2.2 Link Budget 
Starting from the LOS map, a more detailed information about the link quality is provided 
calculating the link budget for the points having the LOS with respect to the GDT. Link budget is 
the power actually received by an antenna – the Air Datalink Terminal (ADT) in our case – taking 
into account the transmitted power (by the GDT), the antenna gains and several present losses. In 
particular, it has been evaluated with the Friis’s Equation [74], [75]: 
 
 
 
 
PR = power received by the ADT [dBW or dBm] 
 
PT = power transmitted by the GDT [dBW or dBm] 
 
GT = GDT antenna gain [dBi] 
168 
 
GR = ADT antenna gain [dBi] 
 
LFPL = Free Path Losses [dB] 
 
LT = GDT (i.e. transmitter) losses due to coax, connectors, etc. [dB] 
 
LR = ADT (i.e. receiver) losses due to coax, connectors, etc. [dB] 
 
LM = losses due to transmission media [dB] 
 
Equation 2. Friis’s Equation 
 
 
 
 
d = distance (i.e. slant range) from the GDT [m] 
 
λ = wavelength [m] – λ =light speed in the vacuum [m/s] / frequency [Hz]  
 
Equation 3. Free Path Losses 
 
 
Friis’s equation parameters are given in input to the function. For details about some units of 
measure very specific of telecommunication engineering see the Appendix B.  
Practically, knowing the minimum admissible received power for the ADT (usually evaluated with 
a safety margin), with this function it is possible to determine the operative datalink range in LOS 
for a given altitude, that depends mainly by the free path losses. In fact, as the distance between 
GDT and ADT increases – being constant the other terms – the received power decreases. 
As for the previous function therefore, a completer representation is provided by the merging of 
several maps stored in a DB relative to the mission zone.  
Using the Friis’s equation involves some assumptions [74], [75]: 
1. transmitter/receiver antenna and transmission line are conjugate matched, 
2. antennas are correctly aligned and polarized, 
3. the bandwidth is narrow enough that a single value for the wavelength can be assumed, 
4. antennas are not isotropic, 
5. wavelength term is included in the free path losses (acceptable for LOS terrestrial 
communication), 
6. all carrier wave propagation is assumed to be wavelength independent, 
7. antennas are not omnidirectional, 
8. near obstacles (i.e. terrain in our case) there are further effects due to reflection, absorption 
and refraction. 
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9. no electromagnetic interferences are considered. 
First six points are usually satisfied by datalinks used for UAS. For the seventh, the antenna has 
been considered omnidirectional in order to have a single map valid in first approximation for all 
the possible antenna orientation. Besides GDT antennas are usually mounted on movable pedestals, 
and hence they can be approximated as omnidirectional. A critic point is the eighth, that makes the 
result not very precise near the transition between LOS / No LOS zones. However an UAV flies 
usually over the terrain with a significant separation, and besides the link budget is evaluated with a 
safety margin. Finally, the ninth is a forced assumption, since the evaluation of possible 
interferences requires a more complex electromagnetic compatibility analysis. In any case, the use 
of the Friis’s equation for first evaluation of datalink performance has been proven in real 
operations. Also this function has been integrated in the external mission planner, for which an 
example is reported in Fig. 135, with the link budget displayed in a grey scale. As reported in the 
example, the received power decreases from the GDT position as the distance increases. The results 
have been again compared with the “Radio Mobile Delux” outputs to validate the function. 
 
 
 
Figure 135. Link Budget 
 
 
10.2.3 Link Budget Real Time Monitoring 
In order to guarantee safe operations, Link Budget shall be always above a threshold. At this 
purpose it has been designed an on-board monitoring function that can evaluate in real time the 
ADT link budget for the estimated future vehicle position, updating the theoretical calculation 
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provided by the Friis’s equation with the current signal strength actually received by the ADT. In 
practice, the output of this function is used to raise an alert about a future lost uplink.  
More in detail, the future position is estimated after a time span (given in input to the function) from 
the function running. This estimation is performed in two different ways according to the engaged 
guidance mode: 
• navigation route mode: projection of the aircraft position along the engaged route. 
• other modes: projection of the current NED speeds for the time span. 
Possible ADT antenna masking due to aircraft maneuvers is not taken into account. This function 
has been successfully tested, with a testing devoted integration in the external planner. 
 
 
10.3 Standard Search Patterns 
Typical UAS missions are monitoring or target searching (e.g. a castaway) on an area. To perform 
these tasks, there are several standard patterns commonly used also by boats or manned aviation: 
• Step ladder: optimized path for a complete and progressive scan of an area 
• Expanding Square: optimized searching path from the last known target position. 
• Sector Scan: path that maximize the probability to quickly find a target in an area, with a not 
progressive pattern.  
Each pattern is characterized by the following geometrical characteristics: 
 
 
 
Figure 136. Standard Search Patterns 
 
 
In particular, the algorithm creates the pattern in terms of WP list, according to the received 
parameters in input. Altitude and speed are assigned equal for all WP according to the received 
inputs, while for WP type the Fly-By has been chosen (most suitable to fly path with perpendicular 
legs). From the practice standpoint, this function can be an aid during manual route creation or a 
sub-module of a more complex autonomous function. 
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10.4 EO/IR Sensor Coverage 
10.4.1 EO/IR Sensors & NIIRS scale 
Electro Optical / Infra Red cameras are the basic UAS payload for monitoring and searching 
missions, due to their flexibility, high resolution and ease of interpretation with respect to o radars 
or multispectral sensors. Considering a MALE UAS, these cameras are usually mounted in a 
gimbaled turrets in order to decouple vehicle and sensor movements (an example is reported in Fig. 
137). Looking a target with the proper camera, however, is not sufficient if a good image is not 
provided to the operator. Evaluating an image quality is not a trivial task, since it depends by many 
factors like the specific payload considered, the external environment, the looked target and the 
assigned task (i.e. what the operator wants to retrieve from the image considering the mission goals 
and the operative context). At this purpose, the “National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale” 
(NIIRS) has been created by the aerial imaging community, in order to rate an aerial image with a 
simple graduated numerical scale (from “0” to “9”) and distinguishing between several payload 
types. NIIRS has become a standard in the aerial imagery evaluation. 
 
 
 
Figure 137. Examples of EO/IR Cameras Installation and EO Image 
 
 
NIIRS level, in particular, can be associated to the Ground Resolvable Distance (GRD), that is the 
minimum object length that can be distinguished in the image (i.e. a sort of sensor resolution). More 
in detail, the NIIRS scale is reported in Tab. 40 [78]. Third and Fourth columns of Tab.40 provide 
only a subset of the available examples for each level. In particular the following terms occur many 
times relatively to the type of information obtainable by the imagery [79]: 
• Detect: the capability to find or discover the presence or existence of an item of interest, 
based on its general shape and other contextual information (e.g. a ship). 
• Distinguish between: the capability to determine that two detected objects are of different 
types or classes based on one or more distinguishing features (e.g. distinguished that the 
previously detected ship is a merchant ship). 
• Identify: the capability to name an object by type or class, based primarily on its 
configuration and detailed components, thanks to the image details (e.g. identify the 
merchant ship as belonging to the “Nemo III” class). 
 
As emerging from the previous considerations, the imagery evaluation with the NIIRS scale is a 
subjective process that could lead to different results according to the user expectations.  
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NIIRS GRD [m] Example of EO Capability Example of IR Capability 
0 / Interpretability of the imagery is precluded by very poor resolution 
Interpretability of the imagery is precluded 
by very poor resolution 
1 > 9 
Detect a medium-sized port facility 
and/or distinguish between taxi-ways and 
runways at a large airfield. 
Distinguish between runways and taxiways 
on the basis of size, configuration or 
pattern at a large airfield.  
2 4.5 ÷ 9 Detect large buildings (e.g., hospitals, factories). 
Detect individual large buildings (e.g., 
hospitals, factories) in an urban area.  
3 2.5 ÷ 4.5 
Detect trains or strings of standard 
rolling stock on railroad tracks (not 
individual cars) 
Identify individual thermally active flues 
running between the boiler hall and smoke 
stacks at a thermal power plant.  
4 1.2 ÷ 2.5 Identify, by general type, tracked or 
wheeled vehicles when in groups.  
Identify individual closed cargo hold 
hatches on large merchant ships. 
5 0.75 ÷ 1.2 Identify radar as vehicle-mounted or 
trailer-mounted.  Identify outdoor tennis courts.  
6 0.4 ÷ 0.75 Identify the spare tire on a medium-sized 
truck.  
Identify individual thermally active engine 
vents atop diesel locomotives.  
7 0.2 ÷ 0.4 Identify ports, ladders, vents on 
electronics vans.  
Identify automobiles as sedans or station 
wagons.  
8 0.1 ÷ 0.2 Identify windshield wipers on a vehicle. Identify limbs (e.g., arms, legs) on an individual.  
9 < 0.1 Identify vehicle registration numbers on 
trucks.  
Identify cargo (e.g., shovels, rakes, 
ladders) in an open-bed, light-duty truck.  
Table 40. NIIRS Scale 
 
 
10.4.2 Sensor Footprint & Pixel Density 
In order to use in practice the NIIRS scale for autonomous planning, the starting point is the 
determination of the sensor footprint, that is the ground/sea area covered by the sensor when it is 
pointed toward the Earth.  
Sensor Footprint is given by the intersection of the sensor Field Of View (FOV) corner versors with 
the ground (see Fig. 138 for an example). Sensor aiming point (also named Sensor Line Of Sight) is 
contained inside the footprint. More in detail, the footprint dimension depends by the following 
parameters: 
• sensor field of views: 
o horizontal (FOVH), 
o vertical (FOVV). 
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• sensor orientation with respect to the vehicle body axes (usually gimbaled sensors has not 
the “roll” degree of freedom): 
o azimuth, 
o elevation. 
• vehicle attitude (partially balanced by gimbaled turrets, especially for some sensor modes 
that keep constant the observed point): 
o roll, 
o pitch, 
o heading. 
• sensor distance from the ground (evaluated in term of slant range between the sensor and the 
relative aiming point), 
• terrain orography (FOV versors projection is actually interrupted by the terrain). 
 
 
Figure 138. Example of Sensor Footprint 
 
 
Sensor footprint alone, however, does not provide any information about the image quality, since no 
data about the camera resolution have been included in the computation. The adoption of a proper 
figure of merit is therefore needed. At this purpose the pixel density along the footprint has been 
chosen (expressed in px/m2), since it takes into account both camera characteristics (i.e. resolution 
in pixels) and captured image (i.e. footprint area dimensions and shape). Pixel density is in fact not 
uniformly distributed on the footprint: it is greater in the part closer to the vehicle and increasingly 
lower toward the farer side. Considering one footprint direction (e.g. the longitudinal) and a flat 
terrain (i.e. the terrain is considered a flat plane at fixed altitude with respect to the sea level without 
considering the real orography), the pixel density in a point “Q” is calculated with the following 
formulas 
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Figure 139. Pixel Density Calculation in a Point “Q” for a Single Footprint Direction [80] 
 
 
 
 
H = sensor height [m] 
 
α = angle between the unit vector from sensor to Q and the normal to the ground plane 
 
γ = pixels angular size [px-1] 
 
 
 
δ = sensor focal length [px] 
 
β = angular offset of Q with respect to the footprint LOS 
Equation 4. Pixel Density in a Point “Q” for a Single Footprint Direction [80] 
 
 
To calculated the pixel density on the footprint area, the previous equations are used to calculate 
both horizontal and vertical linear pixel densities on footprint grid points, which are then multiplied 
to obtain the areal density [80]. In particular, intermediate points for which calculating the pixel 
density are obtained dividing the footprint into grid of equal pixel size and considering their center. 
As the grid is larger, therefore, the smaller the px density and hence the image quality will be. An 
example of pixel density distribution is reported in Fig. 140, in which starting from a default 
configuration, the effects of FOV, sensor position, vehicle attitude and slant range are shown, 
changing one parameter at time keeping constant the others. Focal length has been considered 
constant in all cases. Basic configuration has been calculated with the following data: 
• FOVH = 20°, 
• FOVV = 15°. 
• sensor azimuth = 45°, 
• sensor elevation = -45°. 
• vehicle roll = 0°, 
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• vehicle pitch = 4°, 
• vehicle heading = 0°. 
• vehicle altitude = 10000 ft (3048 m). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 140. Pixel Density Examples 
 
 
The pixel density is reported in relatively terms with respect to the maximum value on footprint. In 
particular, in subfigure a) the basic configuration is presented. Subfigure b) is always relative to the 
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basic configuration and it shows the grid centers on footprint, giving an idea of the stretching. In 
subfigure c) horizontal and vertical FOV are halved, and as consequence the footprint is smaller 
with a greater pixel density. In subfigure d) the sensor elevation is reduced to -30° keeping constant 
the azimuth. The footprint is stretched, and hence the px density is lower. In subfigure e) the vehicle 
rolls of 15°, with a consequent footprint distortion and px density variation Finally, in subfigure e), 
the altitude is halved to 5000 ft keeping constant the sensor orientation at the default value (slant 
range is therefore reduced). Pixel density distribution is very similar to the basic configuration, but 
in absolute value it is increased due to the smaller footprint size. In particular the maximum value is 
the 480% with respect to the basic case. 
In order to practically use the pixel density, it is needed to correlate it with the NIIRS scale, i.e. 
determining the minimum number of pixels covering an area around an object having the relative 
GRD as characteristic dimension. This is not a trivial task, due to the great variability (e.g. detect a 
people in a desert is very different than in a wood) and subjectivity of the matter. A possible way is 
to create a database of px densities relatively to NIIRS scale, comparing the human NIIRS rating of 
sample images with the relative computed density. This operation could be performed both with 
real aerial images, or at the simulator. Accuracy of px density and NIIRS correlation is direct 
function of the database detail. A simulator example is reported below relatively to an airport tower, 
and considering the imagery displayed to the sensor operator in the relative HMI to evaluate the 
NIIRS level.  
 
 
 
Figure 141. Example for Pixel Density Evaluation 
 
 
The following values have been obtained: 
• FOVH = 1.2° 
• FOVV = 0.9° 
• sensor azimuth = -23° 
• sensor elevation = -6° 
• vehicle roll = 0° 
• vehicle pitch = 4° 
177 
 
• vehicle heading = 347° 
• vehicle altitude = 380 ft (116 m) 
• NIIRS level = 5 (GRD = 0.75 ÷ 1.2 m) 
• Minimum Px Density = 0.88 px/m2 
• Maximum Px Density = 3.92 px/m2 
• Px Density at the footprint LOS = 1.94 px/m2 
• Medium Px Density = 2.08 px/m2 
Noting that the px density is evaluated assuming a flat terrain and not the intersection with 3D 
objects. Hence the differences between the footprint size and the visualized image on display. The 
tower, in fact, is located in the closer part of the footprint having a high px density (see Fig. 142 
below), and as consequence it is visualized with a good resolution. Differences between actual and 
ideal flat footprints are annulled when the target is overflown, that is when the sensor aims 
perpendicular to the terrain. Px density remains however a good measure of the image quality, since 
the measure can be correlated to a certain imagery quality and hence to a NIIRS level.  
 
 
 
Figure 142. 3D Object Influence on Footprint 
 
 
10.5 Target Line Algorithms 
First sensor planning algorithm family is relative to the observation of a target line, for which a 
route creation algorithm and the corresponding check function have been designed. In both cases 
the pixel density has been assumed as figure of merit to rate the imagery, while an automatic sensor 
pointing mode has been considered as law for determining the sensor LOS from each route point. 
Being sensor movement decoupled from the vehicle maneuvers thanks to the gimbaled turret, in 
fact, a relationship between them shall be assumed for algorithm development. The considered 
automatic mode, in particular, aims to the optimum target line point according only to the vehicle 
position. The mode “philosophy” is to move as long as possible the sensor and not the vehicle, 
considering that frequent route changes are not needed with a gimbaled movable sensor and that 
they are not good for an integration in the civil airspace. In particular, a route created considering 
the automatic mode is also suitable for the use of a semiautomatic mode, in which the operator is 
free to vary the line scan speed decoupling it from the vehicle position. These automatic and 
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semiautomatic modes permit a reduction in the operator workload, especially considering the 
provisions of BLOS latency (that make difficult a manual sensor control) and the possibility of 
controlling vehicle and payload from a single station. An example of the aiming logic for the 
automatic mode is reported in Fig. 143.  
More in detail, the route is created having as primary objective the maximization of the pixel 
density in the assigned range in input (function of the required NIIRS level), and as secondary 
objective the minimization of aircraft route changes. Initial and final WPs are provided in input. 
Besides the following constraints have been taken into account: 
• no obstacles along the sensor LOS, 
• altitude constraints, 
• terrain avoidance with safety margins, 
• vehicle performances, 
• observation side with respect to the target line, 
• minimum distance from the line. 
 
 
 
Figure 143. Sensor Automatic Mode 
 
 
Validation function works in specular way: given a route and a target line, the good observation of 
the second respecting the assigned constraints is verified.  
 
 
10.6 Target Area Algorithm 
Second item treated relatively to the sensor performance is a route creation algorithm in order to 
cover an area with a given NIIRS level. Only rectangular areas has been considered, and hence an 
irregular target shall be included into a proper rectangle to be processed. In particular, the function 
has been conceived to monitor big areas for which it is not sufficient moving the sensor but also the 
vehicle shall change its path. Step ladder has been chosen as UAV output route, while the sensor is 
considered aimed with fixed azimuth at zero (i.e. toward the vehicle) or scanning with a given angle 
centered on azimuth zero (the mode is a function input). According to the footprint size (determined 
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in function of the required px density), the geometrical parameters of the ladder are set (see Fig. 
144), considering the footprint size for the ladder strip width determination. Ingress and egress WPs 
are provided in input by the operator.  
Besides, the following constraints have been taken into account: 
• altitude constraints, 
• terrain avoidance with safety margins, 
• vehicle performances. 
 
 
Figure 144. Step Ladder on a Target Area 
 
 
10.7 Fuel Consumption and Performances 
10.7.1 Route Validation 
A function verifying the fuel consumption to fly a route has been designed relatively both to the 
mission planning and performance FMS functions. In case of replan check, in particular, first route 
WP coincides with the current vehicle position. Together with the fuel verification, secondary 
checks about vehicle performance respect are done (e.g. assigned IAS and ALT to the WP, or ramp 
angles for climbs and descents). Climb and descent performances are provided in terms of curves 
relative to time, horizontal distance and fuel consumption to change altitude, while in cruise fuel 
flow [kg/min] and specific range [NM/kg] are reported in tables according to different parameters 
(e.g. weight, speed, etc.). This form of database is very generic and hence it can be extended to 
other vehicles simply changing the values and not the structure of the DB. Wind and air temperature 
in altitude are considered. Due to the wind effect, in particular, the fuel consumption in flight is 
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evaluated through the fuel flow (i.e. from the time to fly each leg) and not from the specific range 
(i.e. from the leg length). Finally also terrain avoidance and mission altitude limits are checked. 
More in detail, the fuel check is done leg per leg starting from the determination of the arrival time 
at each WP. An alert about a missing assigned time is also raised.  
This function has been successfully tested and integrated in the external planner, comparing the 
function results with the values obtained flying the mission at the simulator. A test example is 
reported below, with a computed fuel consumption relative error of -0.24 % with respect to the 
values obtained at the simulator. In any case, a further safety margin is provided assigning in input 
to the function an available fuel lower than the current value. 
 
 
Latitude 
[deg] 
Longitude 
[deg] Altitude [ft] IAS [kts] 
Assigned 
Time Type Loiter Time 
N 44.5 E 7.5 3000 90 / Fly Through / 
N 44.85 E 7.5 5000 / 09:16:00 Circular Loiter 5‘ 
N 44.85 E 7.85 5000 90 / Fly Through / 
N 44.5 E 7.85 3000 105 / Fly Through / 
 
Initial Time (i.e. time at WP1) = 09:05:32 
Table 41. Data for Fuel Consumption Function Validation 
 
 
10.7.2 Route Creation for Fuel Consumption 
Parallel to the route validation function, also a route creation algorithm has been produced to create 
a route between two entered WPs that optimizes the fuel consumption, according to one of two 
alternative paradigms chosen by the user: 
• best range, 
• minimum cost (see Eq. 1 for more details). 
This function is especially used to determine transit route toward/outward Areas of Operation, for 
which the fuel is the key parameter. As secondary optimization objective there is again the 
minimization of flight path changes, while the following constraints have been considered: 
• terrain avoidance with safety margins, 
• altitude limitation (mission constraints), 
• vehicle performance. 
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In particular, the algorithm works on the VNAV profile, considering the following aspects: 
• balancing between increased True Air Speed (TAS) in cruise at a new altitude (and hence 
reduced time of flight and fuel consumption considering the fuel flow) with the climb 
consumption, 
• cruise fuel flow variation according to altitude and assigned speed at the leg, 
• wind and air temperature at the different altitudes, 
• determination of the top of descent point in order to exploit as most as possible the low fuel 
consumption and high speed of the descent. 
Horizontal path is instead determined considering a direct geodetic line between initial and final 
WPs (i.e. minimum distance), at least of obstacles to avoid.  
 
 
10.8 Mission Zone Respecting 
According to the mission zone types initially assumed (see section 6.4.1), a relative validation 
function has been designed. In particular, the following checks have been considered: 
• No Fly Zones avoidance with a safety margin, 
• Areas Of Operations respecting, 
• Corridors respecting. 
 
 
10.9 Autonomous Emergency Ground Replanner 
In a successive phase, an autonomous emergency ground replanner has been designed, with a first 
integration in GCS. Replanner analyzes a series of inputs coming from the UAS health monitoring 
system, and when an alert is raised it produces a route to land as soon as possible to the nearest 
admissible airport, that in UAS typical operations coincides with the departure airport where the 
GCS is located. In particular, this function represents a practical case of human – autonomy 
integration and plays a relevant role to increase the ACL to 3. According to the previous 
explanation (see section 9.2.2), the integration has been realized with a “management by consent” 
logic, in which the system proposes an emergency route to the operator that decides if engaged it or 
not. As graphical format, the TSD Navigation Format has been chosen in order to exploit the 
advantages provided by the touchscreen flexibility for the replan and the digital map (see section 
9.6 for more details). In particular a proper alert and a pop-up notify to the operator that a new route 
has been proposed. Then on a Navigation Format the user can approve the route or reject it. Test 
pilot have been rate positively this implementation. An example of the developed interfaces is 
reported in Fig. 145. More in detail, the route is created considering the following parameters: 
• vehicle performance, 
• No Fly Zones avoidance, 
• Areas of Operations and Corridors respect, 
• terrain avoidance, 
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• link LOS budget coverage. 
 
 
 
Figure 145. Autonomous Emergency Ground Replanner HMI 
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11 FMS TESTING & INTEGRATION 
 
 
11.1 Testing & Integration Overview 
As reported in section 6.1, testing and integration activity has been performed in different 
environments at increasing level of system integration and realism (see Fig. 146). Operating on 
multiple environments is required to integrate software inside a complex system, since there are 
many aspects to verify, with each of them that is better evaluated in a certain environment and with 
particular tools. Besides, before the final flight tests it is mandatory to evaluate as much as possible 
the software on ground in order to avoid problems affecting the safety – especially considering that 
there is not a pilot on-board – and taking into account the economic factor that limits the flight 
activity. Testing and Integration has been an iterative activity, with successive tests in order to 
verify the bug fixing effectiveness and that no new problems have been added. This aspect has been 
further stressed considering that the FMS software has been realized in many releases with an 
incremental level of functions. When a new release is delivered, as first step free tests are performed 
on it, just to evaluate that it does not have macro bugs prejudicing further tests with other system 
components. If they are passes, the successive integration and validation activity is done following a 
fix procedure in order to execute established and repeatable tests. At this purpose many test 
requirements (successively converged in test procedures) have been defined for each FMS elements 
in the different environments. In the following sections, test environments peculiarities are 
analyzed. 
 
 
 
Figure 146. Testing & Integration Process 
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11.2 GCS Sub System Rig 
GCS Sub System Rig (SSR) is made up by a real GCS connected to a simulated on-board segment, 
and it is used as preliminary GCS testing environment and system simulator for operator training 
and system demonstration/validation. In particular, since the first steps the real guidance control 
libraries has been hosted in the simulator, while the avionics (i.e. VSM and navigation laws) 
software was simulated. Only in a second phase it has been re-hosted at simulator with incremental 
steps. Datalink is simulated through a latency entered in the simulation model. In Fig. 147 a 
simulator view is reported (keyboards are present for testing and simulator configuration purposes). 
 
 
 
Figure 147. GCS SSR 
 
 
GCS SSR is the first environment in which a new GCS software has been tested before passing to 
the system rig where it is integrated with other elements. More in detail, the following aspects have 
been tested/performed: 
• GCS graphics, 
• GCS internal moding: 
o NSC function moding, 
o interaction between GCS NSC and SC nodes, 
o SC internal functions, 
o SC function related only to downlink data and not to uplink commands, 
• GCS-UAV moding preliminary testing, 
• operator evaluation. 
Graphics test refers to the evaluation of each symbol requirements (see section 7.2.2 for more 
details), and more general to the issue reported in the HMI style guide (see chapter 7). Symbol 
position, color, dimensions, state change moding and interaction quality are an example of 
considered test points. 
GCS internal moding evaluation, instead, involves more issues. Starting from NSC moding, mission 
planner and navigation format on digital map have been entirely tested at the GCS SSR. This has 
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been possible since the NSC node communicates only with the SC one or an external computer (that 
simulates an external mission planner or a C4I), while the on-board segment is not directly 
involved. Therefore, testing these functions at the system rig does not provide any advantages, but 
only drawbacks due to the absence of the SSR tools. With moding evaluation, it is intended the 
checks about the functional requirements of each item and the communication protocols if involved. 
Just to provide an example: considering the mission export from the NSC planner to the SC node, it 
is checked that pushing the relative controls on the GUI the requested function of export procedure 
starting is performed, while for the communication standpoint the correct message sequence and 
content are verified. In particular, the communication protocols have been tested with the aid of 
specific tools to monitoring the Ethernet traffic (GCS and simulator are connected through Ethernet 
cables in place of real datalink): 
• decoded monitoring tool, 
• Wireshark. 
Decoded monitoring tool enable a real time monitoring of the Ethernet traffic, with the messages 
already decoded and displayed on a dedicated GUI. Being a real time device, however, the interface 
displays only the last sniffed message, and hence it is impossible monitoring a protocol sequence, 
especially considering that the time between two messages is of the order of milliseconds. A 
recording with a successive post analysis is however possible. In order to quickly execute the tests 
of protocols messages, Wireshark is preferable. It is in fact a free “packet-sniffer” tool, that enables 
the real time messages visualization and analysis on a GUI.  
 
 
 
Figure 148. Generic Example of Wireshark GUI 
 
 
At difference of Decoded Monitoring tool, Wireshark displays each messages byte per byte in 
hexadecimal form, as visible in the low part of Fig. 148. To retrieve a particular values, therefore, 
the user shall isolate the relative sequence of bytes in the captured packet referring to the message 
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structure (an example is reported in Fig. 59), and then converting it in a usable form (e.g. decimal 
for numbers of string for texts). Nevertheless this effort, Wireshark has been fundamental in the 
integration process, in particular to discover protocol bugs relative to the message content, sequence 
and scheduling  
Finally, internal GCS moding comprises also the internal SC functionalities and the functions 
relative to downlink vehicle data visualization. The seconds, in particular, have been considered as 
“GCS internal”, since they are relative to data visualization without message exchange between 
CUCS/VSM, and with the graphic moding and computations performed on ground. Examples of 
internal functions are the mission validation checks and the numeric keyboards moding, while for 
the data visualization there are the Navigation Format and the Vertical Profile. These formats in 
particular have been mainly tested at the SSR, in order to not engage the very busy system rig with 
a test not involving bilateral communications with other elements and to use the potentialities of the 
SSR. Having the full simulator at disposal provides in fact a greater flexibility in the test execution, 
making possible to quickly change the aircraft state (in terms of position, attitude, etc.), freezing the 
simulation in order to do a specific test point or to disconnect the GCS by the VSM making a 
manual setting of the downlink messages. These functionalities have been used for example in the 
Vertical Profile evaluation, for which some sample terrain profiles have been created (using the 
software “Global Mapper”) to check the format comparing the expected profile with which actually 
displayed on the Main Display, placing the vehicle in the foreseen positions and then freezing the 
simulation. An example of the sample terrain profile is reported below in Fig. 149: 
 
 
 
Figure 149. Sample Terrain Profile 
 
 
Also a preliminary evaluation of the functions involving uplink commands and relative downlink 
feedbacks (like the guidance control) has been performed at the SSR, especially in order to verify 
that the correct STANAG message sequences are scheduled in uplink when a command is given 
through the TSD or HOTAS, and the correct graphic feedback on TSD and Main Display when the 
VSM feedback are received. These tests represent a sort of threshold to discriminate if the software 
is able to be tested at system rig, where a more complete and dedicated integration is done.  
Last but not least, at the simulator the test pilots have evaluated many times the new FMS when it 
reached a good level of maturity during the development. More in detail, the evaluation has been 
provided in qualitative way about generic interface feeling, touchscreen interaction quality, 
provided functionalities, GUI moding, preliminary situational awareness and workload assessment. 
Pilot advises and requirements have been translated in software modifications that have improved 
the system, making the interface closer to the final user expectations according to the User Centered 
Design principles (see section 7.1 for more details).  
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11.3 System Rig 
System Rig is made up by a real GCS and real on-board avionics (both in terms of hardware 
components and software), connected to a basic flight simulator for the vehicle dynamics and 
relative data. This basic simulator has not the flexibility of the full GCS SSR simulator, and in 
particular the presence of real avionics make not possible adopting some features like the simulation 
freeze. CUCS and VSM, in particular, are connected with Ethernet cables in place of real datalink.  
System rig has been used for the final testing and integration of the FMS with the other system 
components, before the software installation in the real GCS.  
In this environment, in particular, the FMS guidance and configuration functions have been tested. 
Great care is put in the verification of the STANAG 4586 protocols relative to the guidance 
commands and the mission upload to the VSM, with dedicated test requirements at this purpose. 
These tests have been performed in definitive way at the system rig, since in the first integration 
steps the avionics was simulated at the SSR and therefore there could be divergence between 
simulated and real software. These software in fact have been developed side by side starting from 
the requirements, and hence the two final implementations may diverge. In any case, also when the 
real avionics software has been re-hosted at the simulator, the correct test environment for a full 
validation remains the system rig where there is also the real on-board hardware, that makes 
possible discovering problems about scheduling and synchronization between ground and on-board 
segments. The same Ethernet traffic monitoring tool of the SSR have been used. Ride along the 
integration tests, also the functions validated at the SSR have been re-tested in a more representative 
environment. 
 
 
11.4 Ground Tests 
Once the software has been cleared at the system rig, it is installed in the real system and tested with 
the vehicle on ground and the real datalink. The flight is simulated by a basic portable simulator 
connected to the vehicle. These tests are the last step before flight and aim to verify the software 
compatibility in the real system, in particular with the datalink. At this purpose test requirements 
have involved the check that any possible operator commands are actually performed by the system, 
verifying their availability by vehicle reactions at the simulator and feedbacks displayed in the 
HMI. No communication analysis is performed, since the protocols have already been validated at 
the system rig. Ground tests are usually shorter than that of system rig, since they are only a final 
check. If a problem is discovered, it is analyzed at the system rig.  
Finally, during the design phase, on the real GCS an ergonomics assessment has been performed 
with the operators about touchscreen position, in order to validate the installation in the real 
environment, especially taking into account the lighting conditions for the TSD visibility. 
 
 
11.5 Flight Tests 
Definitive system validation has been done with flight tests, in order to verify the system 
effectiveness in the real operative environment. Activity for flight test has been relative to the 
definition of the test requirements for the HMI. They are not relative to the system function 
availability (since this aspect has been already validated before flight), but to a HMI assessment in 
terms of general operator feeling, global provided workload and situational awareness.  
188 
 
Apart a global interface evaluation, a more detailed judgment for each format has been required to 
the operators in terms of: 
• visibility, 
• symbol movement fluidity (when applicable), 
• interaction quality (for TSD format), 
• interaction feedbacks (for TSD format), 
• specific situational awareness, 
• specific workload. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
An innovative Human Machine Interface for a MALE UAS Flight Management System has been 
studied in order to overcome the human factor issues of current interfaces, one of the main causes of 
UAS mishaps. At this purpose a preliminary analysis has been performed in the first four chapters. 
Main identified issues are listed below: 
• current interfaces do not directly support the execution of mission tasks, 
• operator is not guided in the execution of mission tasks, 
• interface interaction can be complex, 
• related information are split in several formats with consequent visual search workload, 
• interface interaction requires an excessive mnemonic load to the operator, 
• poor situational awareness about the VNAV profile, 
• current automation moding is very complex and therefore the interface suffers of poor 
transparency (mode awareness issue), 
• greater LOA typical of UAS is not well supported by the current interfaces, 
• automation mode changes are frequently not perceived by the operators, 
• current UAS interfaces are few standardized, with very little application of aeronautical 
know-how about HMI. 
Starting from the above considerations, the interfaces relevant to a large subset of FMS functions 
have been designed, following the STANAG 4586 as reference standard for the interoperability 
achievement (see Chapter 5) and the STANAG 4671 for the civil certification. The interoperability 
is a more and more required feature for new systems, since this capability permits potentially to 
reduce operational/logistic costs with a single GCS able to control more UAVs, and to enhance the 
mission effectiveness in terms of exploitation, dissemination and analysis of gathered data. More in 
detail, the STANAG 4586 provides system architecture, standard communication protocol messages 
and the structure to define private messages to implement the desired Level Of Interoperability. 
Although its benefits, the STANAG 4586 is still an early mature standard, and during the work 
several limitations have been found (see section 5.8). A new issue of the STANAG that takes into 
account these problems is therefore desirable.  
Considering the interoperability requirement and the possibility to easily add new formats/functions 
(i.e. upgradability characteristic), the interface shall have a structure as modular and parametric as 
possible. Put together this issue with the complexity of functions to control, the adoption of a 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) is resulted a natural choice thanks to the flexibility provided by 
software controls. In this way, concentrating more interfaces typically separated in a manned 
aircraft (e.g. MCDU, autopilot and radio panels) into a single device is also possible.  
In particular, the proposed innovative interface is characterized by the adoption of touchscreens as 
data entry devices. Touchscreens have been preferred with respect to keyboard plus a cursor control 
device taking into account the following advantages (see Chapter 6 for the detailed analysis): 
• more instinctive interaction, 
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• greater flexibility with new types of interaction, 
• additional displays available (i.e. possibility to visualize further information on demand or 
emergency backup of fundamental data), 
• main display is used only as monitoring device without interaction on it, 
• less installation issues. 
More in detail, resistive touchscreens have been selected with respect to the other available 
technologies considering the following issues (see Chapter 6 for the detailed analysis): 
• better environmental operative range in terms of temperature, humidity and contaminant 
resistance, 
• MIL-STD-1472 (HMI standard) requires a resistance to the TSD actuation, and therefore the 
unique compliant type is the resistive, 
• the resistance to actuation is a further protection from undesired commands, 
• it is cheaper with respect to other types. 
Touchscreen use in the aviation is at the beginnings, with few practical applications and many 
research activities to extend their use. In particular current standards like the MIL-STD-1472 
provide poor indication about their use, due to the limited accumulated operative experience.  
Realizing a GUI on a touchscreen, in particular, requires the adoption of specific design rules 
reported in Chapter 7. The main issues to consider are: 
• active touch area dimensions, 
• type of contact (first or last), 
• type of interaction, 
• actuation feedback, 
• possible overload of the operator visual sensory channel, 
• critical commands protection. 
In Chapter 8 the formats relative to the vehicle control functions have been presented: guidance, 
navigation format, vertical profile, communication and system configuration. Starting from the 
guidance, a complete set for an UAS comprises full automatic modes (default especially in BLOS 
operation with high latencies), semiautomatic modes (more flexible than automatic and useful 
especially when the vehicle flies following ATC instructions) and finally advanced sensor slaved 
modes in which the vehicle position is determined indirectly by the payload (very useful in area of 
operations for surveillance and monitoring tasks). Manual remote control has still considered, since 
it is not clear if a future regulation will require it or not for integration in civil airspace, at least as 
back-up/emergency mode. Studying the human-machine interface for these modes, the issue of 
mode awareness has been directly taken into account, in order to reduce the problems (and hence 
the mishaps) due to operator’s poor understanding of automation status and moding. At this purpose 
the following functional design choices have been taken: 
• number of modes at interface level has been reduced as much as possible, 
191 
 
• no automatic mode changes, 
• clear and fixed logics for altitude variation control laws (i.e. VNAV profile), 
• clear and unambiguous feedback of automation states (especially of automation commands 
for altitude variation) is provided. 
According to the previous considerations the relative GUI has been designed with the real time 
monitoring on Main Display and the virtual control panel on TSD.  
For Navigation Format and Vertical Profile (Main Display formats relative to the navigation and 
trajectory prediction FMS functions), typical format layouts derived from manned aircraft have 
been adapted to UASs, taking into account their peculiarities, especially in terms of different route 
profile and mission situational awareness. In particular, Navigation Format (relative to the LNAV) 
is configurable by the operator for some aspects like the orientation or the color, in order to be 
adaptable to different mission contexts or user preferences/expectations. An example is the 
Compass Rose orientation, preferred by test pilots in Track Up and in North Up by non rated pilot 
operators. Vertical Profile has been added to increase the situational awareness about VNAV profile 
like on airliners. Two different terrain profile generation modes have been considered according to 
the engaged guidance mode and vehicle position. In particular, an automatic switching between 
them has been foreseen in order to reduce operator workload. The user has however the possibility 
to force the selection.  
Communication and Configuration pages are finally examples of touchscreen flexibility and 
potentiality in the realization of “smart” interfaces to control complex functions, typically hosted on 
more physical interfaces/panels in manned aircraft. 
In Chapter 9 the issues relative to Mission Planning have been illustrated, beginning from the 
presentation of a complete mission concept derived from the STANAG 4586 definition. Starting 
from it, mission planner categories (i.e. external, GCS embedded and on-board) and general 
planning algorithm issues are analyzed. In particular possible architectures for GCS embedded and 
on-board replanners have been proposed according to the OODA loop. About the automation 
management for ground replanners, we have chosen a “by consent” way, considering the support 
role of the automation, the human will to have the final control authority, the need to share the new 
route with the ATC in civil airspace operations and the easiness to certificate a system with this 
strategy. Referring to the proposed architectures, the Management by Consent strategy is more 
suitable for a GCS embedded replanner rather than an on-board one, since for the latter there are 
more messages exchanged between GCS and UAV, with consequent latency in new route actuation 
and bandwidth occupation (especially in case of operator modifications and/or BLOS operations). 
According to the previous considerations, an on-board replanner becomes convenient only with 
higher Levels Of Automation, for which it provides to the vehicle the capability to react 
autonomously at a change in the mission environment/UAV status. Human presence inside the 
control loop is however considered adopting as consequence a “Management by Exception” 
strategy, in which the operator has a timeout to put a veto on the automation proposal. In any case 
there are not adequate rules at this purpose: just to provide an example the STANAG 4671 states 
only that the autonomous replanner can not take the vehicle in a dangerous condition, but it does not 
provide any suggestion about the human-automation interaction. Finally Chapter 9 is concluded 
with the presentation of the GCS embedded TSD planner design, realized in particular taking into 
account the conclusions drawn from the RAFIV model about the excessive mnemonic load and 
poor mission task direct support provided by current FMS interfaces. At this purpose proper 
solutions like prompts in the alphanumeric keyboard, pop-ups and proper color coding have been 
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adopted. From the mission creation standpoint, each element can be entered on the map with a 
successive entering of other attributes or directly typing all information in the alphanumeric 
keyboard (comprised the horizontal position in terms of Latitude and Longitude). First solution in 
particular has requested the definition of specific interaction laws to distinguish for example 
between element placing on map, element moving, map panning, pop-up opening, zoom variation, 
etc. Having studied a planner interface on map, it has been natural to create a real time monitoring 
format, that is a secondary navigation format on TSD from which a quick replanner function has 
been considered. 
In Chapter 10 the studied advanced planning algorithms are presented in detail, relatively to the 
following functional areas: datalink coverage, standard search patterns, EO/IR sensor coverage, fuel 
consumption and performances, mission zones respecting and emergency route in case of vehicle 
failures. Two macro categories of algorithms can be distinguished: route creation and route 
validation algorithms. The firsts produce a route optimized for a main objective plus possible 
secondary objectives, respecting the assigned constraints. The seconds instead validate a route with 
respect to some parameters. Route validation functions can be used to check both 
automatic/autonomously created routes for the paradigms not considered during the creation, and 
manually edited missions. Being these algorithms deterministic, they can be an aid to certificate a 
planner/replanner in which a route is created by a non-deterministic functions (not certifiable 
considering the current manned aviation rules). In any case these algorithms have been designed 
with a structure as modular and parametric as possible, and they form a sort of software library from 
which several planner modules can be created. In particular the emergency route replanner 
represents a practical case of human—autonomy interaction, for which also the HMI has been study 
considering a Management by Consent logic.  
First prototypes of the FMS studied interfaces/functions have been realized and integrated in a real 
GCS, until reaching the flight tests. Integration process has involved many tests in different 
environments at increasing level of integration and realism: GCS Sub-System Rig (coincident with 
the full flight simulator), UAS rig, ground test with the real UAS and finally the flight tests. Besides 
some planning algorithms have been integrated in an external planner for test purposes.  
Pilots are the final stakeholders of the developed functions/formats and they have been taken into 
account during the whole activity in order to create an useful and friendly interface for the users. In 
particular, they have rated the proposed interface starting from drawings and presentations in the 
first design stages, passing then to flight simulator evaluations and finally to the flights. Despite 
touchscreens are not common interfaces in manned cockpit, the pilots get used to them quickly, 
evaluating positively the proposed interface in terms of provided functions, graphical interface, 
interaction quality, obtained situational awareness and workload. In particular, the adopted solutions 
to mitigate the current interface issues have been considered as an significant aid for the user to 
control an UAV. Also the autonomous replanner – feature really specific of UAS and therefore 
alien at a first glance for a manned aircraft pilot – has been quickly accepted by them. In particular, 
pilots have provided many suggestions during the interface study, that have been included into the 
design. Examples are the guidance demand layout or the indication to balance properly software 
protection from undesired commands (i.e. confirm pushbutton and or pop-ups) with the interface 
interaction easiness and quickness.  
Although the research has been carried on focusing on UAS, the main outputs can be easily 
transferred to manned aviation. Touchscreen choice and relative GUI guidelines, in fact, are true 
also for a manned aircraft, adding specific considerations relative to light conditions (e.g. sun 
reflection on TSD), aircraft maneuvers (and hence difficult to actuate the TSD) and vibrations. At 
the same time the proposed formats can be adopted on an aircraft or at least taken as reference to 
193 
 
design a specific GUI. Also part of planning algorithms can be adopted, especially the sensor 
related functions for patrolling aircraft.  
More generally, thesis results can be applied with the same logic to the control stations of 
unmanned ground, sea surface, underwater and space vehicles.  
At the end, the results of this work can be the starting point for the following future research 
activities: 
• completion of FMS functions in the interface, 
• civil air rules integration in the Mission Planner, 
• application of future manned aviation ATM concepts (e.g. SESAR) to UAS FMS, 
• develop more complete and advanced autonomous replanner modules (especially on-board), 
• working together with the Civil Authorities to define certification rules and standards that 
cover all aspects relative to the use of touchscreen in aviation, 
• extend the use of touchscreen to control other UAS functions not related to the FMS, 
• extend the STANAG 4586 considering other UAVs to control (LOI 5) and the relative 
handover procedure/interface switching mechanisms, 
• develop advanced FMS that enable from a single station to control more vehicles or a 
vehicle plus the relative payload at the same time, 
• realize a manned MCDU with touchscreen technology taking into account the relative HMI 
issues and the future ATM concepts, 
• generalize the interoperability concept to different type of unmanned vehicles (e.g. aerial, 
ground, maritime, etc.) developing the relative Unmanned Vehicles Management interface. 
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APPENDIX A – DIGITAL TERRAIN ELEVATION DATA 
 
Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) are a standard terrain model initially developed by the US 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) – now National Geospatial-intelligence Agency 
(NGA) – for general purposes. Each DTED file is referred to a square of 1° of Longitude for 1° of 
Latitude, identified by the southwest vertex coordinates. For example the file having as reference 
coordinates E 007 and N45 refers to the square of Latitude 44° ÷ 45° and Longitude 7° ÷ 8°. Each 
square is further divided in a grid of different spacing according to the reference Latitude and the 
precision level. In particular, each hemisphere is divided in five zones, while for the precision three 
increasing levels have been defined (0, 1 ,2). For each of them, there are the following matrix 
intervals according to the MIL-PRF-89020B “Performance Specification Digital Terrain Elevation 
Data (DTED)”, 2000 [76].  
 
 
 
Figure 150. DTED Matrix Intervals [76] 
 
 
At our Latitude, for example, there is a post spacing of approximately: 
• level 0: 900 m, 
• level 1: 90 m, 
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• level 2: 30. 
DTED files are organized in a particular binary format reported in reference [76], and hence a 
proper decoder function is required to read them. A decoded DTED is a matrix having as value the 
terrain altitudes (in meters) at grid posts. Location posts, in particular, are determined by the 
intersection of the matrix rows and columns.  
Finally, less precise DTED (i.e. level 0) can be downloaded free from Internet [77].  
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APPENDIX B – FRIIS’S EQUATION UNITS OF MEASURE 
 
 
Decibel Watt - dBW 
dBW is a unit of power in DB scale referred to 1 Watt (W).  
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 5. dBW – W Conversions 
 
 
Decibel milliWatt - dBm 
dBm is a unit of power in DB scale referred to a 1 mW.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 6.dBm – dBW – W Conversions 
 
 
Isotropic decibel – dBi 
Antenna gains are usually provided with respect to an isotropic antenna, i.e. is an ideal antenna that 
beams in any direction the same power. According to this, a dBi is “normal” decibel referred to an 
isotropic antenna. 
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